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The thesis traces Soviet foreign policy toward the
Third World in general and Guinea and Somalia in particular
from the end of World War II to the present, showing how
the Soviets have attempted to use military and economic
aid to gain influence in less developed countries (LDCs)
.
It shows how LDCs normally only seek aid from the Soviet
Union if they have been rebuffed by the industrialized
West.
The Soviet Union since World War II has gained only
limited influence using military aid. They have further
drastically decreased the amount of economic aid they pro-
vide to LDCs, and have become increasingly selective with
regard to which nations receive their aid.
The thesis further analyzes the modernizing strategies
selected by Guinea and Somalia, at independence, and
examines the effects of tradition on the success of these
strategies.
The thesis concludes with an analysis of the implica-
tions of Soviet foreign policy toward Guinea and Somalia
on American policy toward Africa seeking to determine what




The spelling of some proper names and organization
names may vary throughout this thesis as original source
spellings are used in the text.
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During the past twenty- five years Africa has been the
scene of a continuing struggle between the Soviet Union
and the West for political influence. Commencing with
Egypt in 1955, this struggle has slowly spread southward
until it now encompasses significant portions of the con-
tinent. In most cases early Soviet successes were more
the result of Western foreign policy miscalculations, than
of a coherently executed Soviet strategy. When the United
States refused economic and military aid to Egypt, the
Soviets stepped in to fill the vacuum. When France cast
Guinea adrift following her vote not to join the French
Community, the Soviets again stepped in to fill the vacuum.
When Somalia found Western sources unwilling to provide
her with military assistance because of her claims on the
territory of her neighbors, the Soviets became Somalia's
primary arms supplier, and as a result acquired significant
base rights in the Horn of Africa.
Initial Soviet successes can also be attributed, in
part, to their championing of various independence (anti-
colonial) movements prior to the colonies receiving inde-
pendence. Following the colony's achievement of this goal,
Soviet success depended on the ability of the governments
of the newly independent nations to transform themselves
12

from traditional/colonial states into socialist states,
promising all citizens a better way of life. This effort
failed for a number of reasons. First, attempts to establish
socialism by modifying and updating traditional patterns
and practices proved to be founded on the incorrect premise
that traditional African culture was a traditional form of
"socialism." Second, the ideology of "African socialism"
lacked a systematic focus and was frequently adjusted to
deal with the most pressing problem, resulting in a prag-
matic, rather than an ideological approach to social change.
Third, attempts to bring about change were resisted by
various elements of each country's population resulting in
the need to utilize coercion to effect change. For the
most part the "socialist" governments did not possess
coercive power sufficient to deal with the rejectionist
elements in their society. Finally, as a result of these
weaknesses, the Soviet Union found itself committed to
ensuring the survival of these economically devastated
countries; a price the Soviet Union became unwilling and
unable to pay. When this happened the African countries
increasingly looked to the West for military aid and
assistance, economic aid and private investment sources,
thereby undermining Soviet influence in the country.
Prior to 1957 the U.S. policy toward Africa was char-
acterized by "deferring to the colonial allies" and policy
13

was based on what they--the allies--said was appropriate.
As the former colonies in Africa began to win their inde-
pendence, U.S. policy began to take on a more activist
character. This was due, in part, to the new Soviet
interest in Africa as reflected in Nikita Khruschev's 1960
"wars of national liberation" speech, and their growing
influence in newly independent Ghana and Guinea. In the
Congo dispute the U.S. supported the territorial integrity
of the Congo. In the southern African dilemma, President
Kennedy attempted to put the U.S. on the correct side of
the problem by coming out in opposition to the South Afri-
cans and the Portuguese. This activist approach did not,
however, produce any appreciable amount of consensus in
American policy toward Africa; American policy thinking
was split between those who advocated "deferring to the
colonialists" and those who advocated continued dealing
with Africa on its own terms.
Africa received little serious attention during the
Johnson Administration, however, shortly after taking office
President Nixon ordered that a study be conducted to develop
foreign policy options toward Africa. The result of the
study (which had been requested by National Security Study
Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39)) suggested five policy options
which the new administration could pursue. The options ran
the gamut from open support of white African regimes, to
14

open support for black liberation movements in Africa, to
staying out of the political fray in Africa entirely.
President Nixon opted for a policy which would maintain
public opposition to racial repression but relax political
and economic restrictions on "communication" with the white
dominated African states.
The April 1974 Portuguese coup d'etat and the subsequent
moves to give Portuguese colonies their independence de-
stroyed the basic premise of U.S. policy toward Africa --
"that the whites are here to stay." The following year saw
U.S. policy toward Africa incapable of preventing heavy
Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War.
A reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Africa took place
following the Angolan Civil War. This resulted in a sig-
nificant shift in America's African policy. This new policy
was articulated by Secretary of State Kissinger in a speech
given in Lusaka, Zambia, on 27 April 1976. In the speech
Kissinger asserted that the U.S. supported self-determination,
majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all
peoples of southern Africa.
The Carter Administration has sought to develop a more
affirmative policy toward Africa. The objective of this
policy is to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is
at peace.
The objective of the research for this thesis has been
to attempt to determine the similarities and the differences
15

between the failures of Soviet foreign policy initiatives
in Guinea and Somalia, and then analyze what influence
Soviet policy has had on U.S. policy toward Africa as a
whole and Guinea and Somalia in particular.
The following hypotheses have been examined:
a. Soviet influence in Africa is dependent on the
willingness of the Soviet Union to supply the lesser
developed African nations with military aid.
b. African nations will become solely or predominantly
reliant on the Soviet Union only in the event of Western
unwillingness or failure to provide the desired military and
economic aid.
c. Relations between the Soviet Union and her African
clients will begin to deteriorate when: African demands
for more and better military equipment exceed the level
which the Soviet Union is willing to supply; or the Soviet
Union attempts to exercise greater control over the deploy-
ment and use of Soviet-supplied military equipment than
the African nations are willing to accept.
d. The Soviet Union is unable and unwilling to provide
sufficient economic aid and assistance to ensure the agri-
cultural and industrial development of African nations.
Chapter Two is an analysis of Soviet foreign policy
goals toward the Third World in general and Guinea and
Somalia in particular. In addition, the chapter also ana-




Chapter Three compares the traditional cultures of
Guinea and Somalia, and analyzes the development strategy
chosen by each nation at independence. This analysis
further examines the impact of the traditional culture on
modernization efforts, and how this effects each nation's
world view.
Chapter Four analyzes the success and failure of
Soviet military aid in Guinea and Somalia.
Chapter Five reviews and analyzes the Soviet use of
economic and technical aid as a tool of foreign policy in
Guinea and Somalia.
Finally, Chapter Six analyzes the effects which Soviet
African policy has had on U.S. African policy during the




II. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
A. THE CONFLICTING DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
A significant amount of research has been conducted
by numerous non-Soviet political observers in an attempt
to acquire an overall understanding of Soviet foreign
policy. Nor surprisingly this has resulted in a wide range
of different interpretations. The Soviet Union has been
variously referred to as "the Great Beast," "the Mellow
Tiger," or "the Neurotic Bear." Much of the current anal-
ysis of Soviet foreign policy has been influenced by the
individual analyst's evaluation of whether Soviet foreign
policy action is primarily influenced by internal variables,
external variables, or by an interaction between internal
and external variables.
William Welch in his book American Images of Soviet
Foreign Policy undertakes the task of evaluating these
three different views of the determinants of Soviet foreign
policy as seen in foreign policy literature at the beginning
of the last decade. In his evaluation he attempts to re-
flect the American academic community's thinking on Soviet
foreign policy since the conclusion of World War II. His
underlying purpose is to evaluate the models used by American
academics and policy-makers to analyze Soviet foreign policy
behavior. Throughout the past decade the three basic
18

positions outlined by Welch have remained basically unchanged
A brief review of the Welch typologies will set the stage
for subsequent analysis of current Soviet foreign policy
toward Africa in general and Guinea and Somalia in particular,
B. THE ULTRA HARD IMAGE- -THE GREAT BEAST
This image asserts Soviet foreign policy is determined
by internal variables. It is reflected in the writings of
analysts such as Elliott R. Goodman, Robert Strausz-Hupe
,
and Bertram D. Wolfe.
Goodman argues in his book The Soviet Design for a World
State that
...the Soviets have today and have had from the beginning
a world state as the goal of their conduct;... [and] that
today and since as far back as the late '20s the form
which that state assumes in their minds is that of a unit
utterly Russified or subordinate to the Russian will.
2
He further argues that the objective of Soviet external
conduct is one of near-limitless expansion, and that accom-
odating and cooperative behavior such as peaceful coexis-
tence and detente are indulged in only rarely, and then
only as "way stations" on the road to world domination.
Goodman sees Soviet conduct as almost wholly initiatory,
often military in nature, making liberal use of deception.
Conceding that Soviet conduct does change from time to time,
Goodman argues that these changes are merely changes in
tactics - -with Soviet goals remaining unchanged.
19

Robert Strausz-Hupe in Protracted Conflict argues that
the Soviets are guided by a
highly rational way of looking at the world and... [plot]
action within the world to gain this end. [To achieve
this] doctrine dictates four operational principles for
the making of strategic and tactical choices. These are
the indirect approach- -fighting the enemy through third
parties; deception and distraction; monopolizing the
initiative; and attrition, or exploiting conflicts in
the enemy's camp.
3
Bertram D. Wolfe in Communist Totalitarianism: Keys
to the Soviet System suggests how "we on the outside" can
view this "war to the death" using a counterrevolutionary
strategy:
Such a strategy would include the lifting of self-
imposed inhibitions against the use of force, the insis-
tence that treaties entered into be self -enforcing , and
the mounting of a propaganda campaign which would broad-
cast the truth that our [non-Soviet] side... is the true,
friend of the freedoms and justice for which all yearn.
The weakness of this image is that it eliminates "out
of hand" many logical arguments which can possibly justify
Soviet foreign policy decisions. Since this image sees
all Soviet policy flowing from a single Soviet drive (the
desire for limitless expansion) it therefore interprets
all Soviet foreign policy actions to be consistent with the
drive for expansion without looking for alternate explana-
tions. For example, although the Soviet desire and need
to ensure its continued access to sources of the earth's
mineral resources might be a determinant of Soviet expan-
sionist policies, the proponent of the Ultra Hard image
20

would continue to attribute Soviet policy to a "global
plan of limitless expansion." He would therefore be unable
or unwilling to see any possible link between changing
Soviet resource needs and changing Soviet foreign policy.
C. THE HARD IMAGE --THE MELLOW TIGER
This image sees Soviet foreign policy as being deter-
mined by a combination of internal and external variables.
Foreign policy is motivated by both the traditional Russian
imperialist drive and Communist ideology; however, if met
with resistance, the policies pursued are modified to adjust
to the resistance. Marshall D. Shulman and Robert C. Tucker
have developed this image in their writings.
Shulman in Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised argues
that the conduct of Soviet foreign policy is highly rational
in nature, of alternately high and low militancy. He sees
the policy as expansion-minded in its objective — the further
conversion of the world to socialism and the enhancement of
Soviet power and influence. "In pursuit of its goal it is
highly active and initiatory, though sensitive to the moves
of others and hence also, at times, reactive."
Tucker in The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in
Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change divides Soviet foreign
policy into two periods — the Stalinist period (1939-1953)
and the post-Stalin period. During the former period,
Tucker argues, Soviet external conduct aimed at territorial
21

aggrandizement and ultimately global hegemony. Stalin's
foreign policy was uncompromisingly belligerent toward the
non-Communist world- -seeing the world broken into two
irreconcilably antagonistic camps, and viewing periods of
peaceful coexistence as "mere interludes between wars."
Unlike those proponents of the Ultra-Hard image, pro-
ponents of the Hard image see Stalin's death as a major
event in the development of Soviet foreign policy. Tucker
argues that post-Stalin policy-makers have set more realis-
tic proximate goals, and in pursuit of the goals employ
less severe measures. Although the Soviets remain expansion-
minded, this expansion takes the form of influence rather
than control. Foreign policy remains active; however, the
Soviets have chosen persuasion rather than coercion to
achieve their goals. The preferred instruments to achieve
these goals are diplomacy, trade, and propaganda. Finally,
the vision of the triumph of socialism is no longer seen
as contingent on war, and ascribes the policy of peaceful
coexistence as a policy of an indefinite duration.
D. THE MIXED IMAGE- -THE NEUROTIC BEAR
This image portrays Soviet policy-makers making decisions
in response to external variables. The Soviets are viewed
as being potentially expansionist, however, primarily driven
by a desire to protect their own security. This image is
reflected in the writings of Frederick L. Shuman, Michael
Gehlen, and Louis J. Halle.
22

In The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect Shuman '
s
thesis is that the Cold War was initiated by the West,
through its invasions of Russia during the First and Second
World Wars. He therefore argues that Soviet actions in
Eastern Europe were merely responses to these prior invasions
from that direction. Shuman ' s core argument is that Soviet
Cold War conduct is limited and conditional military expan-
siveness based on fear and concern for their national
7
security. Shuman takes an historical look at military
aggression against the Russian homeland from the fourteenth
century until the present, and derives a pattern of post
invasion Russian/Soviet territorial aggrandizement following
unsuccessful aggression. In this regard he asserts
The Allied invasion of Russia in 1918 and 1919...
eventuated in the establishment of Russian sovereignty
over more extensive territories than would have passed
under Russian sovereignty had these invasions not been
launched. . .The contemporary post-World War II increments
of Soviet territory and influence . . . are once more in
gpart an aftermath of Western aggression against Russia.
To further bolster his thesis Shuman continues
For a period of eighteen years, from 1921 to 1939,
when Western military aggression against Russia was not
indulged in and not overtly threatened, there was no
Russian territorial aggrandizement at all.^
The Euro-centric character of the argument detracts
from its applicability.
Gehlen in The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods
and Motives further argues that
what distinguishes this view most sharply from [the other
two] is the belief that Soviet aggression is an occasional,
23

not a normal affair, and that it occurs not as the
expression of an inherent drive or instinctive trait
but as a reaction to what are or appear to be menacing
actions of environing states. 10
This view sees peaceful coexistence as a long term
policy of accomodation. The policy relies heavily on trade
and aid, the personal diplomacy of summitry, traditional
tactics of divide and rule, manipulation of foreign parties
and propaganda.
In The Cold War as History , Halle characterizes Soviet
behavior as being "defensive expansion." To Halle, Soviet
conduct does not aim at world domination nor even in any
meaningful sense at world communism, but rather at the more
limited goal of enlarging and strengthening Soviet defenses,
with geopolitical location and ideology playing a small role.
The differences between these three views of Soviet
foreign policy can best be isolated by comparing their
analyses of Soviet objectives, motivating forces, and modes
of policy. The Ultra Hard view sees the objective as unlim-
ited expansion, driven by an ideological lust for power,
pursued by unremitting war. The Hard view sees limited
expansion as the objective, driven in part by communist
ideology and in part by security concerns, pursued actively
and militantly but nonmilitaristically and with a marked
evolution in the moderate direction. The Mixed view sees
restricted expansion as the objective, driven by a fear for






The utility of these different approaches can be
evaluated by examining their ability to explain Soviet
policy toward Africa.
E. THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
1. The Tsarist Period
Russian interest in Africa can be traced to the 18th
century, when Czar Peter the Great dispatched two naval
vessels to Madagascar with the intent of establishing a
colony there which would be used as a "coaling station"
for Russian vessels enroute to or from India and the Far
12East. Although this effort was aborted when one of the
vessels proved unseaworthy, the desire for a strategic
Indian Ocean way station was not abandoned.
By the mid-eighteenth century Russia came to recog-
nize that support of indigenous nationalist movements within
the empires of rival powers served Russian purposes by not
only providing Russia with allies, but also fomenting unrest
for their adversaries (specifically the Ottoman Empire)
.
This policy of supporting nationalism for its disintegra-
tive effect on empires to the south of Russia, became an
integral part of Russian foreign policy during the reign
of Catherine the Great (1762-1796). Catherine encouraged
dissent among the Ottoman's Greek and Egyptian subjects --
scoring Russia's greatest successes in Egypt where in 1783-
1784 Russia's first consul in Alexandria negotiated an
25

agreement with the Mameluk Bey whereby, in exchange for
official recognition of Mameluk independence, the Russians
gained the right to quarter troops in Egypt.
In the mid-nineteenth century Russia's focus shifted
to Ethiopia. The theoretical basis for this involvement
was developed by a Russian Orthodox monk by the name of
Uspensky. Uspensky stressed that because of Ethiopia's
growing political power, its potential for leadership in
northeast Africa, and its ideal location for the dissemina-
tion of Christianity southward into Black Africa, it was a
nation to be cultivated. He saw an opportunity for the
Russian and Ethiopian Orthodox churches to reunite fusing
their apostolic succession. Uspensky asserted that in this
way Russia would not only be in charge of Ethiopia's reli-
gious affairs, but would perhaps gain influence in Ethiopian
political affairs. In addition to these "noble" aims
Russia also desired to gain a foothold in the Red Sea area
from which it could attempt to thwart Britain's ambition to
control a secure lifeline to India.
The last Czar, Nicolas II, continued a close associ-
ation with Ethiopia, and in 1895 formally received a
diplomatic delegation from Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II who
was facing a military confrontation with the Italians. The
mission, consisting primarily of military men, returned to
Ethiopia with modern weapons and the promise of diplomatic
and military cooperation. A Russian military expedition
26

arrived in Ethiopia the same year, and Menelik II in his
battle with the Italians followed the strategic advice of
a Russian officer, Captain N. S. Leontiev. Leontiev advised
Menelik II to follow the historical example set by the
Russians in their battle with Napoleon, allowing enemy forces
to penetrate well into the interior of the country and then
cutting off their sources of supply. The strategy worked,
and the Italians were defeated at Adowa by the Ethiopians
in March 1896. As the first defeat of a modern European
power by an African army, Adowa has been the source of pride
to subsequent generations of African nationalists.
The Russians showed an interest in the Afrikaner
cause during the Boer War, and a small number of Russian
military and medical personnel served with the Afrikaners
17during the hostilities. '
As the anti-British impetus in Russia's foreign
policy abated in the wake of diplomatic realignments in
Europe and the Russian defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese
War, so too did active Russian interest in Africa.
2. The Soviet Period to 1953
The new Communist leadership in the Soviet Union
saw good reason to try to exploit the growing nationalistic
and anticolonial sentiments in Africa.
The Soviets readily perceived a strategic connec-
tion between the economic well-being of the capitalist
system and the expansion of capitalist enterprises in Africa
27

which they labeled "economic parasitism." Another theme
that the Soviets exploited was the use of subject armies by
the colonists to fight their capitalist wars. In light of
their belief that Africa was vital to the economic and mili-
tary position of European capitalist nations by whom they
felt threatened, the Bolsheviks sought to foment unrest in
the European colonial empire as a means of refocusing Euro-
pean concern from the Soviet Union to the colonies. However,
the Soviets faced enormous obstacles. Aside from the great
distances involved, the Bolsheviks had no territorial base
or government establishment in Africa to serve as a staging
ground for any significant ventures. Propaganda campaigns
were hampered by the low rate of literacy and the lack of
a proletarian class in Africa. Of no less importance were
the Soviet's domestic problems and limited resources which
placed practical limitations on what could be done in an
area of secondary priority. Therefore advocacy of colonial
independence was appealing to the Soviets because it was a
costless gesture.
Another significant problem faced by the Soviet
leadership was that of redefining the Eurocentric Communist
ideology to make it applicable to the colonial/post colonial
experience. As early as 1920, at the Second Congress of the
Communist International, Lenin advanced the theory that
certain backward societies could skip the capitalist phase
of development and pass directly into the socialist phase.
28

This, of course, was possible only in those countries which
had an effective Communist organization, which was being




The only Communist Party to be formed in Africa was
the South African Communist Party (SACP) , which was founded
in 1921. Although the SACP endeavoured to develop a multi-
racial leadership, and was first among non-black groups to
protest against such government measures as the pass system
for "influx control," it was primarily perceived by South
Africans as a white party.
To achieve their goals in other parts of Africa in
the absence of a proletariat the Soviets placed their reli-
ance on the Communist parties of the European colonialists,
placing special emphasis on the Communist Party of Great
Britain (CPGB) and the French Communist Party (PCF)
.
The efforts of these European Communist Parties did
not meet with great success. The CPGB organized an active
"League Against Imperialism" but was unsuccessful in attract
ing many Africans to the organization because most African
students in England were from wealthy families which had a
vested interest in maintaining the status quo in Africa.
Further, the CPGB was reluctant to subscribe actively to
the dissolution of the British Empire.
The PCF was somewhat more successful in French West
Africa and made use of publications, study groups, "groupes
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sociales," and trade unions to propagate their ideology.
The PCF further did not advocate the formation of indigenous
Communist Parties, but supported the association of the
colony's communists with the PCF. The loyalties of the
European "comrades" were however, too often to their
metropole rather than to the world communist movement, a
fact that decidedly lessened their success in Africa.
Throughout the Second World War, Soviet support for
liberation movements in colonial areas was virtually non-
existent, except in those instances where the movement was
linked to the successful conclusion of the war. By the
end of the war, the Communists were beginning to revive
their revolutionary propaganda and set up small cells of
Communists from which to spread their influence in the
colonial areas.
The end of the Second World War found the Soviet
Union as the strongest land-power in Europe, her power ex- •
tending far westward from her prewar borders. The PCF and
Italian Communist Party were strong and anticipated early
political victory in their states, and in Africa nationalist
group activity was gaining momentum.
In September 194 7, Andrei Zhdanov delivered a major
Soviet policy pronouncement in which he reaffirmed the
orthodox Communist line, that saw the world polarized between
the capitalists led by the United States of America and the
socialist world led by the Soviet Union. Under such a
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bipolar scheme there was no place for an uncommitted position.
Genuine neutralism as a concept was inadmissible.
Although this hardened line made it more difficult
for communism to gain a following in many developing/colonial
nations, there continued to be some activity in French West
Africa under the tutelage of the PCF.
In 1946 on the initiative of the African deputies
elected to the constituent assembly in France, a conference
was convened to attempt to unite the numerous territorial
political groups and formulate a common policy for French
Black Africa. The result was the formation of the Rassemble-
ment Democratique African- -RDA.
Communist influence was evident in the RDA on at
least two levels. The first was a parlimentary alliance
established in France in 1946 between the RDA "parlementaires"
19
and the PCF. The second was the PCF's association with
the national branches of the RDA such as the Democratic
Party of Guinea (PDG) . In addition in 1952 when Sekou
Toure became the Secretary-General of the PDG he actively
recruited members from the communist-dominated General Con-
federation of Labor (CGT)
.
The RDA found the PCF to be their strongest and
most consistent ally in Paris. The PCF assisted the African
cause by supporting the extension of constitutional rights
to Africans and the elimination of the forced labor system
21
which had been prevalent in French West Africa. This
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association began to weaken in 1948 when the PCF attempted
to gain increased influence in the RDA. Further, as PCF
influence in France waned, so did the reasons for continued
contact between the PCF and RDA. The PCF also failed to
take a strong position in favor of African independence thus
further alienating the RDA. The majority of the RDA broke
with the PCF in October 1950. 22
From 1928 to 1953 Soviet policy toward the Third
World was reflected in Stalin's distrust of the so-called
"national bourgeoisie" whom he labeled as "imperialist
lackeys" and his reliance on native Communists, who had
little influence in their own countries, to be the vanguard
of the socialist revolution. This unimaginative attitude
toward the Third World allowed the underdeveloped/colonial
African countries to remain under Western influence.
3. The Khrushchev Era
With Khrushchev's consolidation of power Soviet
doctrinal formations concerning the Third World underwent
significant evolution. At the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party in 1956 he established "peaceful coexistence"
as the "general line" and basic principle of Soviet foreign
policy. He no longer saw the world polarized into two antag-
onistic camps. He asserted that peaceful coexistence between
countries with differing social systems was not only possible,
but desireable. Khrushchev did not renounce the class struggle,
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but argued that the coexistence of states with differing
social systems was a form of class struggle between capi-
talism and socialism.
Khrushchev admitted that there existed an indepen-
dent position between the socialist camp and the capitalist
camp. The new- -Khrushchevian- -formulation was to "accept
these states as truly independent, but underdeveloped and
struggling to eradicate the remnants of Western influence,
while fighting the return of imperialism under various
23guises." These neutralist nations were said to be a part
of the vast "zone of peace" which included Socialist coun-
tries, and who for various reasons were not interested in
starting a war.
This stress on peaceful competition was accompanied
by a reaffirmation of the Leninist concept of the nonrevolu-
tionary way to socialism. This did not, however, result in
the repudiation of the concept of "wars of national libera-
tion." In 1960 the Manifesto of 81 Communist and Workers'
Parties reiterated that:
Communists have always recognized the progressive,
revolutionary significance of national-liberation wars.
The peoples of the colonial countries win their indepen-
dence both through armed struggle and by nonmilitary
methods, depending on the specific conditions in the
country concerned. 24
Khrushchev also revived the concept of the "national
front" whereby Communists and non-Communists cooperated to
attain their revolutionary objectives of liberation from
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imperialism (where it still existed) and socialist trans-
formation. The Manifesto of 81 further refined the compo-
nents of a "national front" identifying them as "the working
class, peasantry, intellectuals and the petty and middle
25
urban bourgeoisie."
When it became apparent that the Soviet Union was
not gaining the influence in the Third World that it desired,
the broader concept of the "national democratic state" was
expounded. These states were defined as those which refused
to join military blocs or provide foreign military bases
on their territory; made a major influence to reduce Western
economic influence; granted democratic rights and freedoms
to progressive parties, labor unions, and other organizations
including the Communist Party; and introduced major social
change, especially agrarian reform, which is in the interest
of the people.
4. The Brezhnev Era
Khrushchev's downfall did not precipitate any vast
theoretical changes with regard to Soviet relations with the
Third World. Yet despite the basic continuity there were
minor adjustments made on three issues: coexistence, revolu-
tionary democracy, and national front.
Under Khrushchev the general form of peaceful coex-
istence was characterized by significant differences in warmth
between the Soviet Union and various developing nations.
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For example the relations between the Soviet Union and Iran,
a member of the Central Treaty Organization, were no more
than correct. Toward the end of the Khrushchev era the Soviet
government began a period of determined concilliatory dip-
lomacy toward Iran. This trend was further strengthened
in the post-Khrushchev era resulting in the conclusion of
a number of trade and aid agreements with Iran, thus signif-
icantly enlarging the concept of coexistence.
Within a number of Third World nations the Soviet
theorists were confronted with a paradox. They found the
national bourgeoisie, rather than the Communist proletariat,
developing one-party regimes and a socialist society and
economy. The problem was on occasion further complicated
by official and sometimes actual suppression of the Communist
parties in the Third World countries. To account for this
theoretically the Soviets developed the concept of revolu-
tionary democracies, which permitted differentiation between
such socialist regimes, ruled by national bourgeoisie who
did not adopt socialism. Revolutionary democracies were
supported because of their revolutionary and progressive
nature
.
Adoption of the concept of revolutionary democracy
required modification of the theory and practice of the
national front. Because the Communists were not directly
involved in the social transformation in revolutionary
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democracies they ran the risk of being left out when radical
social changes took place. To overcome this the concept of
"party self-effacement" was proposed whereby the Communist
party in a revolutionary democracy either remained inactive
(even to the point of disbanding) or allowed its members to
participate in the government apparatus on an individual
basis, in the hope that ultimate Communist goals could be
attained at some future date.
A theoretical formulation which although not new was
forcefully reiterated in 1968 was dubbed the "Brezhnev
Doctrine." In this Doctrine the Soviet leadership "reaffirmed
its [Soviet] right and obligation to interfere in the affairs
of a fellow Communist country whenever in its view the in-
J (L
terests of socialism were being threatened." To date there
are no African countries which have achieved such a degree
of socialist development as to fall under the umbrella of
27the Brezhnev Doctrine.
F. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THEORY
The Soviet Union was presented with the opportunity to
put theory into practice in the mid-1950s and early 1960s
when the British, French, and Belgian colonial empires
began to dissolve into independent nations. Until the late
1950s the Soviets pursued what has been called a "defensive"
option in their affairs with the newly emerging nations.
Perceiving the "correlation of forces" to favor the United
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States and its allies, the Soviets sought cooperation with
former colonies as a means of buttressing the Soviet Union's
2 8position against any possible Western onslaught. This
approach was characterized by the Soviets working through
their Eastern European allies to gain entrance into those
countries which had been "cast adrift" by the West. As a
result, the Soviet Union gained considerable influence in
nations such as Egypt and Guinea.
Following the Soviet's successful launch of both an
intercontinental ballistic missile and an artificial earth
satellite toward the end of 1957, the Soviet policy-makers
perceived that there had been a dramatic shift in the
"correlation of forces" and that a condition of mutual de-
terrence existed between the East and the West in military
terms. In light of this development Moscow adopted a more
"forward" strategy. To accomplish this it attempted to
encourage the newly independent states to "consolidate their
political independence by embarking on the 'socialist path
29
to development'." This approach cited the Soviet Union's
achievements as evidence that socialism was the wave of the
future, and offered economic aid to those who followed the
socialist course. The Soviets also "[capitalized] on the
survival of resentments going back to the colonial era, on
frictions between governments of developing nations and for-





After experiencing embarrassing setbacks in the Congo
in 1960 and Guinea in 1961, Moscow reappraised its view of
the newly emerging nations and concluded that it had been
wrong to assume that the "crumbling of the colonial empire"
was the herald of an imminent swing of these states into the
Communist orbit. Having thus decided Moscow began to attempt
to distinguish between countries where genuine revolutionary
potential existed and those where it did not, and to devote
its energies to the former.
African states in general dominated the favored group
and the Soviets focused the majority of their attention on
31the "Casablanca Group" established in January 1961. A
second political grouping of African nations, "the Monrovia
Group", which was formed in May 1961 was viewed by the Soviets
as too moderate politically to warrant their support. Over
the next two years, African nations continued their search
for a more satisfactory supranational grouping of African
states. This search culminated in the establishment of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 28 May 1963. Both
the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group were incorpo-
rated into the OAU.
Within the OAU the Casablanca Group gradually lost
cohesiveness . The disintegration was occasioned first, by
Morocco distinguishing itself from the other members of the
"Group" by giving vent to its basic conservatism; second,
by Guinea's falling out with the Soviets over what Sekou
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Toure regarded as their attempts to push his regime toward
extremist policies, even to the extent of replacing Toure
himself; and finally, by the fact that within the OAU the
"radical Casablanca Group" lost most of the internal battles
to the larger "moderate Monrovia Group."
During this period the Soviets were faced with the prob-
lem of how to nurture "progressive" trends so as to realize
their ultimate revolutionary potential. To accomplish this
the Soviet Union decided to encourage indigenous Marxist-
Leninists to work with the "revolutionary democrats" in an
effort to "educate" the latter to embrace "scientific
socialism," and therefore lead to a corresponding reshaping
32
of their policies and societies. Further, Moscow deemed
that the USSR could reinforce these "educational" efforts
by efforts of its own such as providing political training
and extending economic aid to enterprises in the state sector
The June 1965 coup d'etat in Algeria which deposed
Ahmed Ben Bella, the January 1966 coup in Nigeria, and the
February 1966 overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana
and the November 1968 coup d'etat in Mali were severe blows
to the Soviets and prompted a fundamental reexamination of
Moscow's policy toward the Third World in general. The re-
examination reached two key conclusions:
(1) The 'revolutionary democratic' leaders in the
Third World suffered from such monumental faults that
they would probably never effect a transition to
'genuine socialism'. (2) The Third World offered
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no promise of great revolutionary advances in the
discernable future, for 'reactionary' forces still
retained an upper hand over 'progressive' forces
everywhere. 3 3
Out of this reassessment emerged a new Soviet approach
toward the Third World. On the political plane it involved
an emphasis on states which had some inherent importance,
including geopolitical significance, to the Soviet Union.
Economic relations would no longer entail the use of economic
aid to gain influence, rather the USSR would exploit its
economic strength and seek to produce an "international
division of labor." This policy called for the Soviet Union
to supply machinery, equipment, and producer goods to Third
World nations in order to permit them to industrialize and
to provide the Soviets with finished and semi-finished goods.
This policy has resulted in the provision to Third World
countries of entire factories. In sum, this new policy
resulted in a reduction of Soviet emphasis in the Third
World, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Despite this deemphasis, the Third World remained a
focus of Soviet foreign policy. In 1968, in a speech to
the Supreme Soviet, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated,
...in its foreign policy the Soviet government has always
attached great importance to relationships with the un-
committed states... These uncommitted states as a whole
represent a great force on the international stage, a
force with which we successfully cooperate. 34
In a speech made to the Supreme Soviet a year later Gromyko
expanded on this theme when he stated, "it is natural...
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that the Soviet Union, which as a major world power has
extensive international ties, cannot adopt a passive atti-
tude toward events which might be territorially remote but
35
effect our security and the security of our friends."
Throughout the early 1970s the Soviet investment in
Sub-Saharan Africa remained relatively small, although sig-
nificant contributions were made to Somalia to insure access
to facilities in that country. With the dissolution of the
Portuguese colonial empire in the mid-1970s the Soviets
seized the opportunity, took advantage of the reluctance of
the West, and pursued a pragmatic policy from which they
garnered significant influence in Angola and Mozambique.
The Soviet intervention in Angola is illustrative of
Soviet thinking in the mid-1970s with regard to Sub-Saharan
Africa. The Soviet leadership must have been aware of the
strategic significance of Angola. First, Angola could pro-
vide the Soviet Union with port facilities for use by their
Navy. Second, there is evidence that the Soviet leadership
was aware of the potential provided by Angola's oil and
mineral reserves. Since the U.S. and the Peoples Republic
of China were supporting national liberation movements op-
posed to the Soviet supported Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) , the success of the MPLA would
provide the Soviets with an opportunity to weaken U.S. and
Chinese influence in Africa. Finally, the Soviet intervention
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provided the Soviets a geostrategic position from which to
pursue its goal of acquiring a greater voice in southern
37African affairs.
Throughout the late 1970s, much of the focus of Moscow's
foreign policy has been toward southern Africa. Areas of
particular interest have been the now resolved Rhodesian civil
war, the unresolved question of the future of Namibia, and
the racial unrest in the Republic of South Africa.
Despite this focus, the Soviets again exhibited their
ability to successfully intervene on behalf of their clients
in Africa when in 1977-1978 Soviet support and assistance
(in conjunction with the Cubans) was pivotal in the survival
of the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian
defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden . A number of factors prompted
the decision to intervene in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia was strategically located in relation to the
Suez Canal, Red Sea, and northwestern Indian Ocean, providing
the Soviet Navy access to this important area of the world.
While the military facilities lost by the Soviets in Somalia
had been valuable, the loss was not as significant to their
peacetime Indian Ocean strategy as originally thought. The
Soviets were able to shift aerial reconnaissance and other
support activities to Aden. Moreover, they could bunker
warships at least on an ad hoc basis in Mauritius and Mozam-
bique. The most significant loss would appear to have been
the loss of the long range communication facility at Berbera;
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however, Soviet planners may have thought that they would be
able to replace the loss by modifying and using the former
American communications station at Asmara, Ethiopia.
Furthermore, the loss is not necessarily irretrievable.
Since the Somali facilities probably have a good deal more
positive value to the Soviets than to the West, it is con-
ceivable that a failure of the West to provide the amount of
aid Somalia desires could result in a renewed Soviet-Somali
alliance
.
Second, since Ethiopia was not a member of the Arab
League, as was Somalia, the Soviets perceived their alliance
with Ethiopia as more secure than that with Somalia. As a
Muslim nation and a member of the Arab League, Somalia was
attracted to the Arab bloc; thus, the Soviets had to compete
for Somali loyalty against both the West and the Arabs. This
in turn gave the Somalis added leverage in their dealings
with the Soviets. Ethiopia on the other hand, having histor-
ically been a "Christian nation" struggling for "survival in
a Muslim sea" was not likely to be swayed by Arab economic
blandishments. Additionally, Ethiopia appeared to exhibit a
greater commitment to socialism than Somalia.
Third, Ethiopia, with a population almost ten times
larger than Somalia's and having far greater international
prominence, seemed a more attractive showcase for Soviet
development assistance (which as will be seen later they are





revolution succeeded in maintaining the empire's territorial
integrity. This endeavor was made all the more inviting by
the fact that Ethiopia had sufficient resources to repay at
least part of the Soviet investment, especially in the long
run, if the revolution succeeded in reestablishing stability
38in the country.
Soviet foreign policy toward Africa has, however, suf-
fered some reversals during the 1970s, most significant of
which were their expulsions from Egypt and Somalia, both
countries having been the recipients of large quantities of
Soviet military and economic aid.
Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, has remained well
down on a rank ordering of Soviet concerns throughout the
1970s. The increased Soviet activities in the continent in
the late 1970s have been the result of increased opportuni-
ties rather than a shift in policy.
G. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN AFRICA
On the practical level the motivations for Soviet policy
toward Africa are broad. Policy aims since the mid-1950s have
included a Soviet desire to undermine Western influence in
Africa; to prevent the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from
expanding its role in the continent; to gain an increased
voice in African affairs; to project itself as the chief
outside supporter of African national liberation movements
and the drives to end white minority rule; and to acquire
logistic support in Africa for Soviet naval and air forces.
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In an effort to undermine Western influence in Africa,
the Soviet African specialists have traced the origin of
underdevelopment back to the colonial period emphasizing that
the poverty in Africa is being perpetuated by "imperialist
exploitation." A 1969 article in Pravda emphasized this point
stating,
We assume that the problem of 'poor countries' origi-
nated with the colonial plunder and is being aggravated
by the policies of contemporary imperialism which continues
to plunder peoples through its neocolonialist policy. Let
us look at the. . .African. .. countries . Many of them possess
enormous natural wealth, but they remain poor because of
their being looted by imperialists and colonizers .... *>9
To Soviet policy-makers "neo-colonialism" , which they
define as the "economic dependence of newly independent states
on the imperialist powers", has two dimensions. The first
results in the economic exploitation of underdeveloped coun-
tries by the neocolonial imperialists. The second dimension
concerns the practice of "the imperialists" educating the
elite of the underdeveloped countries thereby "gaining con-
41trol of the minds of the African people."
The Soviets do not deny the obvious contrast between the
industrially developed "North" and the economically under-
developed "South", but they reject the division of rich North
and poor South because it places the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries in the same category as the "neo-
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colonialist" states they seek to discredit.
On the practical level the Soviets have attempted to
achieve this goal by providing aid and assistance to those
nations which the West has refused. Commencing with Egypt
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in 1955 and Guinea in 1958, the Soviets have supported a
number of countries in this way.
In addition to aid, the Soviets have attempted to use
propaganda to undermine the position of the West in Africa.
In both Guinea and Somalia a radio station, a printing press,
and technical schools (the curriculums of which included
political indoctrination) were included in the initial
economic assistance.
The struggle between the Soviet Union and the PRC for
influence in Africa takes place on two distinct but inter-
related levels. On the first level each seeks to "win friends
and influence people" through formal and informal political
interaction, economic aid, and military assistance. On the
more abstract level each actor attacks the other's motives
and role related to Africa.
Initial PRC interaction with Africa can be viewed in the
context of the Sino-American confrontation and as an effort
to break out of the American "political encirclement" of the
PRC. With the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the
early 1960s China's African policy became more and more di-
rected at the Soviet Union.
In the political arena the Chinese made significant efforts
in the early 1960s to gain African support for barring the
USSR from participating in the "second Bandung" conference,
scheduled for June 1965 (but later abandoned after an abortive
attempt to convene it)
.
Throughout the 1960s the PRC ran a poor second to the
Soviet Union in aid commitments to Africa. Between 1954 and
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1966, the USSR extended $US 1.9 billion in economic credits
and grants to African countries compared to $US 428 million
from the PRC. These credits and grants were extended to
sixteen countries by the Soviets compared to just eleven
countries by the Chinese. Not only were Chinese credits
smaller, but they did not finance any grandiose "flagship"
projects such as the Soviet Union did in Egypt when they
built the Aswan Dam.
The Soviet Union delivered $US 25,310 million worth of
military equipment to Less Developed Countries between 1955
44
and 1968, compared to $US 755 million from the PRC.
The Cultural Revolution in China temporarily halted
China's budding African policy, and the PRC did not return
to Africa as a major actor again until 1970. A major shift
in emphasis was then evident in China's revived African policy,
China has now become the chief Communist economic aid
donor to African countries providing aid to 29 countries com-
45pared to only 22 receiving Soviet aid. Between 1970 and
1977 China extended $US 1,882 million in aid while the Soviet
Union extended only $US 1,040 million in aid. China has
now extended her economic presence to most of Africa, while
the Soviet Union has concentrated its aid in North Africa
with only scattered commitments south of the Sahara. This
fact is well illustrated by comparing the number of "Communist
Economic Technicians" in Africa in 1978. The Soviet Union
had a total of 43,805 technicians in Africa compared to
11,420 Chinese technicians. A breakdown of the totals
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reveals that whereas the Soviet Union has 36,165 technicians
in North Africa and 7,640 in Sub-Saharan Africa, China has
only 450 technicians in North Africa, but has 10,970 in Sub-
48Saharan Africa.
Finally, China undertook two "flagship" projects in the
1970s, the Tanzania-Zambia railway and the Beledwein-Burao
road project in Somalia.
Only in respect to military aid to African nations do
Chinese activities appear limited. Between 1955 and 1978,
2,705 African military personnel were trained in China com-
49pared with 13,420 trained in the Soviet Union. Further,
in 1978 there were 6,575 Soviet and East European military
technicians in African compared to a total of 590 Chinese
military technicians. Finally, between 1967 and 1976 the
Soviet Union transferred $US 4,424 million worth of military
equipment to Africa compared to $US 142 million by China.
This disparity would be even greater if the 1978 Soviet mili-
tary aid delivery to Ethiopia is included.
Clearly China has been able to bolster her position in
Africa in the last ten years--at least in terms of establish-
ing an economic presence and winning increased formal
acceptance.
The Soviets charge the Chinese with "fanning anti-Soviet
sentiments and undermining friendly tries" between African
nations and the USSR while seeking to impose Chinese hegemony
on Africa. The Chinese countercharged the Soviets with having
three "less than noble" objectives with respect to Africa:
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first, to gain access to valuable natural resources; second,
to advance Soviet global strategic interests in an attempt
to strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis the United States
in the competition for world hegemony; and finally, to under-
mine African unity, interfering directly in the continent's
affairs, setting Africans against Africans and thereby pro-
52ducing setbacks for Africa's struggle against imperialism.
Since China's limited capacity to support African causes
in straightforward power terms will not likely increase much
in the near future, China will not constitute a very formida-
ble alternative to the Soviet Union when African nations seek
"socialist" assistance. Yet the Soviet desire to limit PRC
influence in Africa will continue to be a main Soviet foreign
policy objective.
The Soviet Union's attempts to gain a voice in African
affairs has had a checkered history. As early as 1961, Sekou
Toure felt threatened by the influence he perceived that the
Soviets exercised in Guinea. Former United States Ambassador
to Guinea, William Atwood enumerates five major mistakes that
the Soviets made in attempting to achieve this goal:
(1) they underestimated African nationalism and political
sophistication; (2) Soviet aid programs neglected basic
needs in favor of politically motivated projects; (3) Soviet
barter agreements took advantage of the Africans and ended
up antagonizing them; (4) Soviet bloc diplomats and tech-
nicians were unused to dealing with Africans, and friction
resulted; and (5) African students invited to study in
Communist countries usually came back disenchanted and
envious of their friends who went to the West. 53
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The Soviet Union experienced its first major setback in
Africa in 1960 when it came out in support of Republic of
the Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba, only to find him ousted
by President Joseph Kasavubu. Further, the United Nations
General Assembly, with major African backing, recognized a
Kasavubu delegation as the legal representative of the
Republic
.
This reversal was followed a year later by the expulsion
of the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea for allegedly being in-
volved in a plot to overthrow Sekou Toure. Reversals contin-
ued throughout the 1960s with Soviet supported governments
in Ghana, Algeria, and Mali being overthrown.
During the 1970s the Soviets have experienced their most
significant reversals in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia- -in each
case the result of the perception that the Soviet Union was
attempting to exercise more control over the internal affairs
of the respective nation than the government leadership cared
to accept.
Since the mid-1970s the Soviets have made use of Cuban
technicians and armed forces to assist in gaining an increased
voice in African affairs. Since the Soviets have been accused
of being "racists" by Africans, the Soviets have found that
utilizing "fellow Third World forces" is more acceptable to
the African nations (specifically Angola, Mozambique, and
Ethiopia) . The African alignment with Cuba further removes
some of the stigma experienced by African nations for "align-
ing their nonaligned nation openly with the Soviet Union."
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To strengthen their position in regional affairs the
Soviets have throughout the 1970s diversified their approach.
Unlike during the 1960s, the Soviets now have a strengthened,
tested and protectable military force which they have shown
a willingness and capability to use to effect the outcome of
events in Africa. This was most recently demonstrated in
1978 in Ethiopia. Another means of influence has been the
attempted portrayal of the Soviet Union as the chief outside
supporter of the drive to end white minority rule on the
African continent. This has recently taken the form of Soviet
support during the Rhodesian civil war, for the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union led by Joshua Nkomo , and the continuing
support of the Southwest African Peoples Organization in
Namibia.
The Soviet Union has also supported a number of "wars of
national liberation", such as those fought by the PAIGC in
Portuguese Guinea, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and the MPLA in
Angola.
The desire to acquire logistic and base facilities for
its naval, maritime, oceanographic, and long range reconnais-
sance air forces has been a major goal of Soviet foreign
policy toward Africa since the mid-1960s.
The Soviet leadership has come to recognize the important
relationship between foreign policy and military power.
Since Soviet analysts have long regarded the capability to
intervene militarily as a key aspect of the United States'
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ability to influence the Third World, the Soviets, with their
recently acquired "power projection" capability, are now
able to do the same. This new philosophy has promoted Soviet
interest in supporting changes in Africa which will ease its
access to facilities, and will in turn aid in the pursuit of
Soviet foreign policy objectives in and around Africa.
The first objective, defensive national concerns, involves
the imperative of protecting both the Soviet fishing and
oceanographic fleets and the Soviet shipping routes especial-
54ly the Indian Ocean route from Soviet Europe to Soviet Asia.
To achieve this the Soviets have expended considerable mili-
tary and economic aid in a number of African nations to
ensure access to port facilities in those nations to permit
resupply and repair of, not only the fishing and oceanographic
fleets, but also the Soviet's "blue water" navy which is
tasked with protecting the former. The Soviets have been
successful in acquiring significant access to facilities in
Ethiopia, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia (until 1977),
and Mauritius along with other nations.
The second objective, defensive strategic concerns, in-
volves Soviet attempts to cope with the American nuclear
deterrent in the Indian Ocean, and monitoring American,
British, and French naval movements around Africa. To
accomplish the first goal the Soviets rely on the antisub-
marine forces of their navy deployed into the Indian Ocean.
To support these forces the Soviets constructed a naval base
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in Berbera, Somalia, which included not only fleet support
facilities, but also missile storage and assembly areas, a
long range radio communication facility, and a 13000 foot
runway. To accomplish the second goal they utilize not
only their naval forces in the African area but also their
fishing, oceanographic, and merchant fleets to report sight-
ing of Western warships. They additionally utilize long
range reconnaissance aircraft flying out of Luanda, Angola,
and had used facilities in Conakry, Guinea, until mid-1978
and in Berbera, Somalia, until late 1977, to achieve this
goal.
The third objective, offensive national concerns, involves
the Soviet Navy's ability, by operating out of African ports,
to threaten Western sea lanes of communication (SLOC) such
as the South African Cape route. It further includes the
Soviet Navy's ability to menace Western hydrographic, oceano-
graphic, and satellite tracking activities, and some day
perhaps Western exploitation of marine resources around
Africa. 57
The final objective, offensive strategic concerns, in-
volves the ability of the Soviets by their "base agreements"
to deprive Western nations of military infrastructure in
Africa. To date the Soviets have achieved only short range
success in this dimension as vividly illustrated by their
expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and Somalia in 1977. Facilities
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built with Soviet aid have been made available to the United
States by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the United
States is currently negotiating with the government of Somalia
for the possible use of Soviet-built facilities in Berbera.
H. GUINEA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION
Guinea's initial association with the Soviet Union was
an alliance of necessity and was characterized by mutual
trust and respect. In the wake of the 1961 coup d'etat at-
tempt, however, an element of suspicion entered the relation-
ship. Although Guinea has maintained extensive ties with
the Soviet Union, an element of suspicion continues to permeate
the relationship. What then have been Guinea's reasons for
continued association with the Soviet Union?
First, Guinea has sought military security. With the
French departure and the West's refusal to provide that
equipment necessary to supply a national army, Guinea was
forced to seek Soviet/Communist bloc military assistance.
This has, as will be shown in a later chapter, grown into
Guinean military dependence on Soviet equipment.
Second, Guinea has sought economic and technical assistance
which would permit the rapid economic and infrastructure
development of the nation. The Soviet Union, as will be




Third, Guinea has sought the prestige of being associ-
ated with one of the "Great Powers". Not only did this
provide them with prestige in world bodies such as the UN,
but Guinean diplomatic delegations visiting the Soviet Union
and Soviet bloc nations have received highly publicized "red
carpet" treatment.
Fourth, Guinea at independence found itself to be a
nation with an insufficient number of educated and trained
citizens to govern the nation. The government therefore saw
the Soviet offers to build schools and provide scholarships
for study in the Soviet Union as a means to overcome this
serious deficiency.
Finally, although this is no longer as important as it
once was, Sekou Toure seeks Soviet recognition to legitimize
his regime's rule. At independence, Guinea received no
initial Western diplomatic recognition. As a result Toure
needed a "big power" to recognize Guinea in order to legit-
imize the Republic. With Soviet recognition came Soviet
military equipment. These acts by the Soviets broadened
Toure ' s base of support as he was now the leader of a Republic
recognized "in the international community" which possessed
an Army. Subsequent to the Soviet recognition, a number of
industrialized Western nations have recognized Guinea, there-
by providing Toure' s Guinea with true international legitimacy
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I. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN GUINEA
The Soviet Union came to Guinea's assistance in 1958-
1959, after France and the West had cast the nation adrift
at independence. This association has continued over the
past two decades, yet it would be incorrect to label Guinea
as a "Soviet pawn."
Early in the association the Soviet Union had two foreign
policy goals in Guinea which are no longer being pursued:
waging African revolution -Prom Guinea and using Guinea's
socialist development as a model for African political devel-
opment. The first had to be abandoned as has been indicated
when the Soviets realized that there was no African proletariat
to mobilize for a class revolution. The second had to be
abandoned when the Toure regime opted for a pragmatic approach
to development which included nationalization of some segments
of the economy while at the same time encouraging private
foreign investment- -not at all a socialist model of development
The Soviets, it would appear, have a number of current
foreign policy goals in Guinea. First, Guinea's strategic
location on the west coast of Africa makes it an ideal logis-
tics base for Soviet naval and reconnaissance forces to use
in support of achieving their aims to monitor Western navy
movements, and threaten Western SLOCs . The airport facilities
in Conakry, until mid-1978, were also used as a stopover
point for aircraft enroute to Cuba from the Soviet Union
and vice versa. Although the Soviets have only port use
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rights in Guinea at the present time, a continued goal of
acquiring more significant base rights is one important ele-
ment of Soviet policy toward Guinea.
Second, Guinea possesses important natural resources such
as bauxite and diamonds which the Soviet Union would like to
exploit, or barring the achievement of that goal to deny
their access to the West.
Third, Sino-Soviet competition for influence continues.
Although Soviet aid to Guinea in the past few years has been
small, it has surpassed the aid China has provided. Further,
the Soviet Union has more military and economic technicians
in Guinea than does China and more Guinean military and
academic personnel have received training in the Soviet Union
58than in China.
Finally, the Soviet Union remains determined to weaken
Western influence in Guinea. These efforts are encountering
significant obstacles, however, because in view of the de-
creasing economic aid being furnished Guinea by the Soviets,
the Guinean government is turning to France and the West for
assistance. Further, it was reportedly because of a Soviet
attempt to pressure the Toure regime into permitting the
Soviets to construct a naval facility on Tamara Island just
off the coast of Guinea, that the Soviet's landing rights at
Conakry were suspended. This was partially responsible for
the Guinean government's decision to look to someone less
insistent on reciprocation for assistance- -the West.
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J. SOMALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION
Although Somalia no longer has close relations with the
Soviet Union, their previous association was determined by
many of the same factors seen in the Guinean situation.
First, the Somali government looked to Moscow for mili-
tary assistance when the West failed to respond satisfactor-
ily to Somalia's requests for military aid to counter the
perceived "Ethiopian threat" following independence. This
dependence increased significantly following the October
1969 coup d'etat, and continued until the Soviet expulsion
in late 1977.
Second, Somalia urgently required economic and technical
assistance. As will be discussed in detail later, the Soviet
Union has not provided sufficient aid to result in any sig-
nificant development or modernization.
Third, Somalia's association with Moscow has provided
it not only international prestige, but also leverage which
could be utilized in dealings with the West.
Finally, with the successful rise to power of Siad Barre
in 1969 came a necessity to legitimize his "scientific
socialist" regime. Since the coup d'etat had supplanted the
former multiparty political system, it was important to Barre
that he have Soviet acceptance on the world scene. Since
the Soviet Union was beginning to recognize the strategic
significance of Somalia, Moscow willingly provided political
support for the new regime.
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K. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN SOMALIA
In many respects the Kremlin's goals in Somalia were
similar to those in Guinea. First, Somalia's location at
the entrance to the Red Sea and in relatively close proximity
to the West's crude oil SLOCs from the Persian Gulf made it
an ideal location for a Soviet base facility. Besides pro-
viding logistic service to the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean
Squadron, Berbera provided long range reconnaissance aircraft
with servicing facilities. Somalia further played a central
role in the Soviet plans to create a trilateral alliance of
Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Peoples Democratic Republic of
Yemen which would have given the Soviets, through their allies,
virtual control of the Bab El Mandeb Strait, thereby menacing
ship traffic utilizing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.
Second, the Soviets made their initial move into Somalia
by way of a military aid agreement which was provided to
counter a smaller Western offer. This assistance jumped dra-
matically in 1969 when Siad Barre assumed power through a
coup d'etat and espoused "scientific socialism." This goal
has at least been temporarily sidetracked as a result of the
1977 Soviet/Cuban expulsion from Somalia, and the "friendly"
overtures being made toward the West by Somalia.
Third, although the Soviet Union was successful in coun-
tering the Chinese influence in Somalia prior to the Soviet
expulsion, the Chinese now enjoy considerable influence in
Somalia. In April 1978 Somali President Barre visited China
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requesting emergency military and economic assistance. The
Chinese responded with offers of training and technical
assistance, but only delivered nominal amounts of military
59hardware to Mogadishu. China further maintained the pres-
ence of its 3000 man economic technician delegation in Somalia
and agreed to provide $US 18 million in aid to finish aban-
doned Soviet projects. As a result the Chinese are now the
most influential socialist country having diplomatic relations
with Somalia.
Finally, as in Guinea, the Soviets had hoped to foment
unrest in East Africa. The initial economic aid package
provided to Somalia included a radio station and a printing
press, both potential propaganda tools. Although the Soviets
may have made some short-term gains in this area, Eastern
Africa has been relatively peaceful during the past ten years
except for the Somali-Ethiopia war and the Eritrean movement
in Ethiopia.
In sum, the Soviet's opportunistic African foreign poli-
cy has enjoyed only short-term success in Guinea and Somalia.
The reasons for this will be analyzed more thoroughly later;
however, there are three brief observations which can be made
concerning the Soviet failures in Guinea and Somalia. First,
the Soviets continue to underestimate the strength of African
nationalism when dealing with these countries. Second, Soviet
aid repayment programs and Soviet refusals to renegotiate
them continue to antagonize the African nations. Finally,
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in most cases, Soviet aid projects continue to neglect the
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In the Epilogue to their book Africa and Africans , Paul
Bohannan and Philip Curtin assert, "African leadership today
is unanimous in wanting to 'modernize', and whatever else
is included in modernization, this means creating a society
that is capable of high per capita productivity and consump-
tion. The question is no longer whether modernization is
possible or desirable, but how to implement it. Modernization
is impossible without culture change." Yet, the modern
African leader is faced with problems which would challenge
even the most skillful leader, who has at his disposal a
highly trained and educated civil service and government.
A far from exhaustive list of problems faced by the leader
of a newly independent African nation in the late 1950s and
early 1960s included: insufficiently trained indigenous
civil service personnel, low levels of education throughout
the country, incompletely developed economics, non-existent
infrastructure to support commerce, and social fragmentation
due to a lack of national identity. Many, if not all, of




As each former colony gained independence its leader-
ship was forced to choose a plan for development. Some chose
a socialistic pattern, arguing that traditional African cul-
ture provided a ready foundation for their socialist programs
This argument in retrospect was greatly overstated. Other
leaders chose a capitalistic pattern of development, but
were hampered in achieving their goals by the lack of invest-
ment (foreign and indigenous), a skilled work force, and an
industrial base.
By and large these development efforts have failed to
achieve the positive results promised by the African leader-
ship and expected by the masses. In the domestic arena this
has led to civil unrest, excessive repression to stifle
opposition, and in some cases, coup d'etats. On the inter-
national front the result has been increased dependence on
the developed world which has brought about a form of neo-
colonialism.
The goal of this Chapter will be to compare traditional
societies, modernization techniques, and patterns of develop-
ment in the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and
the Republic of Somalia.
B. TRADITIONAL CULTURES
Guinea can be divided into four specific geographic
regions: Lower Guinea, Middle Guinea, Upper Guinea, and the
Forest Region, each region farther from the coast than its
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predecessor. In all there are approximately two dozen ethnic
groups in Guinea (each possessing its own language, traditions,
and forms of social and political organization) some as large
2
as a million people, others numbering in the thousands.
Each region, except the Forest Region, has a dominant ethnic
group.
The Soussou is the dominant group in lower Guinea, with
smaller concentrations of Baga, Coniagui, Landouman, Mayo,
and Nalou. Throughout the area the Soussou have tended to
assimilate the smaller groups, and the Soussou culture has
supplanted some of the social traditions of the other groups,
such as the matrilineal organization of the Landouman and
the land tenure system of the Nalou. These ethnic groups
are primarily cultivators, artisans, fisherman, and traders
and dominate the trade between the coast and the interior.
The majority of these ethnic groups have adopted the Islamic
religion.
The Foulah, who comprise the nation's largest ethnic
group, dominate Middle Guinea. The Foulah, originally nomads,
eventually settled and became sedentary cultivators and
stockraisers . Under the influence of sedentation and Islam,
a social hierarchy developed among the Foulah which consisted
of both hereditary nobility and hereditary slaves. The feudal
state thus created, was ruled by a quasi-religious leader
chosen every two years from the two strongest Foulah families.
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The Malinke ethnic group dominates Upper Guinea. The
Malinke are not only cultivators but also traders, and are
further known to be good soldiers. Although almost all
Malinkes are Muslim, some of their earlier religious prac-
tices, centering on a supernatural relationship with their
ancestors and the land, are known to exist today.
The largest ethnic group in the Forest Region is the
Kissi. Originally "slash and burn" farmers, they have now
become rice cultivators. Another group engaged in cultiva-
tion are the Guerze, who rely on gathering root crops and on
hunting. The ethnic groups of the Forest Region are largely
animists
.
The small community of ten to one hundred families was
traditionally the principal unit of social organization for
the majority of Guineans. Within most villages the basis
of organization was patrilineal, although in some smaller
ethnic groups, such as the Coniagui, matrilineage was the
rule. Typically an individual married outside his or her
lineage, although there were endogamous groups found through-
out Guinea.
The most highly stratified society in Guinea evolved
among the Foulahs. In this society there were four main
social strata: the territorial rulers, the free lineages
(those which had participated in the holy wars [jihad] of
the mid-18th century) , the Foulah of the bush (those who had
not participated in the jihad) who were forced to pay tribute
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to the lineage chiefs) , and serfs who were descendents of
earlier non-Foulah residents of Middle Guinea or prisoners
of war.
By way of contrast, the Somali, who constitute ninety-five
percent or more of Somalia's population, are united by lan-
guage, culture, devotion to Islam, and reputed geneological
ties to a common ancestor. All Somalis trace their ancestry
to two brothers Samaal and Saab, reputed to be members of the
Prophet Mohammed's tribe (the Quraish of Arabia). There are
six major clan-families (tribes) in Somalia, four which trace
their ancestry to Samaal and two which trace ancestry to
Saab. The four Samaal clan-families who constitute an esti-
mated seventy-five percent of the Somali population, were
historically and remain nomadic or seminomadic pastoralists
;
whereas, the Saab clan-families settled in the river regions
of southern Somalia where they have relied on a mixed economy
of cattle husbandry and cultivation.
The Samaal looked down on the Saab because of their
sedentary ways, and both groups felt themselves superior to
non-Somali groups. However, even within descent groups rela-
tions were characterized by competition and conflict. Among
the Samaal competition for pasture and water pitted clan
against clan. Although the Saab, once settled, were less
likely to engage in physical conflict, they had a history of
inter/ intra clan warfare over religious matters. As a result
of these cleavages kinship as the basis for group loyalty
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was modified by the principle of contract- -clan rights and
obligations being explicitly made the subject of treaties
or contracts between clans or lineages within a clan-family.
The Samaal and Saab evolved different social structures
as they adapted to different ecological environments. The
egalitarian and homogeneous Samaal were cautious about affil-
iating with strangers. The largest political unit was "the
clan" which had a head called soldaan (sultan) who had large-
ly honorary and ceremonial functions. The clans were
segmented into primary lineages with the political and
economic affairs of each segment managed by an informally
constituted council consisting of all adult males in the
group. Those males with the most prestige and experience
were asked to judge disputes and act as leaders in political
activity. This leadership role was not, however, ascriptive,
"he who speaks poetically, or cogently, or cleverly has
7
authority; and not he who has an ascribed authority role."
Samaal marriages are exogamous, a secular contract having
both economic and political importance in linking different
clans and lineages.
The Saab developed a heterogeneous society living within
clearly marked borders, which accorded higher or lower status
to different groups depending on their origins and occupation.
Descendents of the original clan were at the top of the social
hierarchy and members of occupational groups such as hunters,
leather dressers, and smiths were at the bottom. Most Saab
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clans were subdivided into subclans which usually had a
single head; others, however, had no clan heads and clan
affairs were conducted by leading elders. The subclan was
an important economic unit, which traditionally owned land
and water rights which the headmen distributed to individuals.
The Saab typically marry within their descent group,
frequently following the Arab practice of preferential mar-
riage with a father's brother's daughter.
C. THE COLONIAL LEGACY
Commencing with Lower Guinea in 1891, Guinea over a
9period of twenty years became a colony in French West Africa.
The French then proceeded to superimpose their colonial gov-
erning mechanisms on the traditional political structures.
Two Guineans (who after 1925 were elected by an electoral
college drawn from several categories of Africans, such as
civil servants, persons with prescribed educational qualifi-
cations, or those who had been officially cited for loyalty
to France) sat on the four man Council of Administration.
The country was divided into districts and subdivisions which
were administered by French administrative officials and
civil servants. Below the subdivisions were provinces, can-
tons, and villages each of which normally was administered
for the colonial administration by an African chief.
The primary responsibilities of the chiefs were to collect
taxes, supply the colonial authority with laborers for public
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work projects, and provide men for military service. Although
provincial and canton chiefs were paid salaries, the village
chiefs were remunerated with a share of the taxes they col-
lected. The chiefs, as agents of an alien authority, were
therefore distrusted by the Africans they were tasked to
govern.
The French colonizers did not emphasize education. The
chief task of the three to four year village school was to
teach the student personal hygiene and spoken French. Region-
al schools offered five to eight years of more formal French,
along with some vocational training. The academic content
of the instruction, which was entirely in French, was of
French origin and largely irrelevant to African life.
Following World War II the constitution of the Fourth
French Republic established a new relationship between France
and her colonies- -a French Union, which was designed to
permit France to lead the peoples of the French Union toward
democratic self-government. This included allowing African
deputies to serve in the French National Assembly. The depu-
ties were elected by the Guinean General Council (later
redesignated the Territorial Assembly) which served chiefly
a regulatory and advisory function for the French government
which possessed the exclusive right to legislate for overseas
territories
.
In June 1956 the French National Assembly passed the
"loi-cadre" for French West Africa. This provided for universal
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suffrage, and the devolution of legislative powers from the
French National Assembly to the Territorial Assemblies.
The changes approved implied that the Territorial Assembly
would eventually evolve into the new sovereign government of
Guinea, and control of the assembly became of paramount
importance in the view of all Guinean political parties.
Although political parties were for the most part formed
along ethnic lines, in 1947 the broad based socialist Parti
i
Democratique de Guinee (PDG) was formed. The PDG's early
years were marked by little strength because its diverse
ethnic and political leaders each went their own way. In
1952, however, Sekou Toure became the Secretary General of
the PDG, and began to actively recruit party members from
the labor union. In 1955, the PDG adopted a new program of
political action, which declared the peasant class to be
the party membership base, and gave both women and youth
active roles in party affairs. This organizing effort to
make the PDG representative of all Guineans was successful
and in the January 1956 election of deputies to the French
National Assembly the PDG won two of the seats and narrowly
lost the third.
The well organized PDG next turned its attention to the
Territorial Assembly elections set for March 1957. Again
the party's efforts paid handsome dividends, with the PDG
receiving over seventy-five percent of the vote and winning
fifty-seven of sixty seats (the remaining three seats being
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won by socialists who ran as independent candidates)
.
With control of the Territorial Assembly (Sekou Toure
was elected Vice President and for all practical purposes
fulfilled the role of prime minister) the PDG set about to
take control of as much of Guinea's administration as possi-
ble, including the africanization of the civil service. One
of the first actions taken was the elimination of the system
of government-appointed chiefs. Every chief was evaluated,
some were pensioned off and some (in order not to lose their
governing experience) were reassigned to other duties. The
chiefs were replaced by democratically elected village and
district councils, whose membership consisted primarily of
members of the PDG party. So effective was this effort that
as of 1 January 1958, Sekou Toure reported that the "chief
-
tancy in Guinea was inactive."
With the return to power of Charles de Gaulle in June
1958, a new draft constitution was proposed replacing the
French Union with a French Community- -an association between
France and its former colonies, in which the former would
serve as the senior partner. The organs of this new French
Community included a president (who would be the President
of France), an Executive Council (composed of the President,
the Prime Ministers of member states, and the French ministers
concerned with the community's affairs), a Senate (with mem-
bership elected indirectly by each member state in proportion
to its population), and a Court of Arbitration.
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Sekou Toure expressed opposition to the proposed consti-
tution for two reasons. First, it did not provide for a
federal structure for French West Africa, which Toure felt
was necessary to establish the French Community as a confed-
eration of equals with metropolitan France. Second, he
objected to the fact that the constitution did not provide
for a federal legislative body of supranational character
but left final control in the hands of the French National
Assembly.
Sekou Toure encouraged Guineans to vote "no" in the
referendum called to approve the proposed constitution. As
a result, on 28 September 1958, Guinea became the only member
of the French Union to vote not to adopt the new constitution.
In a fit of pique General de Gaulle, declared Guinea an
independent country- -outside the French Community- -withdrawing
all French personnel, infrastructure, and records, leaving
the Guinean Territorial Assembly to declare the independence
of the Republic of Guinea on 2 October 1958.
The Territorial Assembly constituted itself as the National
Sovereign Constituent Assembly and proceeded to draft a con-
stitution. Sekou Toure as leader of the majority party
assumed the task of forming a new government.
The conditions of the Guinean economy, infrastructure,
and social structure at independence are a damning indictment
of over half a century of French colonial rule. At indepen-
dence coffee and bananas accounted for eighty percent of
76

12Guinea's total exports. Banana cultivation was dominated
by French and Syro-Lebanese planters, using Guineans as cheap
labor. Future coffee production was also compromised by the
colonial administration which introduced a variety of coffee
susceptible to destructive disease which between 1958 and
1964 reduced the number of coffee plants from seventy million
13
to between forty and forty-five million. Other agricultur-
al crops such as palm produce, groundnuts, and pineapples
along with the raising of livestock were neglected by the
colonial administration. "Perhaps the most eloquent testi-
mony of the colonial administration's failure to promote
agricultural development is the fact that Guinea was import-
ing about 10,000 tons of rice between 1955 and 1958 in spite
of repeated claims by successive colonial governors (from
1949 onwards) that Guinea could become the rice granary of
French West Africa."
Although the mining of gold, diamonds, iron ore, and
bauxite started in the 1920s, no significant amounts were
mined until the 1950s. By 1958 Guinea was exporting small
quantities of these minerals, however, the colonial admini-
stration had made extraordinarily generous financial arrange-
ments with the multinational mining corporations which provided
Guinea with little revenue.
Indigenous industry was limited and in 1958 consisted
of the manufacture of such products as soft drinks, soap,
canned fruits, and furniture.
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Transportation facilities in 1958 were grossly inadequate
Of the few hundred kilometers of all weather roads in the
country only 187 kilometers were tarred. The 673 kilometer
railway could not function in 1958 because of the bad state
of repair of the rails. The country had one seaport at
Conakry. A subsidiary port constructed in Benty was used
to handle bananas. Finally, the country had only one airport
17located in Conakry.
In 1958 in a country with an estimated population of 2.8
million there was one large hospital in Conakry, one "second
rate hospital" and ninety-nine dispensaries managed by fifty-
1
8
eight doctors throughout the rest of the country.
Finally in 1956 it was estimated that only ten percent
of the school age population of Guinea were actually attend-
19ing school.
To overcome this colonial legacy of neglect, to prove
to General de Gaulle that they could survive on their own,
and that they would not return to the French fold hat in
hand asking to be readmitted into the French Community, was
the challenge faced by Sekou Toure and the people of the
Republic of Guinea on 2 October 1958.
Unlike the Guineans (who were exposed to one primary
colonizer) the Somalis were exposed to the ambitions of four
colonizers: the French, the British, the Ethiopians, and the
Italians. Much of this colonizing effort took the form of
acquiring "zones of influence" by making treaties with the
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Somali soldaans (sultans), agreeing to provide the Somali
clans protection from the better armed Ethiopians in exchange
for annual cash payments and/or legal rights to Somali
territory.
When the dust from the late 19th century scramble for
the Horn of Africa had settled, the French had colonized the
area around present day Djibouti, the British controlled
an area along the Gulf of Aden, and the Italians controlled
an area stretching from the Gulf of Aden south to present
day Kenya. It is British Somaliland and Italian Somalia
which eventually united to form the Republic of Somalia.
During the first phase of Italian rule (up until 1941)
,




When the initial plans of the Italians, to resettle
Italian farmers from the poorer areas of Italy to Somalia,
foundered, the Italians developed large commercial plantations
for which they sought to recruit indigenous labor. When the
recruitment efforts failed, the colonial government began
compulsory labor recruitment.
In 1922, the first facist governor was appointed to
Somalia. Under the facist regime some attempts at infra-
structure construction were made, but some of these efforts
21
such as a light railroad were destroyed during World War II.
Development in British Somaliland between World War I
and World War II was extremely limited for two reasons.
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First, the British government required the Somaliland colo-
nial administration to finance its colonial operations from
indigenous resources. Because of Somali intransigence,
direct taxation proved impossible to implement. As a result
the British administrators imposed import and export taxes
on the colony, which provided very limited funds for develop-
ment. Second, attempts to establish a comprehensive education
system failed when it met significant indigenous conservative
religious opposition.
The British military administration which controlled
both Somali colonies between 1941 and 1949 was able to make
more social and political changes than either their British
or Italian predecessors. It was during this period that the
predecessors of the post independence political parties were
formed. In the south the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was founded
in 1943. The SYC gained popularity rapidly and had gained
22
an estimated membership of 25,000 by 1946. The SYC's found-
ing members represented five of the clan-family divisions in
Somalia, and its members made strong efforts to promote the
concept of a Somali nation over clan divisions. When it
changed its name from the SYC to the Somali Youth League (SYL)
in 1947 the party had branches not only in the south, but
also in British Somaliland, and the Somali-populated sections
of Kenya and Ethiopia. The party platform included planks
calling for the unification of all Somalis over and above
clan and tribal differences, increased opportunities for
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modern education, the development of a written form of the
Somali language, and opposition to the continued colonial
fragmentation of Somalia and reimposition of Italian colonial
rule
.
A second political organization established during this
period was the Somali Digil Clan Party (HDM) . Representing
the agricultural clan-families of the region between the
Shabelle and Juba rivers, the leaders of the HDM saw their
party as a counter to the increasing dominance of the SYL
by pastoral interests. Because the HDM received considerable
financial support from the Italians, they had little objection
to the return of Italian rule.
In the north the chief political parties at this time
were the Somaliland National League (SNL) which represented
the Isaq clan-family, and the United Somali Party (USP)
which represented the Dir and northern Darod clan-families.
In November 1949 the UN General Assembly entrusted
Italian Somalia to the Italians as a UN Trust Territory, with
the specific goal of preparing it for independence before
the end of 1960. As a result of this, and because of close
UN supervision of the process, the indigenous peoples of the
Trust Territory of Somaliland (under Italian administration)
were provided the impetus to work purposefully toward indepen-
dence. In the north on the other hand, although the develop-
ment process was somewhat accelerated following World War II,
the process progressed haphazardly, and this disparity between
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the north and the south continued until independence.
In the concerted effort to prepare the Trust Territory
of Somalia for independence, allowances had to be made for
the traditional elements of society. In the first national
election held in 1956 to elect a Legislative Assembly, those
eligible voters (universal male sufferage) in the settled
areas cast secret ballots. Because this method of voting
was impractical in the nomadic regions, each nomadic clan
met in a shir (traditional clan assembly) and decided jointly
on the candidate for whom all clan votes would be cast. The
clan leaders then informed the authorities of the shir's
decision. A total of 600 shirs were held, and the total num-
ber of votes cast in the shirs far exceeded the estimated
size of the actual electorate in the nomadic areas.
As a result of this national election the SYL emerged
dominant in the Legislative Assembly. One of the first acts
of the new SYL-dominated assembly was to make it illegal for
a political party to bear the name of a clan or tribe, thus
forcing the second largest party in the Assembly (the HDM)
to change its name to the Somali Independent Constitutional
Party.
Other attempts to break with the traditions of society
prior to independence included decreasing the powers of the
traditional clan/tribe leaders by increasing the powers of
the central and local governments, outlawing the arifato
(customary law in which one clan is bound by a client
82

relationship to another) , and attempts to abolish the tradi-
25
tion of "the claim to collective property."
The first national election in British Somaliland was
held in 1958 to select members to the National Council. As
in the Trust Territory, the election was by secret ballot
in the urban areas and by shir acclamation in the rural areas.
British Somaliland received its independence on 26 June 1960,
and merged with the Trust Territory to form the independent
Republic of Somalia on 1 July 1960.
The Somalis gained independence with a mixed legacy. Although
in many ways they had received more preparation for indepen-
dence than any newly independent nation of that time, the new
government was faced with a paucity of natural resources in
the nation, large deficits in the public budget, a political
system which with independence saw a strengthening of danism
and a fragmenting of the political parties, and an unresolved
boundary dispute with Ethiopia.
In the economic sphere, bananas, livestock on the hoof,
and hides and skins were the Republic's major exports. Al-
though some mineral wealth did exist, it did not provide a
viable economic base because the quality of the deposits
was poor, the skilled manpower base was low (if not nonexis-
tent), and the required infrastructure was inadequate.
Further, because "about 80 percent of the population was




the tax base remained extremely low. In an effort to off-
set the impact of this poor economic position, the Republic
was successful in its attempts to acquire foreign aid and
technical assistance which by 1962 was worth approximately
27
$ US 94.5 million. This aid was designed to improve
Somali infrastructure and explore new sources of industrial-
ization suited to the new Republic.
In the area of education independence found the Trust
Territory with a total of 135 primary schools (attended by
16,000 students), four secondary schools, five vocational
schools, one Islamic studies school, a school of public
finance and commerce to train indigenous civil servants, and
2 8
one higher level school (the University Institute of Somalia)
.
In the north there were a total of 38 primary schools
for boys attended by just over 2000 students, three primary
schools for girls, twelve intermediate schools for boys, two
29
secondary schools, and two vocational schools. A total of
45 trained Somali teachers taught in the north compared to
approximately 470 in the south (290 with teaching diplomas,
30the remainder were qualified as teacher's assistants).
Although provided with considerably more preparatory
training than that provided to the Republic of Guinea by
France, the Republic of Somalia faced many of the same
problems: lack of a skilled/educated population, small/under-
developed economic base, and an inadequate infrastructure.
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D. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL
CULTURE ON MODERNIZATION
The development task faced by the leaders of both Guinea
and Somalia appeared overwhelming, yet each government was
determined not to fail in its efforts to bring the country
to modernity. The enormity of the task can be seen in the
fact that even after over a decade of independence both
countries were still classified in United Nations General
Assembly Resolution Number 2768 (XXVI) as being among the
least developed countries in the world.
A number of development strategies have been suggested
by political scientists to explain the transition of tra-
ditionally oriented independent societies to modern societies.
Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, Jr. have posited a
development strategy which they call a "transformation strat-
egy." They suggest that the transformation strategy "has at
its essence a commitment to break the inherited pattern of
structural dependency [on the previous colonial power] and to
reconvert the society to certain traditional ideas, values
31
and life-styles." They see the transformationalist states
as determined to end their dependence on the Western-dominated
world economic system and substitute in its place a "communo-
cratic" system which emphasizes collective living and social
solidarity. Although the transformationalists are not
necessarily Marxist, they find some of the Marxist theory and
rhetoric attractive because of its rejection of Western
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capitalism on one hand and its collectivist inspiration on
the other. In principle at least, the transformation model
involves a complete rejection of the links to the world
capitalist economy, because otherwise the transformational-
ists see their country having no choice but to "co-operate
32
with external capitalism, as a very junior partner." The
transformationalists stress simultaneous multiple goals,
such as social equality, self-reliance, economic and social
transformation, and African economic integration. Of these
goals self-reliance is the most significant, as it permits
the transformationalist state to pursue an independent
foreign policy. Finally, the transformationalists view
alternative strategies which rely on the international capi-
talist system as morally repugnant because they are inequita
ble (in favor of the larger nation) , demean the dignity of
the smaller country, and limit the smaller country's options
for self-determination.
Rothchild and Curry have suggested six dynamic system
goals which a country must continually work to achieve no
matter what development strategy it chooses. These are:
ensuring systemic survival; establishing a national identity
by fostering an awareness of common ties; integrating the
society to facilitate growth of community-wide interaction,
primarily through the expansion of the central institutions
of government; creating an acceptable authority system, by
acquiring public acceptance of the legal and political
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structure; mobilizing and distributing resources efficiently,
by increasing productive capacity and the sharing of output
among members of the community; and securing freedom from
external control, by reducing economic, political, and
33
social dependence on any external actor.
According to Rothchild and Curry, both the Republic of
Guinea and the Republic of Somalia fit into the transforma-
tionalist pattern of development. The remainder of this
chapter will deal with a comparison of Guinea's and post
revolutionary Somalia's political and economic development
strategies using the Rothchild and Curry framework.
E. CREATING AN ACCEPTABLE AUTHORITY SYSTEM
According to Rothchild and Curry to achieve this sytem
goal involved at least four elements. These included legit-
imizing governmental authority with a strong ideology combined
when necessary with extensive discipline to ensure compliance,
establishing a hierarchical authority throughout the nation,
and having an inspirational (charismatic) leader at the
apex of the hierarchy.
Upon gaining independence, Sekou Toure and the PDG assumed
control of governing Guinea. According to Toure, the notion
of nation building "involves the pursuit of three major objec-
tives: the establishment of a political, institutional
framework for nation building, the promotion of socio-economic
development and the search for a national identity." There
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are further, three major factors in the Guinean approach to
nation building, "a mobilization-oriented single party, an
35inflexible party ideology and a flexible charismatic leader."
To achieve the first factor, at independence the doctrine
of party supremacy was adopted. Accordingly, the PDG has
had a mass membership, and the PDG continues to encourage
mass participation in the political process. In practice,
membership in the PDG is automatic for every adult Guinean
as he pays the party dues as an integral part of his state
tax. Guinean leaders point out that this mass party member-
ship helps bring the population together thereby eliminating,
in part, the elite-mass gap. To further ensure that this
dichotomy does not emerge the PDG has attempted to discourage
the growth of indigenous private enterprise since it believes
that such development would lead to the emergence of antag-
onistic classes of "the exploiters" and "the exploited."
Since the Guinean government has been forced by economic
circumstances to accept a certain degree of indigenous private
enterprise, it has instituted a policy which excludes the
entreprenuers from holding party posts, reasoning that they
are making no contribution to the nation's development process
To complement the priority of the PDG party organization,
at independence a democratic constitution was adopted. Arti-
cle One states that Guinea is to be a democratic, secular,
and social republic. Sovereignty is vested in the people, to
be exercised through the election of deputies to the National
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Assembly, and through election of a chief executive by uni-
versal sufferage. In practice, however, deputies are elected
from a single list of candidates, by majority ballot, which
gives the party polling the most votes, all of the National
Assembly seats, and makes it impossible for an opposition
party to challenge the PDG monopoly. Toure defends the
"single nationalist list" system by asserting that the system
is necessary to ensure that deputies are not influenced by
any regional, ethnic, racial, or religious considerations,
but have as their major goal to serve the national interest
as "trustees of the nation."
The government is closely linked to the Party even at
the lowest levels of government in the villages/wards. The
basic unit of government, the Local Revolutionary Power (PRL)
has merged with the local Party committee. This organization
headed by a mayor is responsible through the regional govern-
ment for local economic development, local administration,
local social development, and local public works and communi-
cations. This organization was designed to provide the PRL
a communication link to the central government decision-makers,
and although theoretically a two way link, it works most
effectively as a one way link from the central government
to the PRLs.
At independence the PDG saw its position as insecure
unless it accomplished four tasks: to prevent the rise of
Foulah opposition; to contend with the divisive tendencies
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of the Moslem, Christian, and Animist religions; to destroy
the power of the chiefs; and to mobilize the nation's youth
37
and women.
To accomplish the first task the PDG leadership made
Diallo Saifoulaye (a Foulah) Vice President of the Republic
and Political Secretary of the PDG, and brought a number of
Foulahs into the government and the PDG, giving them pres-
tigious positions. Foulah women and youth were brought into
the PDG and given active political roles. Foulah children
were sent away from their homes to attend school in non-Foulah
regions to expose them to other ethnic groups. The central
government awarded the Foulah their full share of funds for
welfare projects. Finally to ensure the effectiveness of
these measures, the Regional Executive position was assigned
to an "alien" non-Foulah, this designed to inhibit the forma-
38tion of ethnic opposition.
Although women's organizations existed before independence
they were mainly regional, ethnic, religious, or social in
nature with virtually no political influence. With the found-
ing of the PDG in 194 7, women were encouraged to become active
in politics, and during the 1950s exercised a powerful politi-
cal force by their vote in the elections. Following independence
women retained their political status. This has included
both the acquisition of high governmental positions (including
membership in the National Political Bureau) and the expansion
of employment opportunities for women. Guinean women today
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still have a most powerful weapon in "the power of the vote,"
a weapon upon which Sekou Toure is dependent.
Neglected by the colonizers, the youth of Guinea became
a PDG focus at the time of independence. The Party began
to organize the youth and bring them into the political
system as active participants - -in 1959 it was decided to
make the youth organization a functional arm of the Party.
As a result of this, Toure ensures that the youth are repre-
sented at official functions and during his state visits
(as members of the official party) . "A natural by-product
of this confidence which the Party has placed in its youth
39has been youth's trust in the Party."
The problem of the chiefs was officially ended prior to
independence; however, following independence the PDG gave
the traditional chiefly functions to the PRLs
.
In addition to a hierarchical authority system, Toure
has over the years taken for himself a wide variety of titles
designed to enhance his own personality cult as a charismatic
leader. These have included "Faithful and Supreme Servant
of the People," the "Doctor of Revolutionary Sciences," and
40
the "Liberator of Oppressed Peoples." Further although no
African leader denies the role of chief more fervently than
Toure, it is hard to imagine one who fills it more fully.
Another tactic used by Toure to enhance his leadership
has been the "discovery of plots against the nation." Since
independence the government has uncovered some fifteen plots.
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The conspirators have included teachers, merchants, former
PDG and cabinet members, Guinean exiles, the Portuguese,
41physicians, and in 1976 the National Soccer team. In short
"Toure has become the embodiment of the nation, the only
theoretician of the state, the ultimate law-giver and inter-
preter. He has written about 20 books which are compulsory
readings in the country... He is an expert in all fields from
agriculture to philosophy, including religion and soccer...
All national and regional officials are appointed by the
president [Toure], and none can make any major decision
42
without consulting him."
Toure is committed to the ideology of "scientific social
ism" to guide the development of the nation. This ideology
has been defined as meaning:
the social ownership of the means of production, distri-
bution, and exchange and the establishment of a society
where all citizens are assured of minimum requirements of
food, shelter, and clothing, equal access to essential
social services and political freedom. 43
This is to be accomplished through the Party/State
hierarchical government and a "non-capitalist way to develop-
ment." A major part of the economic development involves
nationalization of the economy and state planning, which to
date in Guinea has been far from successful. As a result
of this Guinea's socialist ideology has not been transformed
into practical realities.
Despite a hierarchical government authority system, a
charismatic leader and a strong ideology, Guinea still must
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use considerable coercion to maintain the authority system.
This coercion can be seen in the statistic that more than one
million Guineans (about one sixth of the total population)
are living in exile, mainly in neighboring countries. Al-
though Toure was extremely careful to appease tribal feelings
immediately following independence, today the Foulah make up
the bulk of the political exiles. Amnesty International
estimates that there are between 2000 and 4000 political
prisoners in Guinea. This number included (until his recent
release) the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Conakry who had
been sentenced to life imprisonment for his supposed role in
44the 1970 Portuguese invasion of Conakry.
Toure ' s support among the nation's youth is also being
eroded. He is receiving growing pressure from young cadres
to reduce the emphasis on the political and ideological goals
of the past two decades and to set more practical and realis-
tic targets.
Toure ' s standing among the women was also shaken when
in August 1977 there were nationwide protests by women over
the inadequacies of the state distribution system, and the
abuses of the economic police who were tasked with regulating
internal trade, but were in fact involved in smuggling and
extortion. Following the riots Toure disbanded the economic
police.
Although Guinea for the past twenty years has conformed
to the transformation strategy, recent events make it appear
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that Toure may be reassessing his development strategy and
tending toward the reorganization strategy with its moderate
ideology, bargaining relationships, and limited discipline.
To assess the development strategy of the Somali govern-
ment from independence to revolution and the causes for the
21 October 1969, revolution, are beyond the scope of this
chapter. The following assessment will evaluate Somalia's
development strategy since the revolution.
Upon assuming power, the military commanders who comprised
the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), abolished the nation's
constitution (promising a new constitution) and outlawed all
political parties (an effort primarily aimed at disbanding
the SYL) . The stated objectives of the SRC in staging the
revolution were to end corruption and nepotism in government,
establish a written Somali language and end illiteracy, and
bring about rapid social, economic, and cultural development.
To accomplish this, Law Number One assigned the SRC the func-
tions previously performed by the president of the republic,
the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, as well as
some duties of the Constitutional Court and the High Court
of Justice.
With the enactment of the local government reform law of
August 1972, the SRC established a hierarchical structure of
regional, district and village councils. The village councils
were chosen annually through elections. The regional and
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district councils which were largely appointed by the SRC
were required by law to form six committees: economic devel-
opment, social affairs, public security, finance, political
orientation, and mediation and conciliation. The last two
committees were charged with educating the people concerning
the SRC's ideology and with attempting to settle disputes
between various segments of the community.
On 1 July 1976, the SRC announced the creation of the
Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) . The SRSP's
specific duties were to correct and streamline the efficiency
of the party cadre, assist with national economic development,
and lay the groundwork for a productive and socialist nation.
The practical aspects of the creation of the SRSP have been
similar to those in Guinea--the creation of a party state,
with a rigid hierarchy to ensure the authority of the ruling
government.
Although somewhat less blatant than in Guinea, attempts
have been made to portray Siad Barre, the president of the
republic, as a charismatic leader. He is referred to as
Comrade in most official publications. He has attempted to
gain stature among his people by his support of the continuing
"war of liberation" being fought in the Ogaden. One interest-
ing sidelight on this attempt to portray Barre as charismatic
was his refusal "because of modesty" to accept the title of




Barre has attempted to mobilize the Somalis to his ide-
ology of "scientific socialism", which literally translated
46
means "livestock sharing which is built on knowledge."
In practice the ideology is confused. For example, although
the banks have been nationalized, Barre has assured business-
men of a good investment climate. What has evolved from it
has been a form of pragmatism which is found in many countries
with scarce resources, and has as its goal the reduction of
Somalia's dependence on foreign states through self-help
projects and increased educational opportunities for its
citizens.
The most recent effort to legitimize the rule of the
SRSP was the mid-1979 ratification of the new Somali Consti-
tution which provides that the SRSP is the country's sole
political party and its supreme ruling body. It further
establishes a national People's Assembly, whose members are
elected by popular vote. Yet despite this apparent easing of
autocratic controls by the military regime in power, opponents
of the regime dismiss the new constitution as a farce, point-
ing out that the powers enjoyed by President Barre are as
wide under the new constitution as they were under military
rule. The President remains the head of state, the head of
the SRSP, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces, and chairman of the High Judicial
47Council which disciplines judges.
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The creation of an acceptable authority system has not
been without its difficulties. There have been a number
of purges of high level government officials. To Somalia's
credit, however, is the fact that in a 1978 Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Report it was stated that Amnesty Inter-
national had identified few reports of torture of political
prisoners although more than 50 were said to have been detained
without charge or trial. One reason why more organized
political opposition has not been observed is that even today
sixty to seventy percent of the Somali population is nomadic
and therefore is not fully effected by government policy
decisions
.
There has, however, been increasing evidence of opposition
to the Barre regime. Barre has been accused of attempting
to strengthen his power through nepotism. Disenchanted
pro-Soviet military personnel unsuccessfully attempted to
overthrow the government in April 1978. Finally, a guerilla
movement intent on overthrowing Barre, the Somali Salvation
Front, is training in Ethiopia.
It would appear that Barre, at least for the time being,
finds the transformationalist strategy in the realm of creat-
ing an acceptable authority system to be meeting his needs
and I foresee no impending change to his strategy.
F. ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL IDENTITY
Rothchild and Curry's transformation strategy to achieve
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this system goal involved the engenderment , by the government,
of a high nationalistic and high pan-African consensus among
the population.
At independence, Toure was faced with a significant
problem that of establishing a Guinean national identity.
Although the new nation's effort to develop a nationalism
was facilitated by a lack of irredentism, the nation did
contain significant ethnic and religious disparities, and
each ethnic group had its own language, traditions, and forms
of social and political organizations. Further, those few
people who had received an education, had received a colonial
based Euro-centric education which had little bearing on the
problems of Guinea.
Toure took some immediate steps to establish a national
identity. He adopted a Guinean flag and national anthem. He
assembled a national youth orchestra. He had the educational
curriculum revised to teach Guinean history, geography, and
language. He encouraged interregional and national competi-
tion in native songs, dances, sports, and even public works
projects. Those who excelled in these competitions were
hailed as Guinean champions.
An effort to establish nationalism based on the traditional
bases was "investissement humain" which is "the use of unpaid
volunteer labor for the construction of public works projects
48for the welfare of the general community." The theory
98

underlying this effort was that besides constructing needed
public works projects, Guineans involved would be imbued with
a common sense of national purpose.
To lessen the religious division in the country Toure
organized a religious "debunking campaign." This effort not
only downplayed the utility of religion, but also included
the africanization of the clergy and nationalization of all
parochial/religious schools. An interesting footnote to
this campaign was written in 1979 when in a speech Toure
enjoined the Muslims in the Faranah region not to forget
49
"that being a true Moslem means to increase production."
Besides being highly nationalistic, Toure continues to be
a strong supporter of pan-Africanism. He is so committed to
the philosophy that the Guinean constitution contains refer-
ence to the willingness of Guinea to give up a certain amount
of national sovereignty to further pan-Africanist goals.
In Somalia Barre was not faced with quite so formidable
a task when developing a Somali national identity. Somalis
have long considered themselves Somalis, despite the residual
tribalism existing today. The task, however, has not been
an easy one because with so much of the population living a
nomadic lifestyle they migrate from area to area with little
concern as to whether they are in Kenya, Somalia, or Ethiopia,
To counter this the Somali government has emphasized the
doctrine of pan-Somalism, with the aim of reuniting the five
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Somali enclaves: Djibouti, the Ogaden, and northern Kenya
with the Republic of Somalia (British Somaliland and Italian
Somalia). In this regard Somalia does not follow the trans-
formation strategy's emphasis on a pan-African ideology.
There are some indications that a change in philosophy may
be taking place with regard to pan-Somalism. The recently
approved Constitution calls for the right of self-determination
of Somalis "under foreign rule" rather than urging the use
of force to reunite Greater Somalia.
G. INTEGRATING SOCIETIES
As defined by the transformation strategy, the integration
of societies required unitary control of the population,
thereby providing them with a single focus for their loyalty.
As a result the strategy was antitraditional in its policies
and goals.
In Guinea, much of the government rhetoric has been anti-
traditional in nature, and many of the actions taken have
been designed to break from the traditional mold. These
include the abolishment of the chieftancy, the granting of
rights to women, pronouncements in opposition to polygamy,
and the prohibition of marriages between persons more than
52twenty years apart in age.
Toure has further moved to integrate Guinean society
using the PDG, equating membership in and loyalty to the
PDG as synonymous with being a patriotic Guinean. Since all
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Guineans are members of the party by definition, this pro-
vides the Party with control of its members, and gives the
Party members a single focus for their loyalties. Those
who do not show sufficient loyalty run the risk of being
singled out as "Fifth Columnists" or otherwise punished for
their deviation from the Party line.
Article 45 of the Guinean Constitution states that any
act of racial discrimination as well as propaganda of a
racial or regional character shall be punishable by law. The
punishment has been defined as two to five years imprisonment
or a 70,000 to a 700,000 franc fine. The law is considered
a valuable deterrent since no one has been convicted of this
crime to public knowledge.
The Supreme Revolutionary Council in Somalia has broken
with the traditional values in a number of ways. Women have
been urged to take an active part in government, in sports,
and in self-help projects. In 1975 Barre announced the de-
cision of the SRC to give equal rights to women, including
equal inheritance rights. It was later announced that limi-
tations were being imposed on polygamy, and that men would no
longer be permitted to divorce their wives at will. These
efforts at the emancipation of women were opposed by some
conservative Islamic leaders. So vociferous was the opposi-
tion that Barre arrested and executed ten religious leaders




Laws passed in 1973 banned weddings, burials, and reli-
gious rites held on a tribal basis. Wedding ceremonies were
to be held in public places such as hotels, and money could
no longer be collected from lineage members for the burial
of dead members. The purpose of these antitraditional actions
was to transform society. The SRC believed that the tradi-
tional structures, although adequate for preindustrial society,
were a hindrance to their modernizing efforts.
With the 1976 founding of the SRSP as the state party,
the Somali leaders were attempting to integrate society, as
the Guineans had, by creating a monolithic party state. The
SRSP has a vision in which all citizens are expected to give
their best for the common welfare in exchange for basic
needs, and as the economy progresses for some personal extras.
Another tactic used by the Somali government to engender
a single loyalty to the state has been the formalization of
a written Somali language. Within two years of the revolu-
tion a standardized system of writing Somali had been devised
and was in use. An initial campaign to teach the new language
to those living in urban centers was followed by a mass liter-
acy campaign in the countryside between August 1974 and March
1975.
Finally, an environmental factor which the government has
put to good use in their continuing program to integrate the
society was the drought of the mid-1970s. The severity of
the drought prompted relocation of starving nomads into
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government operated relocation camps. The government made
a concerted effort to relocate peoples of diverse clans
together, and then teach them a new trade (fishing, cultiva-
tion) in hopes of preventing their return to their nomadic
ways. These efforts are reported to have been fifty percent
successful
.
The efforts of the Somali government to more fully inte-
grate their society seem at this time to be meeting with
relative success.
H. MOBILIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES
This system goal was characterized by the desire for
substantial economic growth, emphasizing high equity in the
distribution of the resulting resources throughout the pop-
ulation. This growth was to be accomplished using moderate
private and high public investment. Rapid africanization of
all facets of the government, economy, and society was to
be pursued.
Guinea has experienced significant difficulties in this
area. The appalling economic conditions left by the French
colonizers have been discussed previously. Sekou Toure had
little choice but to africanize the government immediately
upon gaining independence. Yet those persons thrust into
government positions had neither the education nor the exper-
ience needed to mobilize and distribute resources efficiently
To overcome this deficiency, by late 1960 an estimated 100
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to 150 East European technical assistants were working in
Guinea and "virtually every Ministry has some Czech advisors
attached to it . . .
"
In socialist fashion "nationalization and the economic
plan" were utilized to mobilize the economy. The first
Three Year Plan (1960-1962), due to a lack of qualified
indigenous personnel, was drawn up by a team of French
economic experts. The French economic team established
agriculture as the plan's priority. They further made an
estimate of anticipated investments for the period, then
worked out the "proportions for the different sectors includ-
ing the details of the activities to be carried out within
each sector." As might be expected, the plan did not achieve
its goal because the investment was not forthcoming and the
indigenous infrastructure to carry out the plan was nonexistent.
A second Seven Year Plan (1964-1970) , devised by the
Ministry of Economic Development and described as a "wish
list," was no more successful than the first plan. The third
Five Year Plan (1973-1977) which took about a year and a half
to develop, on initial analysis appears no more successful
than its predecessors. Agricultural production continues
to fail not only to meet the needs of the population, but
also the needs of foreign financed industries, such as fruit
juice and meat canning factories.
As a result of the failure of indigenous economic plan-
ning, Guinea has become indebted and dependent on foreign
capital and technology to develop/exploit her mineral wealth.
104

For example, the Japanese have entered an iron ore enterprise,
and the Soviets and other multinational corporations (MNC)
have entered joint bauxite enterprises. The problem has
been further exacerbated by the fact that Guinea has obli-
gated itself to various countries so deeply that she is forced
to give them favorable terms on raw material exports. For
example, the Soviet-built Kindia bauxite project "aims at
producing 2.5 million tons per year of bauxite for shipment
to the U.S.S.R. over a 30-year period as a repayment of
Guinea's debts." To make matters worse the Guineans are
getting only one fourth the world price per ton from the
Soviets for this bauxite.
In an effort to ensure equitable distribution of agri-
cultural land, the state assumed legal title to all land in
1959. As the title holder, the state is entitled to take
over neglected land; however, the government has insufficient
resources to improve this land. As a result, in most areas
of the country landholdings still conform to the customary
patterns of small-scale family tenure.
Besides taking title to all Guinean land, the government
has over a period of time nationalized the education system,
health facilities, radio telecommunications, transport (air
and rail), electric power, diamond mining, forestry, trawling,
banking, insurance, and foreign and domestic trade. These
efforts have met with mixed success, with the greatest success
found in the socio -cultural areas.
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Because the state framework for marketing agricultural
products and consumer goods was so poorly planned and managed,
the new institution did not work as planned, especially in
the supply of consumer goods. As a result a large parallel
black market has grown up which markets agricultural products
and in return provides consumer goods to the population.
Africanization in the industrial/business sector is still
handicapped by a lack of trained, skilled personnel. One
bright spot in the economy has been the new financial terms
Guinea has been able to work out with the MNCs . Through
patient negotiation Guinea has been able to negotiate deals
with a number of MNCs which call for Guinea to own 49% of the
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company and receive 65% of the taxable profits.
Rather than conforming to the transformation strategy
model in this area, Guinea- -in spite of the desire to develop
more independently— is limited to slow africanization (accom-
odation strategy) and dependency on high private/foreign
investment combined with moderate public ownership (reorgani-
zation strategy)
.
The problems of mobilizing and distributing resources
efficiently are even more severe in Somalia. Somalia's main
5 8
exports (71% live animals, 191 bananas, 9.6% hides and skins)
are not big money exports, and Somalia has no real raw materi-
al potential. Further, with only five percent of her population
employed in industry, commerce, and transportation, she is
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severely limited with regard to africanization of the
59
economic sector.
The SRC's first effort at economic planning, the Three -
Year Development Plan (1971-1973) was not met because of a
lack of local resources, especially trained manpower, and
the weakness in the planning apparatus.
The most recent development program, the Five -Year
Development plan (1973-1978) envisioned the creation of a
fishing industry, the opening of thousands of acres of land
to cultivation, and the establishment of some thirty-five
new industries. However, the severe drought in 1974-1975
and the Ogaden War have destroyed any hope for fulfilling
the Plan. The status of the follow-on Five Year Development
Plan is in jeopardy because the Soviets (who were expelled
in 1977) were supposed to draw up the plan.
Like Guinea, Somalia is becoming dependent on foreign
investment capital. In fact, "according to the government's
planning department, long-term objectives envisage an increas-
ing role for foreign private capital, notably in the
manufacturing sector."
To ensure the equitable distribution of what little arable
land there is, the government enacted a Land Tenure law in
1975. According to the law (which has as its base, state
ownership of all land) arable land may be held by individuals
only under a ten-year concession granted by the Ministry of
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Agriculture. The size of the concession varies depending
on whether it is irrigated or non-irrigated land; a farmer
may sublet his land to another only because of physical
disability and with government permission. Mortgage, sale,
or lease of the land is prohibited; however, the concession
is renewable for a second ten year period. The law further
restricted the size of large plantations to 247 acres.
In principle pasture land not owned by a specific clan
is open to grazing by all Somali nomad herds. In practice,
there has been a high degree of customary clan usage.
Besides the nationalization of the land, the Somali
government has, since the Revolution, nationalized banking,
insurance, electric power, oil distribution, most large
manufacturing establishments, medical service, education,
printing, and those commercial enterprises involved in import
and export.
In the final analysis Somalia does not fit completely
into the transformation framework in this area. With its
slow africanization, high private investment, and low public
investment it reflects the accomodation strategy. Although
it seeks economic growth and an equitable distribution of
resources, Somalia is becoming more dependent on foreign
capital and technology, with self-sufficiency even a ques-
tionable long term goal.
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I. ENSURING SURVIVAL AND SECURING FREEDOM FROM EXTERNAL
CONTROL
Because I feel that these final two system goals are so
closely interrelated I have chosen to discuss them as com-
plementary goals.
Rothchild and Curry characterized these system goals as
leading to a high desire on the part of the country to retain
its sovereignty; however, this was tempered by a flexible,
pragmatic approach to continental federation. The develop-
ing country further strives to maintain a closed economy in
order to limit its links with Western capitalism. In addition
its foreign policy is characterized by some form of "positive
nonalignment .
"
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Guinea is ruled by an
autocratic leader who over the past twenty years, has created
a mentality within the nation which sees his personal survival
closely linked with that of the party and the nation. In
practice there is no established mechanism for succession.
As a result, in spite of initial attempts at ensuring wide
ethnic representation in high governmental circles, Toure
began to remove those whom he perceived as threats to his
political survival. These "Fifth Columnists" became traitors
to the nation, and Toure began to encircle himself with
family, friends, and clan members who stand to gain much as
long as Toure remains in power.
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In addition to the personal survival aspect of the leader,
Guinea at independence had as an added incentive to ensure
their national survival, their determination to prove to
General de Gaulle that they did not need French help in their
national development. This tendency also contributed to the
limited links which Guinea established with other Western
capitalist nations, fearing association with these nations
would lead to economic neo-colonialism. This desire to ensure
independent survival secure from external control, I believe
accounts, at least in part, for the cooling of relations
between Guinea and the world socialist states to which Guinea
had become deeply indebted economically.
Although Guinean socialist ideology advocates a self-
sufficient closed economy, the nature of that economy- -raw
materials requiring high investment and high technology to
exploit- -makes a pragmatic course more appropriate. While
talking a socialist line Guinea can encourage outside invest-
ment and technology to develop her resources. This pragmatic
approach is illustrated in a comment by Toure when, in response
to criticism from the Eastern European press that he had
abandoned the Guinean revolution, he responded that "I will
deal with anyone for the sake of Guinea." This is consis-
tent with Guinea's newly revived policy of positive nonalignment
which rests on scrupulous adherence to four principles:
"equal friendship for all peoples; respect for all countries;
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non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
and active cooperation with countries and individuals desir-
ing to aid in the evolution of Africa on the basis of justice,
effective solidarity and respect of human dignity."
Finally, Guinea by her constitution supports the concept
of continental federation (Pan Africanism) , including a
Pan-African Army "to deal with the problems which now bring
in foreign intervention." Although Toure rhetorically
supports the federation, I feel that if it were to result in
diminishing his power, he would oppose the implementation of
the philosophy.
In Somalia, as in Guinea, the survival of the head of
the Party and the State is linked with the survival of the
nation. Although Somalia reportedly has fewer political
prisoners than Guinea, Barre has not been reluctant to elim-
inate opposition, not only from within the military, but
also the government, Islamic leadership, and the general
population. Further, to strengthen his rule Barre has begun
to rely heavily on his close relatives. In late 1979, Barre's
son-in-law, half-brother, and two uncles occupied the posts
of Security Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces, and Party official for mobilization
respectively.
The new Somali Constitution is seen by many as merely a
device to legitimate Barre's rule. Therefore, despite con-
stitutional provisions allowing the People's Assembly, under
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certain circumstances, to dismiss the President, it appears
highly unlikely that this will ever occur.
There is no overwhelming Pan-African sentiment in Somalia.
The strongest sentiment is reserved for the Pan-Somali move-
ment. Historically the aim has been to reunite all Somali
peoples, by force if necessary. Additionally, the Somalis
are disenchanted with their OAU associate's lack of acceptance/
support for their position concerning the reuniting of all
Somalis
.
To the degree that Somalia has nationalized numerous
social services and industries, Somalia possesses a relatively
closed economy. The nation is, however, like Guinea-
-
notwithstanding socialist rhetoric- -forced to accept large
quantities of foreign investment and technical aid. To
further emphasize this point, the Somali Minister of Higher
Education and Culture, Omer Arteh Ghalib, in a 1977 interview
stated:
We have an investment law inviting all countries in
the world, particularly those friendly to us, to invest
in our country. But as a revolutionary government we are
security conscious. We must be absolutely sure that the
companies, or individuals, who want to come to our country
to invest have no ulterior motives. When we are sure of
their sincerity and pure commercial interest of the organ-
ization or company or individual, I can assure you they
will be most welcome. 68
Somalia, like Guinea, has become deeply indebted to the
Soviet Union, and this fact along with the dynamics of the
Soviet involvement in the Ogaden War (which is beyond the
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scope of this study) , has culminated in Somali disenchant-
ment with her "socialist ally" and, of necessity, forced
closer economic ties to the West, a pattern more in line
with the accomodation or reorganization strategy.
Chapter One of the new Somali Constitution specifies
that Somalia is to pursue a policy of nonalignment and to
cooperate with all the peoples and nations of the world.
In practice this involves developing relations with whichever
country can meet Somalia's immediate needs.
J. CONCLUSION
The diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, economic and
ecological backgrounds found in African nations, when combined
with the disimilarities of their colonial heritages make it
impossible to neatly fit Guinea and Somalia into a single
developmental strategy framework. Although the Rothchild and
Curry framework for explaining development strategies is
somewhat simplistic, and as such contains deficiencies, it
does provide a useful tool with which to analyze the develop-
ment strategies of the less developed countries of Africa.
In Guinea and Somalia, modernization will continue to be
the primary goal of the ruling elite. Closely related will
be the goal of ensuring the survival of the State as a sover-




Ethnic, religious and clan-family cleavages will not be
overcome in the foreseeable future in Guinea and Somalia.
It has also been proved, I believe, that in both nations,
"scientific socialism" is not, and will not be accepted as,
a modern expression of the traditional African communal way
of life. As a result the leaders of the nations studied will
continue their antitraditional efforts both rhetorically and
practically, but will not hesitate to fall back on tradition
as a mobilizing vehicle when it suits their purposes.
With the one party state, and the absence of the concept
of the "loyal opposition", extensive discipline will continue
to be used in Guinea and Somalia. This is further exacerbated
by the fact that in neither country has a formalized succes-
sion system been established; this will undoubtedly result
in some degree of fragmentation upon the death or removal of
the present head of state.
Although ideology will continue to receive rhetorical
emphasis, it would appear that in the long-term, pragmatism
rather than ideology will guide the decisions made by the
leaders of Guinea and Somalia. As a result neither country
will break completely with the capitalistic world economy,
and patient negotiation can result, as it did in Guinea, in
the improvement of the terms of trade so that they are more
favorable toward the nation than toward the MNC.
114

The problem of ensuring the equitable distribution of
wealth in Guinea and Somalia has no short-term solution,
and I am pessimistic as to whether there is any potential
long-term solution to the problem.
Finally, the leaders of Guinea and Somalia will continue
to strive to maintain a "positive nonalignment" policy in
dealings with the capitalistic and socialistic world economic
systems. Although I feel that at the present time there is
insufficient evidence to prove the hypothesis, it would appear
that the vacillation seen in Guinea and Somalia from dependence
on the socialist world to dependence on the capitalist world
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IV. PATTERNS OF SOVIET MILITARY AID TO
GUINEA AND SOMALIA
A. INTRODUCTION
Although serious Soviet attention to Africa dates back
only to the mid-1950s, between 1967 and 1976 the Soviet
Union was the predominant supplier of military aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa. What accounted for this rise in Soviet
participation in the affairs of Africa? What are the deter-
minants that result in African nations becoming reliant on
2the Soviet Union for military aid?
The goal of this chapter is to examine the following three
interrelated hypotheses. First, Soviet influence in Africa
is dependent on the willingness of the Soviet Union to supply
the lesser developed African nations with military aid.
Second, African nations will become solely or predominantly
reliant on the Soviet Union only in the event of Western
unwillingness or failure to provide the desired military aid.
Finally, relations between the Soviet Union and her African
clients will begin to deteriorate when: African demands for
more and better military equipment exceed the level which
the Soviet Union is willing to supply; or the Soviet Union
attempts to exercise greater control over the deployment and
use of Soviet-supplied military equipment than the African
nations are willing to accept.
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The chapter will focus on two Sub-Saharan nations which
have had longstanding ties with the Soviet Union- -the Popular
and Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and the Republic of
Somalia.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Post-World War II Soviet attitudes toward the less-
developed countries (LDCs) reflected either a cautious indif-
ference, or a lack of understanding of the situation in which
nationalist and communist movements found themselves. The
Soviet Union was preoccupied with the communization of Eastern
Europe, the problem of Germany, and Russian relations in the
Turkish and Iranian areas. The LDCs received only cursory
attention, and this was characterized by the Zhadanov two
camp doctrine which held that even the revolutionary leaders
in the LDCs, such as Sukarno in Indonesia and Nehru in India,
were "imperialist lackeys" because they were not totally
committed politically to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet attitude started to change in the early 1950s.
At the 19th Communist Party Congress held in Moscow in 1952,
shortly before Stalin's death, future prime minister Malenkov
"urged a stronger role for non-communist nationalist leaders
in the less developed world and stressed the contributions
which their opposition to the western powers could make to
the overall position of the Soviet Union."
After Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the dominant Soviet
leader in 1955, the Soviet government began to emphasize that
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through peaceful coexistence, which included economic, social,
and ideological competition with the Western world, the Soviet
Union would emerge as the supreme world power. In the wake
of the 1955 Bandung Conference, Moscow became convinced that
a major restructuring of the world political scene was under-
way. The 1955 transfer of military equipment from Czechoslovakia
to Egypt was the first use of Soviet military aid in Africa.
The use of Czechoslovakia to consumate Soviet military
aid deals became the primary Soviet "modus operandi" through
the remainder of the 1950s, and was next seen in Africa in
1959 when between late March and early April, Polish ships
delivered three shipments of weapons and vehicles from
Czechoslovakia to Guinea, describing them as "gifts to this
new African republic from countries behind the Iron Curtain."
By using Czechoslovakia, the most self sufficient arms manu-
facturer in the Warsaw Pact with the exception of the Soviet
Union, as a proxy the Soviet Union could overcome two potential
problems in dealing with the LDCs . First, it provided an
avenue for providing military assistance to LDCs who did not
want to deal openly with the Soviet Union. Second, it pro-
vided the Soviet Union a cover, albeit rather transparent,
to counter the charge that they were arming the newly emerging
Third World.
The past two decades have seen this facade disappear and
the Soviet Union emerge as an arms supplier in her own right.
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As Soviet policy-makers came to realize that nuclear war was
an unacceptable alternative in their competition with the
United States (US) , they were faced with the problem of
competing with the Western powers in ways that limited the
chance of nuclear/general war. Military assistance filled
the bill. The Soviet Union in the 1950s had a stockpile
of obsolete/obsolescent military equipment that it could
provide as military aid, which was designed to enhance Soviet
influence, power, and prestige in the Third World. As an
added bonus military aid appeared to the Soviets as an ideal
means to break Western "containment arrangements" such as
CENTO and SEATO. Yet despite the apparent safety of military
aid as a foreign policy tool, the Cuban missile crisis showed
the Soviets that even military assistance was fraught with
danger.
There were a number of discernable patterns of Soviet
military aid in Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Nations which were most likely to receive Soviet
military aid were identified as "militant nations", had leaders
with "Marxist" tendencies in domestic policies, and maintained
pan-African and anti-West postures in their foreign policies.
Nations did not necessarily have to be pro-Communist to
receive Soviet military aid, they just needed to be anti-West.
The period 1961 through 1963 was a period of reappraisal
for the Soviet Sub-Saharan Africa policy-makers. Soviet
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military aid overtures during the 1960 Congo crisis had
resulted in unfavorable reaction from most African nations,
giving the Soviets a bad name in Sub-Saharan Africa. Initial
ties with Guinea had been strained resulting in the expulsion
of the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea in 1961 for alleged sub-
versive efforts against Sekou Toure. Further eighteen Soviet
technicians accused of diamond smuggling were expelled from
Guinea. Besides these problems the Soviets, because of their
unfamiliarity with Africa, had made a number of mistakes
which resulted in aid recipients' unhappiness.
Somalia presented the Soviets with their next military
aid opportunity when in 1963 it accepted a $US 35 million
"no strings attached" arms package from the Soviet Union
instead of a $US 15 million package offered by the West.
The Soviets had begun to take a pragmatic approach to mili-
tary aid transfers - -standing ready to "jump in" wherever the
US or its western allies refused military aid. Gone were
some of the ideological trappings which first influenced
Soviet military aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact a "basic
characteristic of Russian arms aid policies was the relative
ease with which the Soviet Union was prepared to dispense
with ideological principles in taking on another military
7
hardware customer."
Following the 1966 overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana,
the Soviet Union undertook another more fundamental reexam-
ination of its policy toward LDCs , and reached two key
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conclusions: first, that "' revolutionary democratic' leaders
in the Third World suffered from such monumental faults that
they would probably never effect a transition to 'genuine'
socialism;" and second, that "the Third World offered no
promise of great revolutionary advances in the discernable
future." 8
As a result of this reassessment a new Soviet foreign
policy approach toward LDCs appeared. On the political plane,
it placed emphasis on states and political groups which could
be of some inherent importance to the Soviet Union, rather
than on those which happened to qualify as progressive by
Soviet standards. Tied to this new pragmatism was a geo-
political feature which resulted in the Soviet Union concen-
trating its attention on the countries in "a broad arc to
the south of the Soviet borders, from North Africa to Southeast
Asia, and included even states formally aligned with the West
q
such as Iran and Turkey."
The practical result of this new emphasis was that
although the Soviets still valued contacts with all African
countries willing to deal with them and continued to woo those
nations they felt to have some intrinsic value to overall
Soviet policy goals, aid to Africa in general and Sub-Saharan
Africa in particular fell drastically between 1965 and 1974.
Although since 1974 the Soviets have increased military
aid to a number of Sub-Saharan Africa nations, there is
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insufficient evidence to prove that this was the result of
any major shift in Soviet policy, rather it would appear
to be a reflection of increased opportunity in the area.
C. DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFER POLICY
Much has been written attempting to analyze the determi-
nants of Soviet arms transfer policies. In a paper presented
at a Naval Postgraduate School conference on the Communist
States and Africa, Edward J. Laurance enumerates ten foreign
policy objectives which are served by Soviet military aid.
Of the ten, eight are specifically applicable to Sub-Saharan
Africa in general, and Guinea and Somalia in particular.
The first objective is the establishment of a Soviet
presence in order to gain a voice in LDC affairs. The Soviet
Union came into Africa as the champion of national liberation
movements, portraying herself as a non-colonial power, un-
tainted by a past of colonial excess. Although this has been
and continues to be a policy goal, the Soviets have been far
from successful in Guinea and Somalia. The first Soviet
attempts to gain influence in Guinean affairs in 1961 resulted
in the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador to Guinea who was
accused of conspiring to overthrow the Toure regime. In
1962, the Soviets were refused landing rights in Guinea during
the Cuban missile crisis; in 1977 they were again refused
permission for Soviet advisers and Cuban troops to assemble
in Guinean enroute Ethiopia; and more recently (May 1978)
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the Soviets have been denied the use of Guinean airfields to
conduct long range reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic
12Ocean. In Somalia the Soviets, after some fourteen years
of close association and investment, found themselves expelled
when they attempted to inject themselves into Somali affairs
concerning the Somali-Ethiopian war in the Ogaden.
The second objective is the undermining or neutralizing
of Western influence in LDCs. In both Guinea and Somalia
the Soviet Union stepped in to fill a vacuum when the Western
countries failed to provide the LDCs with desired military
aid. This has in turn provided the Soviets with short term
gains; however, the requirement in both African nations for
broad based economic and technical support, which only the
West can provide, has worked to counter this Soviet objective
in the long term.
The third objective is the breaking of Western arms
supply monopolies. Although this has been a major objective
in some African countries, most recently Ethiopia, it has not
been a significant Soviet objective in her dealings with Guinea
and Somalia. Neither country had been heavily dependent on
Western sources of military aid before reaching initial
agreement with the Soviet Union. According to a 1970 study
conducted by Amelia Leiss and her colleagues, between 1955
and 1970 the Soviet Union had been Guinea's sole supplier of
combat aircraft, training aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and
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armoured personnel carriers (APC) , and had supplied over
sixty percent of Guinea's transport aircraft. In the case
of Somalia, the Soviets were her principal supplier of all
classes of equipment except helicopters (which Somalia did
not have in her inventory until after 19 70 at which time the
Soviets became her sole supplier). Subsequent to 1970 the
Soviet Union continued to be the principal arms supplier to
Guinea, and also to Somalia until mid-1977.
The fourth objective is the extension of the Soviet capa-
bility to project military power. Both Guinea and Somalia
are strategically located, and provide the Soviets with
potential airbases for long range reconnaissance aircraft,
and port facilities for the growing Soviet navy. Soviet
military presence in these two countries made it significant-
ly easier to support the Soviets' growing worldwide military
presence, and provided potential bases from which the Soviet
Union might threaten Western sea lanes of communication.
Again as in the achievement of a number of previous policy
objectives, the achievement of this objective was short term,
and even then subject to the hospitality of the host country.
The fifth objective is the enhancement of the internal
security of allies and clients. Both Guinea and Somalia have
highly centralized governments, dependent on coercion to
retain power. In both countries Soviet military assistance
provides the leaders of the nations with the means to keep
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the military relatively well equipped, therefore satisfied.
A satisfied supportive military is a necessary ingredient
to the maintenance of power in many Sub-Saharan African nations
The sixth objective is the support of insurgencies and
wars of national liberation consistent with Soviet ideology.
In Guinea this took the form of supplying military aid for
further transfer to the PAIGC guerillas who were fighting
the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. In Somalia until 1977 the
Soviets were indirectly supporting the Western Somalia Liber-
ation Front which was fighting to reunite the Ogaden region
of Ethiopia with the Republic of Somalia.
The seventh objective is the reduction of Chinese (Peoples
Republic of China) influence in Africa. To a large degree
the Soviets have been successful in achieving this objective
as it concerns Guinea and Somalia. Chinese involvement in
Africa since the Cultural Revolution has lost some of its
impetus. There are reports from Guinea that in the late
1960s and early 1970s the Chinese were involved with training
14Guinea's Peoples Militia. The Guinean Navy was also report-
ed to have received four Shanghai class patrol gunboats in
early 1973. Further, some 200 Chinese "military technicians"
were estimated to be in Guinea in 1978. Chinese military
aid to Somalia has been negligible, and the Chinese have




The final objective is the improvement of the Soviet
balance of payments. Although called aid, Soviet military-
aid takes the form of long term loans, repayable in converti-
ble currencies, commodities, or local funds. These loans
have usually been ten to twelve year loans at a two and one
17half percent interest rate. The willingness of the Soviet
Union to accept commodity repayment for military aid was
tempting to the LDCs, and superficially appeared to favor
the recipient who was afflicted with a single crop economy,
with their major export commodity usually being buffeted by
1
8
fluctuations in an uncertain world market. Actually such
arrangements were fraught with dangers for the recipient,
as crops or mineral wealth would have to be mortgaged for
years ahead to provide a means to repay the Soviet Union.
The predictable result was that the whole direction of
trade of the recipient would shift toward the Soviet Union.
This resulted because, as the Soviet capacity to absorb the
produce was limited, the Soviet Union would dump the excess
produce on the world market in order to acquire foreign
exchange. As a result, the world market would become glutted
with the particular commodity, thus eliminating or severely
reducing the Soviet military aid recipient's Western markets
and its only source of hard-currency income. In its military
barter agreements the Soviet Union insisted that commodity
repayments be evaluated in current (and normally depressed)
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world market prices, which were readjusted annually to ensure
that the Soviet Union would receive the full benefit from
any further reduction in the world market price of the commod-
ity. The Soviet Union insisted that a debt which could not
be covered by produce at current market prices, would be
repaid in fully convertible currency. Thus, the recipients
of Soviet weapons could find themselves drained of foreign
exchange, not only because of the artificial diversion of
their trade, but also because of direct Soviet calls on their
dollar or sterling balances.
Guinea was caught in this dilemma when the Soviet Union
was receiving bauxite at $US 6 a ton when the world market
price was $US 24. Since Somalia's export base consists of
little that the Soviets could absorb or dump, this has not
been as significant a problem for the Somalis.
D. SOVIET MILITARY AID TO GUINEA- -THE BEGINNINGS
Following Guinea's "no" vote in the 28 September 1958,
French Community referendum, French President de Gaulle
ordered the French out of Guinea. In order to punish the
Guineans for their affront to the French, de Gaulle ordered
all removable French infrastructure removed from the country.
As a result of this on independence day, 2 October 1958, the




In order to alleviate the immediate problem of a lack
of a national army, the Guinean government formed a two
thousand man army made up of some members of the French-trained
Gendarmerie and indigenous French Army veterans selected for
19their political reliability. This was only one of a number
of significant problems faced by Guinean President Sekou
Toure and his government. The French colonial legacy was
appalling. Although for nine years before independence French
colonial governors claimed that Guinea could become the "rice
granary of French West Africa," between 1955 and 1958 Guinea
imported 10,000 tons of rice. Although rich in mineral wealth
(gold, diamonds, iron ore, and bauxite) in 1958 Guinea was
exporting only small quantities of these minerals. Indigenous
industry was limited to the manufacture of soft drinks, soap,
canned fruit, and furniture. Transportation facilities were
grossly inadequate. Only 187 kilometers of roads were tarred.
The country's 673 kilometer railway could not function because
of the poor state of repair of the rails, and Guinea had one
port and one airport--both in Conakry. Although the popula-
tion of Guinea was estimated to be 2.8 million in 1959, there
was only one large hospital in Conakry, and one "second rate
hospital" and ninety-nine dispensaries managed by fifty-eight
doctors throughout the rest of the country. Finally, it was
estimated in 1956 that only ten percent of the school age
20population of Guinea were actually attending school.
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The outlook for Guinea was bleak. Guinea was in dire
need of assistance of all kinds, especially economic and
technical. The Western nations, including the US, were not
forthcoming with the needed aid, for fear of offending
President de Gaulle. This hesitation provided the Soviet
Union with its first opportunity to assist a Sub-Saharan
African state.
Since the Soviet Union perceived that Guinea's move gave
the country popular appeal with independence movements else-
where, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations
with Guinea almost immediately. However, despite this recog-
nition the Soviet leadership initially chose to remain in
the background letting its Eastern European satellites do
the "spadework."
By 7 January 1959, East Germany had already signed a
trade and cultural agreement with Guinea, which was to be
repaid under a partial barter arrangement of agricultural
produce. A Czechoslovakian trade delegation had also finalized
21
an aid agreement with Guinea. Additionally by 4 April 1959,
trade and diplomatic missions had arrived in Guinea from
22Bulgaria and Poland.
It has been suggested that the Kremlin's most urgent
purpose in establishing relations with Guinea was to establish
a base for "the political subversion of an awakening conti-
nent." Guinea was to be the African Cuba with dynamic and
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popular Sekou Toure cast in the role of Castro. Guinea, it
was postulated, was to be the heart of a Soviet master plan
23
to Sovietize Africa. There is some physical evidence to
support this argument. Some of the initial projects under-
taken in Guinea by the Soviet Union and her allies included
the building of a 100KW radio station, a printing press,
hotels for use by visiting delegations, a huge stadium to
be used for political rallies as well as sporting events, and
the establishment of a technical training school (which it
was conjectured had some ideological education in its
curriculum)
.
First reports of the arrival of military aid in Guinea
came in late March 1959 when a second shipment of arms from
Czechoslovakia arrived in Conakry in a Polish ship. Newspaper
accounts of the delivery also alluded to the arrival of a
first shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia which had arrived
25
"several days ago." A third shipment of arms arrived from
Czechoslovakia in early April 1959. In addition, during
this time frame, an eighteen man military delegation headed
by a Czech general, arrived in Guinea to train the Guineans
how to use the "gift cargo of weapons."
Sources conflict on what composed the "gift cargo," but
in any case the "gift" shipments comprised many more weapons
than a two thousand man army could possibly need. The reports
indicate that the shipments consisted of between three and
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eight thousand rifles (unofficial Guinean government sources
reported that only two to three thousand rifles were delivered)
,
150 thousand tons of ammunition, light artillery weapons
(bazookas and machine guns) , numerous antitank and antiair-
craft guns, three armoured cars, two light tanks, and radio
communication equipment. One reporter reported the visual
sighting at a military camp of about fifty small field kitch-
ens designed to be horsedrawn, although Guinea has no horses
because of the prevalence of the tsetse fly in the country.
Some neutral observers reported that much of the military
27
equipment received by Guinea was obsolete.
As could be expected, the Guinean government was unhappy
because the Western media had not reported the receipt of
non-military "gifts'* of tractors and plows with the same
zeal with which it had reported the arrival of the military
aid. Guinea further charged the French "colonialists" with
using the reportage of the Czech arms deliveries to alienate
Western sympathy from the country. In two April 1959 news
conferences held by Guinean Ambassadors at the United Nations
in New York, and in Paris, Guinea further articulated her
position on the Czech military aid. They rightfully claimed
that Guinea needed military aid because the French had
withdrawn or destroyed all military equipment prior to inde-
pendence. They further claimed that the "gifts" had been
unsolicited and were given within the framework of friendly
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relations between countries, and were not nearly as large
as had been reported. Guinea's foreign relations appeared
one sided, they said, because no Western nation had proposed
any agreements with Guinea. The GuineanUN Ambassador charged
that the effort to discredit Guinea for accepting Czecho-
slovakian military aid was an attempt by the "colonial powers"
to create the impression that the removal of colonialism
would inevitably open the way to infiltration from the out-
side, by which they meant communism. Both ambassadors, stating
that Guinea was ready to conclude commercial, technical, or
cultural agreements with any nation, appealed for ten thousand
tractors, fifty thousand plows, one thousand transportation
2 8
vehicles, fifty ambulances, and five hundred classrooms.
In late 1960 Sekou Toure visited Moscow and signed a trade
agreement with the Soviet Union. At the time Soviet Premier
Khrushchev told Toure that he could depend on the Soviet
29Union's "selfless economic and political support."
Relations with the Soviet Union cooled considerably about
a year later and culminated in the expulsion from Guinea of
Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod in December 1961. This strain
in relations was caused by a number of problems. First, the
"Teacher's Plot" to overthrow Toure was viewed by Toure as
an attempt by Moscow to install a more pliable leader in
his place. The Guineans were also becoming disenchanted by
the poor quality of Soviet aid and their poor performance
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in development projects. Finally the Soviets were perceived
30
to harbor racist sentiments against the Guineans
.
Guinean reaction to this disenchantment, besides the
expulsion of Solod, included expulsion of 60 French Communist
teachers, closing of the communist bookstore in Conakry,
joining the International Monetary Fund and inviting the US
Peace Corps to Guinea against Soviet wishes, voting against
the Soviet Bloc at the UN, and keeping the new Soviet Ambas-
sador waiting six weeks to present his credentials.
During the hiatus with the Soviets, West Germany insti-
tuted a $US 2.5 million military aid program with Guinea.
This program consisted of equipping and training three engi-
neering companies, building military roads, and improving
32the nation's communication infrastructure.
To reestablish better Guinean-Soviet relations Moscow
sent First Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Guinea in January 1962.
During his visit Toure again emphasized Guinea's willingness
to accept aid from any country. Two months after Mikoyan 's
visit Pravda announced a new Soviet loan for Guinea, believed
to be in excess of $US 10 million, to be used to cover the
costs of Soviet personnel and equipment sent to Guinea to
build hangars, fuel storage tanks, and aircraft servicing
facilities at Conakry airport; warehouses in five cities; and
33
a rail line between Conakry and the inland city of Mamou.
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E. THE CONTINUING ASSOCIATION- -1962-1969
The renewed aid did not gain all of the influence that
the Soviets desired. In October 1962 during the Cuban
missile crisis, Moscow requested landing rights at Conakry
for reinforcement airlifts enroute to Cuba. Toure, pleading
34
neutrality, politely but firmly resisted the Soviet entreaties.
During the remainder of the 1960s Soviet and Soviet Bloc
aid, consisting primarily of training assistance, remained
at a low level and Guinea maintained a 2000 man army and a
3300 man paramilitary force throughout the remainder of the
decade ( see Figure One) . However the Guinean economy
stagnated and the Soviet and Soviet Bloc barter deals which
appeared so tempting, locked Guinean trade into a straight-
jacket, depriving the government of needed foreign exchange
while enabling the Communist bloc to sell Guinea's produce
on the world market for hard currency. Soviet barter mer-
•7(1
chandise shipped to Guinea was inferior and overpriced.
In late 1967 Portuguese intelligence reports were made
public which suggested that in September of that year Guinea
and the Soviet Union had signed a secret agreement which, in
exchange for an unspecified amount of arms, supposedly
delivered in mid-November, gave the Soviets the right to
37
establish a submarine base and radio installations in Guinea.
Subsequent information and data have shown the report to be
erroneous on both counts. At this time there were, however,
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two hundred Guineans reported to be studying in various
3 8
Soviet military academies.
The Soviet Navy made its first appearance in Guinea,
when a task group of Soviet warships paid a highly publicized
visit to Conakry in February 1969. This was the first visit
by Soviet warships to a West African nation south of Morocco.
F. THE INCREASING ASSOCIATION- -1970 -1979
The size of Guinea's Army increased dramatically follow-
ing the November 19 70 invasion of Conakry by Portuguese and
anti-Toure forces. As can be seen in Figure One, the army
was enlarged and reorganized. Although reports of specific
deliveries of military aid are incomplete, analysis of Guinean
weapons inventories would indicate that the Soviets and/or
their allies provided Guinea with additional tanks, armoured
personnel carriers, and artillery. In addition to this aid
to the Army, a two hundred man Navy was formed and supplied
with six ex-Soviet patrol boats, and a two hundred man Air
Force was formed and supplied with eight MIG-17 fighters,
39two IL-18, and four IL-14 transport aircraft. The para-
military forces were also increased to include a five thousand
40
man "Chinese trained" People's Militia.
The early 1970s saw a reorganization of the armed forces
structure brought about not only by the unsuccessful Portu-
guese invasion, but also by a 1969 "military plot" against
Toure
. The reorganization was characterized by a shift from
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training the army for a role of strictly military nature to
a role which was overshadowed by the Army's civic action.
This effort included a campaign to eliminate widespread
41illiteracy in the army ranks.
Radio Conakry in a 23 February 1970 report stated that
the Guinean Army had inherited a colonial structure, and this
encouraged colonialist attempts to reconquer Guinea using
lackeys among the lesser officers. "The reorganization of
the armed forces was planned for their rational usage in the
consolidation of political independence and the acceleration
42
of the struggle for economic liberation in the country."
The new organization would consist of "militants in uniform."
Finally, the armed forces would no longer be concentrated
in the urban centers but would be distributed throughout
Guinea. The Marxist/Leninist influence in this reorganiza-
tion was evident, and the redeployment of forces stemmed
from Toure ' s desire to keep the military as fragmented as
possible in order to prevent challenges to his power. In
late 1970, in a move designed to further increase the mili-
tary indoctrination of the non-military Guinean population,
militia instruction was made compulsory at all educational
institutions, in order to make the struggle against "imperial-
ist threats" more effective. The Soviet Bloc was happy to
lend their support to these efforts because this portrayed




These efforts fed Toure's grandiose schemes and in April
1971 he announced a plan to provide 300,000 to 500,000 Guinean
men and women with military training, after which "arms depots"
would be put at the disposal of the people for use in case of
foreign aggression. A component of this scheme was to form
a 1000 to 2000 member militia in each of the country's 210
43
administrative districts. The fact that at no time has the
paramilitary force strength exceeded 8,000 members would
indicate the failure of this grandiose scheme.
Initial reports of Soviet warships regularly using Conakry
as a base of operations for the West African coast came in
late 1971. According to US observers this presence was meant
to show Soviet support for Toure, and increase Soviet influ-
ence in West African affairs. In addition, Soviet support
of Guinea provided them with landing rights in Conakry for
their long range reconnaissance aircraft, used to reconoiter
the South Atlantic.
Some reports indicate that Cuban military advisers arrived
44in Guinea as early as 1972. Conakry was also used as an
assembly location for Russian advisers and Cuban troops enroute
to Angola during the 1975 crisis in that country.
Despite this heavy Soviet/Soviet Bloc influence in Guinea
during the mid-1970s, Toure began to seek to normalize rela-
tions with a number of Western nations and with several of
Guinea's neighbors with whom Guinea had had strained relations.
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Relations were reestablished with West Germany in May 1975,
established with Japan in. January 1976, and reestablished
with France in February 1976. The reason these diplomatic
moves were taken was to establish economic ties with some
of the Western countries who had the potential to invest in
45Guinea on non-barter terms of trade.
The Soviet Union and Cuba still retained considerable
influence in the military. In early 19 77 three hundred
Cubans were reported to be serving as a "palace guard for
46Toure," as well as advisers to the Army. Late 1978 reports
suggest that in addition to some "400 Cuban advisers" there
were also approximately one thousand Soviet military advisers
in Guinea. Yet Soviet influence was not exclusive in the
military area because the People's Republic of China again
48delivered two Shanghai class gunboats to Guinea in 1977.
The years 1977-1978 saw a three thousand man increase in
the Guinean Army's strength. Additionally, the Army received
new T-54 medium and PT-76 light tanks and doubled their inven-
49tory of armoured personnel carriers. The Air Force also
was reported to have received two MIG-21 aircraft.
There are a number of possible causes for this increase
in strength and support. In addition to reestablishing/
establishing relations with the developed countries during
the mid-1970s, Guinea had also mended her fences with a number
of her neighbors. In 1977 Guinea sent a peace keeping force
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to Liberia to help restore order there following "rice riots."
A peace keeping force was also sent to Senegal in mid-1978,
again to calm civil unrest. These threats to the Liberian
and Senegalese governments may well have caused Toure some
concern because he may have felt no more secure than the
leaders in Liberia and Senegal- -therefore strengthening his
army for protection. A corollary reason may have to do with
Toure 's desire to present Guinea as a military power (albeit
relative) prior to embarking on a renewed Pan-Africanist
crusade. Finally, Toure may just have been setting himself
up with a large Army preparatory to an anticipated cooling
of Soviet-Guinean relations, and a reemphasis of Guinea's
nonaligned independence.
The Soviets on their part may have been driven by the
desire to ensure the continued use of Guinean air facilities
to support their resupply efforts in Angola and Ethiopia,
and to "sweeten the pot" before asking for authorization to
build a naval base in Guinea. If these were their motiva-
tions, neither bore fruit.
In May 1978 Sekou Toure cancelled the right of Soviet
military aircraft to use Conakry airport as a base for Atlantic
surveillance flights. Toure did, however, continue to
permit Soviet warships to use Conakry as a port of call.
Two plausible reasons have been suggested for this shift in
Guinean attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The first reason
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was the blunt refusal of the Russians to renegotiate their
contract for the purchase of bauxite which permitted them
to acquire this valuable resource at prices well below the
world market price. A second reason was that Toure felt
himself under pressure from the Soviets to allow them to
construct naval facilities on the Guinean island of Tamara,
52but did not want to permit the construction of the facilities.
In mid-1978 it was reported that in 1977 Toure refused
to permit Russian advisers and Cuban troops to assemble in
Guinea enroute to Ethiopia. The Soviets responded to the
prohibiton by cutting off crude oil exports to Guinea and
temporarily recalling her Ambassador in Guinea. The US filled
53the crude oil gap.
Militarily Guinea is still dependent on the Soviet Union
and her allies for support.
G. THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP
Between 1955 and 1978 a total of 1290 military personnel
from Guinea were trained in communist countries. A total
of 330 communist military technicians were also reported to
be in Guinea in 1978. Therefore Guinea finds itself sup-
plied, trained, and advised by communist countries. To shift
support at this time is economically infeasible. A possible
shift in dependence may result from Guinea's new ties with
France, who is capable of supplying Guinea with military aid.
Any possible transition will be slow, taking perhaps a decade
146

unless there is a severe Communist -Guinea break in relations,
which appears unlikely at this time.
Although landing rights for reconnaissance flights have
been cancelled, to be able to use the port facilities in
Conakry still provides an important strategic capability to
the Soviets. They further have an economic stake in Guinea
which must not be jeopardized. The Soviet Union is not ex-
pected to sever relations with Guinea and will continue to
train Guinean military personnel. In fact People's Republic
of Guinea decree number 17 of 9 January 1979 reported the
names of twenty Guinean Air Force personnel who were being
sent to the Soviet Union for three years to receive pilot
and maintenance training in the MIG-21 and MIG-17 aircraft.
In her foreign relations Guinea will continue to pursue
her non-aligned, Pan-African policies. In a Paris Radio
interview conducted in November 1978, Toure stressed that
Guinea was experiencing no interference from the Soviet Union,
emphasizing that the trust shown other countries by Guinea
is based on that country's attitude toward Guinea. "Africa
must opt for non-alignment, preserve its personality, cooper-
ate on an equal footing with the continents which may wish
to work with it."
H. SOVIET MILITARY AID TO SOMALIA- -THE BEGINNINGS
Somalia, unlike Guinea, was relatively well prepared for
independence on 1 July 1960. The new government was, however,
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faced with a paucity of natural resources in the nation,
large deficits in the public budget, an unresolved boundary
dispute with Ethiopia, and irredentist designs on Ethiopia,
Djibouti, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. In
the economic sphere bananas, livestock on the hoof, and
hides and skins were the Republic's major exports. Although
some mineral wealth did exist, the quality of the deposits
was poor, the skilled manpower base low (if not nonexistent)
,
and the required infrastructure was inadequate. Further,
about eighty percent of the population was nomadic and there-
fore outside the cash sector of the economy making the nation's
tax base extremely low. The nation's literacy rate was below
five percent. To say that the new Republic of Somalia was
in need of immediate economic, social, and cultural aid would
be an understatement.
Somalia, however, further felt that it needed military
aid in order to build its five thousand man army into a fight-
ing force which would be capable of countering the US supplied
Ethiopian Army. In early 1961 there were a number of anti-
American demonstrations in Somalia protesting US military aid
to Ethiopia.
In early June 1961 Somali Prime Minister Shermarke made
a ten day visit to Moscow. At the conclusion of his visit
he signed an aid agreement with the Soviets, in which the
Soviets "promised to build without compensation two hospitals,
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a high school, a printing plant, and a radio station. It
also will send without compensation groups of Soviet physicians
57
and teachers and to train Somali doctors in Soviet schools."
This initial assistance was similar to that given to Guinea.
In addition to this aid, in 1961 and 1962 Somalia received
varying amounts of aid from Italy, the United Kingdom, the
United Nations, the European Common Market, West Germany,
the US and the United Arab Republic (UAR) . The US also pro-
vided equipment to the Somali Police Force, while the UAR
58provided substantial arms to the Somali Army.
Somalia was not happy with the amount of military aid
they were receiving to support their five thousand man army.
Somalia wanted aid to support a ten thousand man army. Prime
Minister Shermarke, during his initial visit to the US in
November 1962, asked President Kennedy for increased military
aid- -weapons to match the four US equippped divisions in
Ethiopia, and to arm an internal security force. A primary
factor in this request was the Somali government's need to
keep irredentism alive as a unifying force within the nation,
and keep its promise to reunite "Greater Somalia," by force
if necessary.
Initial anti-Western sentiments were exacerbated in March
1963 when Somalia broke diplomatic relations with the United
Kingdom over the failure of the British to recognize the
desire of the population of Kenya's Northern Frontier District
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to secede and join Somalia. The fact that this break cost
Somalia an annual loss of $US 3.64 million in aid from Britain
59
only made matters worse.
The US finally responded to Shermarke's earlier request
for military aid in August 1963, while the Somalis and Soviets
were negotiating a military aid agreement in Moscow. The
US offered to immediately ship "certain defensive weapons,"
however, the US specified that this aid was not meant to
"offset the annual American contribution of $US 10 million
in arms to Ethiopia as rent for a communication base in
Asmara." The US aid package was reported to have been
designed to supply between five and six thousand men, and
provide engineering equipment which could be used for internal
development.
On 15 November 1963, a Somali UN spokesman announced that
his country had accepted military aid from the Soviet Union
rather than the US because Somalia's "longstanding request
for US military assistance was not met." The spokesman em-
phasized that this acceptance did not mean that Somalia was
"going communist" or that she was preparing to fight her
neighbors, and expressed a hope of receiving economic and
military aid from the US in the future.
The Soviet Union was able to seal this agreement for
a number of reasons. First, she was prompt in agreeing to
the deal which was set up between August and November 1963.
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Second, she provided the Somalis with more than, they needed.
The deal was reported to be worth $US 32 million, with the
objective of raising a ten thousand man army. Finally,
the Soviets could view the aid as supporting a national
liberation movement, since that is how the Somalis character-
ized the Somali/Ethiopian war in the Ogaden. Even Ethiopian
Emperor Selassie charged that Soviet military aid would per-
mit the Somalis to release small arms to the guerillas fighting
on the Ethiopian frontier.
Somalia defended its choice of suppliers by arguing that
the Western offer was not only too late, but was inadequate
quantitatively and qualitatively, and was further unaccepta-
ble because of the political conditions accompanying it (that
Somalia could acquire military aid from no other source)
.
The Soviet proposal was on the other hand Munconditional .
"
Although refusing to provide the specifics of the Soviet
package, Shermarke complained that the Western powers had
tried, since Somalia won her independence, to persuade Somalia
to concentrate on economic development and hold military
spending to the minimum required for internal police
64protection.
As early as February 1964 fear was being expressed by
Somalia's neighbors about the possibility of the establish-
ment of a Soviet military base in Somalia. Somali President
Osman denied that the military aid agreement with the Soviet
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Union provided for the construction of a Soviet base. The
Somali Republic, he said, "will not allow anyone to build a
base on its territory." A year later in an interview over
Radio Mogadishu, Somali Defense Minister Adan stated that
"[those Russian instructors] who serve under us... train our
Army in the use of the arms we receive from the Soviet Union.
They follow our orders and do nothing on their own." Yet
despite these assurances, the Soviets with this initial mili-
tary aid package laid the groundwork for what was to become
a significant Soviet presence in Somalia a decade later.
Some 500 Somalian military officers went to Russia for train-
ing and the Soviet Union sent an estimated two hundred to one
thousand military experts to Somalia to help train and
reorganize the armed forces. They also commenced work on
improving the port facilities in Berbera to permit the handling
f\ 7
of ships with displacements of up to ten thousand tons.
Somalia, at this time, was not totally dependent on the
Russians for military aid. Some Somali officers were still
sent to Italy for training and Italy, along with West Germany
and the US, provided assistance for the training of the police
and a commando battalion.
Reports of early Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia are
sketchy. An early 1966 report by "an authoritative source"
asserts that deliveries up to that time had included sixty-
five tanks, sixty-five armoured personnel carriers, antiaircraft
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and field artillery weapons, a squadron of MIG-15s, and a
"considerable quantity" of infantry weapons. Additionally
two hundred fifty officers and non-commissioned officers,
along with about six hundred Somali cadets were in the Soviet
69Union for training. Somalia finally showed off some of
her "new" Soviet equipment during the Sixth Anniversary In-
dependence Day Parade when thirty-three T-34 tanks, twenty-
five armoured personnel carriers, antiaircraft guns, mortars,
rangefinders , and mobile radar units passed in review as
70
seventeen MIG aircraft flew overhead.
A number of other factors which came to light during the
mid-1960s showed growing Soviet influence in Somalia. In
mid-1965 the Russians turned a new 50KW radio station in
Mogadishu over to the Somalis. Cultural agreements were
signed providing numerous scholarships for Somalis to study
in Soviet/Soviet Bloc schools. The Soviet Union gave the
Somalis oil to the value of $US 7 million--"enough for a
whole year." (When the Soviets were expelled from Somalia
in late 1977, as in Guinea previously, they stopped providing
oil to Somalia. Saudia Arabia entered the breech to supply
Somali with the required oil.) Finally, in mid-1966 Radio
Mogadishu reported that twenty thousand students were train-
ing at military camps following a government order that all




The Soviets made use of proxies to a lesser degree in
Somalia than in Guinea. Somali military personnel were
reported to be receiving training in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq,
and the Egyptians were reported to be providing the Somalis
71
with weapons, including two ex-Soviet Skory class destroyers.
The end of the decade found Somalia with a military man-
power strength of slightly less than ten thousand. The goal
that the military reach the twenty thousand man level had
lost much of its urgency because of a relaxation of the mili-
tant irredentist sentiment that had characterized newly
independent Somalia. This policy of detente was contributory
to the October 1969 coup d'etat, which saw the military gain
power. This assumption of power opened a new chapter in
Soviet-Somali relations.
I. THE STRENGTHENING ASSOCIATION- -1969-1976
Politically, the new Somali government with its centralized
Supreme Revolutionary Council and its socialist rhetoric, was
even more appealing to the Soviet Union than was the previous
government. As a result of this new rhetoric, much of the
Western world looked at Somalia skeptically; however, the
Soviet Union embraced the new government.
One of the clearest indications of the Soviet commitment
to the new government was its increased supply of military
aid. The size of the Somali Army almost doubled in the first
two years following the revolution. The amount of major
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Soviet military equipment reported to be in the Somali
inventory showed a dramatic rise (See Figure 2)
.
There was also an apparent shift in emphasis as the
Soviets became more desirous of utilizing bases in Somalia
to support their growing presence in the Indian Ocean. In
early 1972 Soviet Defense Minister Grechko paid a four day
visit to Somalia, and expressed Soviet satisfaction "with
respect to the relations of friendship and broad cooperation
between the Armed Forces of the two countries and to an agree-
72
ment on practical measures for their further consolidation."
This visit was followed shortly thereafter by a shift in
emphasis on the role of the military in Somalia which was
obviously Soviet inspired and resembled the "militant in
uniform" philosophy of Guinea. In a message to the National
Army on the twelfth anniversary of its founding Somali Presi-
dent Barre described the Army as the "vanguard of the socialist
revolution in Somalia." He continued that he was convinced
that the "National Army will play a key role in the construc-
tion of the country..." Finally, he called on the Army to
redouble its efforts in the contribution they were making in
the social, economic, and political spheres and in defense
73
against Somalia's enemies--reaction and imperialism.
Relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union improved
still further with the July 1974 visit to Somalia by Chair-
man of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Podgorny.
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This visit culminated in the signing of a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation between the two countries.
From the Somali perspective, they saw the Treaty as pro-
viding them with more military equipment. In fact as can be
seen in Figure 2 this took not only the form of quantitative
improvements, but also qualitative improvements. Podgorny's
visit was followed by the disclosure that among other mili-
tary equipment the Soviets would supply the Somali Air Force
74
with seven MIG-21 aircraft. The Somalis needed this new
equipment because relations with Ethiopia were deteriorating.
From the Soviet perspective Somalia and base rights in
the country had taken on a new strategic significance follow-
ing the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Arab oil embargo. They
also saw it as something of a "quid pro quo" to the US
development of base facilities at Diego Garcia. The Soviets
were, however, only cementing a "fait accompli" because
although post treaty signing reports suggested that the Soviets
had provided the Somali military with additional equipment
in return for bunkering and resupply facilities in Berbera,
the fact was that the Soviets already had a base facility in
Berbera- -a section of the port completely controlled by the
Soviets. Additionally there were an estimated 2500 Soviet
75
military advisers in Somalia at this time.
Additional Soviet interest in Somalia was exhibited by
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Fleet Gorshkov's December
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1974 visit to Somalia to discuss questions concerning "increased
Soviet -Somali cooperation."
Considerable controversy arose in late 1974 and 1975 over
US accusations (accompanied by intelligence photos) of Soviet
bases in Somalia. Somali President Barre flatly denied US
accusations that bases had been granted to the Russians,
stating "Somali ports are open to all nations for peaceful
7 f\
purposes." Somali Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Ghalib also denied the presence of the bases, stating that
Somalia objected to the presence of foreign controlled bases
in their country because it compromised a part of Somalia's
sovereignty; it meant accepting the domination of neocolo-
nialism; and foreign bases were detrimental to international
77peace and security. He further accused the West of using
the base issue to attempt to justify the US-British presence
in Diego Garcia and the French presence in Djibouti, and to
provide justification for establishing a Western base on
78Masira Island of Oman. Soviet denials were not as vehement
but did describe US accusations as "wild speculation."
To reinforce their denials, the Somalis invited the US
to inspect the Berbera facilities to see for themselves that
there were no "bases." Several reasons for this invitation
are plausible. First, the Somalis may not have considered
the Russian installations to be "bases" in the strict mili-
tary sense. Second, Somalia was experiencing a severe drought
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and Barre may have hoped that this openness would secure
badly needed US aid to help with resettling and feeding the
265,000 refugees from the drought. Third, the Somalis may
not have known the extent of Soviet facilities in Berbera.
Fourth, Barre himself may have been misinformed of the
extent of the facilities by pro-Soviet officers in the mili-
tary. Finally, Barre may have wanted to show his independence
from the Soviets, proving to the world that Somalia was not
becoming a Soviet outpost. In an interview Barre stated
"There is no Soviet military equipment in my country under
Russian control. Berbera is our port..." He continued
"I deny that Russian planes ever landed here during naval
exercises. Berbera does not have an airfield big enough to
take planes that size. I am not sure how many [Russian ad-
visers] are here, but certainly under a thousand. There are
79
more Chinese here building roads than Russians."
What the US House and Senate delegations found when they
visited Berbera only confirmed previous US intelligence re-
ports. The facilities in Berbera included a fuel storage
capacity of 140 thousand barrels, three 1000 foot bunkers
for missile storage, a missile arming center, a 13000 foot
runway, and two Soviet-manned radio stations designed for
8long-range multi-directional communications. The complex
was protected by surface to air missiles.
159

J. THE WEAKENING COMMITMENT- -1 976-19 77
Soviet and Somali relations remained cordial through
1975 and 1976 with the Soviets providing Somalia with con-
tinued military aid including MIG-21 aircraft, SA-2/3 surface
to air missile systems, T-54 medium tanks and OSA missile
8
1
boats, and a supply of at least thirty Styx (SS-N-2) missiles.
The Soviets in early 1976 were reported to be building a
missile base in Kismayu, about sixty miles from the Kenya
border. Reports indicated that the Soviets intended to trans-
8 2fer the base to the Somali Government upon its completion.
However, the overthrow of Emperor Selassie in Ethiopia and
the breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and the US pre-
sented the Soviets with another target of opportunity in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The problem, however, was how to gain
influence in Ethiopia without alienating Somalia.
The Soviets serious courtship of the new Ethiopian govern-
ment commenced in 1976. The courtship was made difficult,
beginning in January 1977, when the Western Somali Liberation
Front (WSLF) began a drive into Ethiopia through the Ogaden,
assisted unofficially by regular army officers on leave (most
probably Soviet trained) and using Soviet made and provided
equipment.
In an attempt to keep a foot in both the Somalian camp
and the Ethiopian camp, the Soviets had Fidel Castro A^isit
Somalia, Ethiopia, and South Yemen in an effort to forge a
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trilateral alliance and thereby hopefully diffuse and stop
the WSLF drive into the Ogaden, and to further form a "radi-
cal alliance" at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
Castro's unsuccessful 16 March 1977, visit to Somalia was
followed by an effort by moderate Arab League states to woo
the Somalis and South Yemenis out of the Soviet camp through
the good offices of Sudanese President Numeri who met with
the leaders of North Yemen, South Yemen, and Somalia on March
23. It was reported that Saudi Arabia had also offered
Somalia $US 300 million in military and other aid if they
8 3broke with the Soviet Union.
The Castro failure did not discourage the Soviets from
attempting one additional diplomatic effort to resolve their
dilemma in the Horn, with a two day (2-3 April 1977) visit
to Somalia by Podgorny. When these diplomatic efforts failed
the Soviets began an attempt to stymie Somali efforts in the
Ogaden by slowing resupply of required military equipment to
Somalia. Yet despite the apparent strain in Soviet-Somali
relations, Somali President Barre, when asked about the pos-
sibility of breaking with the Soviets, claimed in a late
June 1977 interview that "we are not thinking in terms of
divorce and remarriage." Stating that four thousand Russian
advisers were in Somalia to advise the army down to the
company level, Barre said that "I can assure you there will
be no conflict between Somalia and the Soviets. They never




same token we cannot influence Soviet policy." Shortly
thereafter Barre openly committed regular Somali troops to
the Ogaden War. By August 1977 the Soviets had closed the
8 5Somali military aid pipeline. The Soviets continued to
increase their military aid to Ethiopia, preparatory to a
massive supply of aid commencing in November 1977.
Somali unhappiness with the Soviet tilt toward Ethiopia
was expressed on a number of occasions by Siad Barre. In a
nationwide radio broadcast on October 21 he said that "the
continuation of the present all-out armed support of the
Ethiopian regime by the USSR and the influx of Cuban troops"
put the relations between these countries and Somalia "in
great jeopardy." At a November 2 press conference in
Mogadishu, Barre stated "The Somali Democratic Republic has
never been anybody's stooge. I hereby delcare that Somalia
8 7pursues a non-aligned foreign policy."
On October 19, the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia announced
that his country had "officially and formally" ended supply-
ing arms to Somalia. He followed this, four days later, with
8 8
a pledge of total Soviet support for Ethiopia.
Somalia reacted on 13 November 1977, to this shift in
Soviet support by abrogating the Soviet -Somali Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation; ordering all Soviet military and
civilian advisers stationed in Somalia to leave the country
within one week; ordering the Soviets to immediately withdraw
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from all military facilities granted them by the Somali
government, and calling for the Soviets to reduce their
embassy staff to eight persons. In addition to these sanc-
tions against the Soviet Union, the Somali government ordered
the expulsion of all Cuban advisors within forty-eight hours,
followed by the severing of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
K. ANATOMY OF THE SPLIT
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been opposed
to Somali aggression in the Ogaden as this aggression violated
the OAU policy of the inviolability of the "colonial borders"
of African nations. Therefore, faced with a general lack
of support among African nations for her expansion, follow-
ing her split with the Soviets Somalia began seeking support
from her Arab League associates, and a number of Western
nations
.
Her Arab League partners were able to provide only limited
military aid, and the two members who were willing to provide
the most aid, Saudi Arabia and Iran, were prevented from
doing so by the US restriction on the retransfer of US mili-
tary equipment to third parties.
Although the US was reported in June 1977 to have been
prepared to "reduce Somali dependence on the Soviet Union"
by providing her with defensive military equipment, the
entry of the Somali Army into the Ogaden War resulted in
the US making her aid dependent on the Somali's withdrawal
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from the Ogaden. Attempts to procure arms from Great Britain
met with a negative response; a position which would not
change, British spokesmen stated, as long as Somalia main-
tained its irredentist claim to the Northern Frontier District
of Kenya.
Why did Somalia expel the Russians? First, the Soviets
upon whom they were militarily dependent, had stopped resup-
ply, and therefore Somalia was forced to decide that the
time had come to diversify its sources of military aid. They
anticipated that the West and Arab League would be most will-
ing to jump in and fill the vacuum left by the Soviet departure
89This has not been the case.
Second, prior to the split Somalia was becoming closely
associated with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet bases placed
her nonaligned status in jeopardy. The Soviet expulsion
provided Somalia a means of reestablishing her nonaligned
credentials
.
Third, the Somalis were unhappy with Soviet attempts to
meddle in Somali internal affairs. Following the Soviet/Cuban
expulsion, Somali government officials, in various forums,
accused the Soviet Union of "imperialism" and "opportunism."
The decision to expel the Soviets was made, it was claimed,
in order to safeguard the sovereignty, unity and existence
of the Somali people. President Barre stated at a news
conference that Somalia "could not have its policy dictated
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to it," and added that "independence and liberty were pref-
erable to any amount of material aid." The Cubans were also
90
accused of being tools of the "neocolonialists.
"
Whatever the anticipated payoff, Somalia did not receive
the support she anticipated prior to her break with the
Soviets, and as a result lost the war in the Ogaden after
massive Soviet and Cuban aid and assistance was provided to
the Ethiopians.
What determined the Soviet willingness to shift camps?
First, it was apparent to the Soviets from the Castro and
Podgorny failures that Russia in the near term was not going
to be able to create the desired alliance, and the major
stumbling block to the plan was Somali intransigence.
Second, ignoring Somali accusations that they were turn-
ing their backs on support of a war of national liberation,
the Soviets by their support of Ethiopia could, by extension,
be viewed by the leaders of OAU countries as being supportive
of the OAU's "status quo" position with regard to international
boundaries in Africa.
In his book War Clouds on the Horn of Africa , Tom Farer
suggests three salient costs to the Soviet Union that their
break with Somalia would entail: the loss of access to air
and naval facilities in Somalia; loss of credibility as an
ally; and involvement in a military quagmire threatening
91great cost and little hope of success.
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The Soviets considered that the facilities in Somalia
for bunkering and maintenance of their naval forces were not
essential, at least in a time of low tension, since these
facilities were available to some degree in Aden, Iraq,
Mauritius, and Mozambique. The loss of the air base and
communication facilities was, however, more critical. Based
on Soviet resupply efforts in Ethiopia it would appear that
significant aircraft handling capability exists at least in
Addis Ababa, and communication facilities could be constructed
in Ethiopia if desired. Furthermore, the Soviet loss is not
necessarily irreversible. To date no Western power or coali-
tion of powers has stepped in to fill the vacuum left by
the Soviet expulsion.
The Soviets are not burning their bridges behind them
as shown by the message of congratulations received by Barre
from Brezhnev on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of
the Somali revolution. In the message Brezhnev sent his
"cordial congratulations" and wished the Somali people "pros-
92perity and progress." Furthermore, after the break with
the Soviets Barre reaffirmed the fact that Somalia is and
93
will remain a socialist state.
Considerations of credibility should not have weighed
heavily on the Soviets. After all, the Somalis had initiated
the conflict, and once the Somalis had violated the inviolate
colonial boundaries accepted by the OAU, the Soviets could
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invoke its respect for regional and international norms to
justify its shift. Furthermore, after what appeared to be
good-faith efforts to conciliate the dispute, the Soviets
could invoke the parochial norm of fraternal assistance among
Marxist states to shed a positive light on the alliance shift.
The quagmire question was more serious but not alarming.
Since the Soviets controlled the military effectiveness of
the Somalis by refusing to provide them with military spares,
they were capable of slowing the Somali offensive by "doing
nothing." Furthermore, while the Somalis were, even under
the best of circumstances, hard-pressed to strike at the
Ethiopian heartland, the Ethiopians could ignore the wastes
of the Ogaden and press on to critical Somali targets. There-
fore, given sufficient assistance the Ethiopians would be
able to gain the upper hand in the conflict and bring it to
94
an end.
In retrospect the Soviet Union was able to make a major
shift in alliances with minimum negative repercussions.
L. CONCLUSIONS
What of the hypotheses? The Guinean and Somalian case
studies show that although Soviet economic aid to these
countries might have resulted in a limited amount of influ-
ence, military aid provided the Soviets with significantly
more leverage with which to achieve their policy objectives.
Second, in both cases Western failure to be forthcoming
with military aid provided the Soviets with golden opportunities
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to become the arms supplier. In the case of Guinea, despite
her desire for Western aid, the West ignored her. In the
case of Somalia, the West was given the first opportunity to
provide military aid, but because of self-imposed restrictions,
lost the Somalis to the Soviets.
The case studies do not conclusively prove the third
hypothesis. Although Soviet-Guinean and Soviet-Somalian
relations have deteriorated during the last few years, the
linkage between African demands for qualitative and quanti-
tative improvements, the Soviets failure to meet these demands,
and the deterioration of relations cannot be proved. In
the case of Guinea, after some initial problems, the Soviets
have provided the Guinean military with the amount of equip-
ment that their poorly educated military can absorb. Since
the Guineans perceive no significant exterior threat to their
security they have been satisfied with the modest improvements
in military aid. In the case of Somalia, up until 1977 when
the Soviets realized that they would have to choose either
Ethiopia or Somalia, her military aid had most probably been
quantitatively greater than the Somalis could absorb. How-
ever, because much of the equipment was permitted to fall
into disrepair, the Somalis most probably absorbed as much
as they were capable of operating. The fact that the Soviets
provided the Somalis with so much equipment was determined
in great part by their desire to maintain the strategically
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located bases in Somalia. Other than the combat aircraft
most of the military aid provided Somalia was of post-World
War II vintage and therefore should have been qualitatively
simple enough for the Somalis to absorb. The fact that so
many foreign military advisers were required in Somalia,
however, would tend to refute the assumption.
With regard to that portion of the hypothesis which
attributes the deterioration of relations to Soviet attempts
to exercise greater control over the deployment and use of
the military aid provided, the case studies did not prove
this conclusively. In Guinea, although this may have been
a secondary determinant in the decision to cancel Soviet
landing rights, the request for permission to construct naval
facilities cannot be used as sufficient evidence to prove the
hypothesis. The primary determinants of the cooling in
Soviet-Guinean relations were economic (dissatisfaction with
Soviet economic aid and repayment agreements) and political
(desire to reassert national sovereignty and nonalignment)
.
The Somali case supports the hypothesis to the extent that
the Soviets attempted to control the deployment and use of
Soviet supplied military aid by cutting off logistics support
in 1977. In the final analysis, however, the primary deter-
minants of the break in Soviet-Somali relations were political
(the shift of Soviet political and military support to Ethiopia
and the desire to reassert national sovereignty and nonalignment)
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The cases studied do not provide a definitive analytical
framework to use when studying the relationship between mili-
tary aid and the continuation of relations between the Soviet
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V. PATTERNS QF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO GUINEA AND SOMALIA
A. INTRODUCTION
Since World War II the disbursing of economic and tech-
nical aid to less developed countries (LDCs) has been a major
theme of United States [US) foreign policy. This policy was
initiated immediately following the war to assist in the
rebuilding of a devastated Europe. In early 1947 economic
aid was used for the first time as a political tool to stave
off the spread of communism, when President Harry Truman
requested that Congress authorize economic aid donations for
Greece and Turkey which were portrayed as being threatened
by Communism.
The postwar period found the Soviet Union preoccupied
with reconstruction and the developing cold war. As a result
of this the Soviet Union failed to work out positive economic
policies toward the developing nations. It vigorously sup-
ported indigenous Communist parties, to the exclusion of
emerging nationalist regimes. An example of Moscow's nega-
tive attitude toward non-Communist regimes in the LDCs
following the war can be seen in its refusal to contribute
to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program when it
was established in 1948. One of the earliest indications
of a change in Soviet attitudes toward the Third World was
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the unexpected July 1953 Soviet announcement that the Soviet
Union was prepared to contribute to the United Nations Tech-
nical Assistance Program.
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the mid-1950s
saw the evolution and expansion of economic aid as a central
focus of East-West competition in the Third World. An
example of this focus can be seen in Soviet economic aid to
Egypt. Between 1956 and 1958 the US government withdrew and
refused to reinstate the economic assistance desired by Egypt
to construct the Aswan High Dam; in response the Soviet Union
stepped in to offer Soviet economic assistance to allow its
construction. An additional development that will be discussed
will show how the Soviet Union, during the past decade, has
modified its philosophy of economic and technical aid result-
ing in a drastic reduction in the quantity of non-military
economic and technical aid it has provided LDCs, especially
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Two related hypotheses will be evaluated in this chapter
using the Soviet experience in Guinea and Somalia. First,
African nations will become solely reliant on the Soviet
Union only in the event of Western unwillingness/failure to
provide the recipient desired economic aid.
Second, the Soviet Union is unable and unwilling to
provide sufficient economic aid and assistance to ensure the
agricultural and industrial development of African nations.
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What is aid? Technical and economic cooperation is a
more descriptive term than aid; however, technical and eco-
nomic cooperation occurs between developed countries and
need not incorporate aid. Aid only occurs when the economic
cooperation contains a "gift" element. This "gift" element
can be an outright grant of assistance with no repayment
required, or it can be the charging of a lower rate of
interest on a credit than the marginal rate of return on its
other possible investments. Therefore for the purpose of
this chapter aid is defined as a grant or a credit provided
to a LDC . Aid can include the financing of industrial/agri-
cultural projects, provision of food supplies, and the
provision of technical expertise.
B. SOVIET AID- -AN OVERVIEW
With the death of Stalin and the Soviet Union's abandon-
ment of its hostile policy toward non-communist nationalist-
led nations, came a new era in the Soviet use of aid as a
foreign policy tool. This new policy was attuned to the
aspirations of the LDCs and entailed both rendering diplomatic
support against the West and catering to the desires of the
LDCs for economic independence by granting them economic and
technical aid for development.
It was apparent that political objectives were the dominant
goals in this new drive. This was made possible by the fact
that the Soviets were well on their way to complete postwar
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recovery. This effort by the Soviets was viewed soberly by
the West who perceived this shift from Russia's hitherto
prevailing autarky to participation in the international
economy as "yet another Soviet effort at subversion designed
to steer the new nations in the direction of economic, polit-
ical and diplomatic radicalism, an effort that was to be
capped eventually by Soviet dominance of the new nations'
domestic and foreign policies."
This change in policy was heralded by the first Soviet
contribution to the UN Technical Assistance Program in 1953,
and the 1954 signing of a credit and trade agreement with
Afghanistan. By 1955 the Soviets could boast of only two
economic cooperation agreements (Afghanistan and India)
.
The first such agreement signed with an African country was
concluded with Egypt in January 1958. By 1960 the African
ranks had swelled to four nations, and by 1966 they had
increased to sixteen. In 1971 the Soviets had technical and
economic aid agreements with forty developing nations --twenty
of them with African nations.
Under Krushchev the Soviet aid program appeared opportu-
nistic, with aid provided wherever it appeared to have the
most chance for gaining Soviet influence. This aid often
involved grandiose schemes, such as stadiums and powerful
radio stations, which provided the recipient with a measure
of prestige, but committed the LDC to a debt which did not
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contribute materially to the true economic development of
the new nation. Since Khrushchev's fall from power Soviet
aid relations have lost their opportunistic character and
seem to be somewhat less politically motivated. They have
become better integrated and economically more justifiable,
however, not necessarily more successful.
A most significant feature of Soviet aid is that it is
normally 100 percent tied in the strictest sense of the word
Normally, the economic and technical assistance
agreement does not, in the final analysis, bind the
Soviet Union to provide anything, and funds promised
will only be made available in their entirety if the
recipient can put forward a sufficient number of accept-
able projects and an adequate amount of finance to
cover local costs of construction, although the Soviet
Union may supply additional assistance to help with
these. Since both these limitations are time consuming,
the amount of aid committed by the Soviet Union is ~
normally in excess of the amount actually disbursed.
This is clearly shown by comparing the total value of
economic credits and grants extended to LDCs by the Soviet
Union between 1958 and 1978 which amounted to $US 17,088
million, with the total credits and grants from the Soviet
Union drawn by the LDCs which total only $US 7,595 million.
The Soviet Union provides two forms of credit to the
LDCs for the acquisition of capital goods: state credits
and commercial credits. State credits which in Africa have
been reserved for governments, are normally available for
the acquisition of complete factories and related services,
and typically are repayable at 2h percent interest over
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twelve years. Commercial credits which have been available
for both government and private concerns are generally used
for individual sales of machinery and equipment, and usually
require a 10 to 20 percent down payment with a 4 percent
4interest rate repayable over five to eight years.
Soviet credits for particular development projects nor-
mally cover three items: machinery and equipment not available
in the recipient country, technical assistance needed for
the construction of the projected works, and the training of
local personnel.
Several new departures in Soviet relations with LDCs in
the last decade have demonstrated Soviet efforts to introduce
elements of integration and profitability into these associa-
tions. These have been characterized by coordinated planning,
joint production of raw materials, cooperation in industrial
production and manufacturing, and mixed companies.
Coordinated planning ensures the establishment of regular-
ized bilateral channels for planning. If an LDC is not entirely
sure what it wants, the Soviet Union can be asked to conduct
a feasibility survey, although this has not guaranteed the
success of the selected project. For example, the Soviet
project report for a meat factory in Somalia estimated a
capital return period of approximately two years; it did so
by assuming three hundred working days per year and an eight-
hour work shift. In fact, the plant lost over $US 720,000
in its first year of operation because it was operating at
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only 5.3 percent of full capacity due to the unavailability
of sufficient cattle, coupled with a low demand for the
finished product.
Geological prospecting figures prominently in Soviet aid
projects and the discovery of valuable mineral deposits
usually results in additional aid in the form of joint pro-
duction for its extraction and commercial exploitation. In
return for this aid the Soviets receive as payment a share
of the output. A recent example of this type of aid involved
the construction of a bauxite mining enterprise near Kindia,
Guinea, for which the Soviets will be repaid with two million
tons of bauxite annually for thirty years (1970 to 2000).
Cooperation in industrial production and manufacturing
has proceeded at a much slower pace. The Soviets use this
type of aid to acquire products specifically geared to their
domestic needs , and repayment for such assistance is normally
made by the LDC in the form of the finished products of the
factories set up with Soviet aid.
Soviet economists have been urging the formation of mixed
companies (Soviet/LDC) as a more advantageous form of utilizing
credits, arguing that this would not only earn profits for
the Soviet Union, but would also assure a steady supply of
needed raw materials and industrial goods. The economists
however face stiff opposition from the political leadership
who assert that the Soviet Union (unlike the West) supplies
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"disinterested" aid and "does not seek to hold any assets
on the territory of other countries or to derive profit at
7their expense. . ."
In 1963 the first signs of a reappraisal of aid policies
appeared, and instead of granting new credits for new projects,
the Russians began to insist on completing projects already
started. By 1965 several factors made it mandatory for the
Soviets to start demanding that aid recipients take measures
to put their "houses in order."
October 1964 saw Khrushchev's ouster. A factor contribu-
ting to the ouster was his largess in continuing to grant
credits to LDCs despite the growing economic difficulties
of recipient regimes upon whom he had lavished aid, and their
inability to repay these debts.
Second, a number of radical regimes, which had received
significant Soviet aid, were overthrown. In each case the
new regime cited overambitious government schemes and chaotic
economic conditions as contributing factors leading to the
coup.
Finally, about this time (mid-1960s) repayments fell due
on the first series of credits provided by the Soviets. Despite
the Soviet claims that their aid, particularly the large
industrial projects, would prove more effective than Western
aid in generating income, a number of LDCs sought to reschedule
debt repayment because predicted income had not met expectations
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As a result of these considerations economic advice
offered by the Soviets to LDCs became less doctrinaire, and
more pragmatic. It concentrated not so much on the require-
ment for a large public sector, but more on performance. It
should not, however, be assumed that the Soviets have abandoned
their belief in public ownership as the proper organizational
form, rather it appears that they are seeking ways to make
public ownership function more efficiently in the LDCs.
Throughout the past decade Soviet economic and technical
aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has significantly diminished as
Moscow has shifted its attention to concentrate on states in
an arc around the Soviet Union's southern border. Since
1954, Moscow has extended economic credits and grants to
o
over 29 Sub-Saharan African nations. This has diminished
to the point that in both 1977 and 1978 the Soviet Union
extended economic credits and grants to only 6 Sub-Saharan
9African nations.
A further shift in Soviet policy can be seen in the
increasing role of Eastern European nations in providing
economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1954 and 1978,
over 17 Sub-Saharan African nations received Eastern European
economic grants and credits. In 1977, significant economic
credits and grants totalling $US 100 million were extended
by Eastern European nations to 5 nations. In 1978, Eastern




economic credits and grants to 8 Sub-Saharan African nations.
Although Eastern European aid has played an important role
in Guinea, Eastern European aid to Somalia has been negligible.
At the present time Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer a
major focus of Soviet economic and technical aid.
C. SOVIET AID TO GUINEA
Because Guinea was ignored by the West at independence,
the Soviet Union was presented a golden opportunity to estab-
lish close economic ties and attempt to gain influence in
the newly independent nation. As previously discussed Moscow
permitted her East European allies to establish initial
economic contacts with Guinea. The Soviet Union and Guinea
did however sign their first agreement on economic and tech-
14
nical cooperation on 24 August 1959. In a 1964 interview
Guinean Ambassador to the USSR M. Camara recalled the aid
given to Guinea by the USSR during "the difficult time during
independence" calling it "tangible examples in Guinea of
Soviet friendship." He continued to recount the specifics
of the aid which had consisted of the construction of a radio
station, an international airport, a polytechnic institute,
a refrigeration depot, the Hotel Camayenne, a 25,000 seat
stadium, and "other works either built or under construction."
Since Guinea was the first Sub-Saharan African nation
to receive Soviet aid, a number of initial problems were
experienced. The Russians (and their East European allies)
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wanted to make a quick impact but lacked local experience.
The Guinean administration, weakened by the mass departure
of the French, was ill-equipped to deal with such highly
bureaucratized partners. As a result of this inadequate
organization and planning, cement arrived in Conakry just
before the rains and because of a lack of covered storage
and adequate transportation hardened on the quays, matches
became damp and would not light, and sugar arrived which was
so effectively damp-proofed that it would not dissolve.
Other stories are told of thousands of dollars' worth of
electrical equipment and nearly a hundred light tractors
deteriorating dockside in Conakry, along with a large shipment
of bathroom equipment --s inks , toilet bowls, and bidets- -for
17
a country with little indoor plumbing.
The mid-1960s saw the Soviet aid to Guinea shift away
from the "frivolous aid of the late 1950s" to more significant
aid. This new aid took the form of credits and grants for
industrial and infrastructure projects, from which the
Soviet Union could gain some tangible return in the way of
manufactured goods from Guinea. However, even this aid was
not without its problems.
A 7 May 1965 newspaper report in Horoya gives an account
of the opening of a new factory complex built with Soviet
financial and technical aid in Mamou, Guinea. Included in
the complex were a slaughterhouse and a meat cannery and
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processing plant. An orange juice cannery was planned for
construction at a later date. The complex was built at
Mamou because it had been chosen by the government as the
"food processing center of Central Guinea." A subsequent
Horoya report published in November 1970 recounts the economic
problems of the Mamou "tomato" cannery, which possessed an
annual production capacity of 5 million tins, but was only
producing 3.5 million tins. This shortfall was accounted
for because of a lack of raw material (tomatoes grown in
the Mamou area) . The reason for the shortfall was explained
in monetary terms. The local peasant had little incentive
to sell his tomatoes to the cannery. Although the peasants
received 25 Guinean Francs per kilo from the cannery for his
tomatoes, the cost of a can of tomatoes processed by the
cannery was 400 Guinean Francs. Consequently, the peasants
kept the tomatoes they wanted for their own consumption and
1
8
sold the rest to others.
Nor did all Soviet aid plans come to fruition. Upon their
return from a mid-1965 trip to the Soviet Union, a Guinean
government delegation reported that among other assistance
the Soviets had agreed to provide Guinea with a small boatyard
19
at Conakry for the construction of fishing boats. In April
1967, however, it was reported that the West German govern-
ment had signed an agreement to construct a boatyard "to permit
20the local building of fishing boats."
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Guinea, upon being accepted by the world community,
diversified its sources of economic and technical assistance
quickly and effectively. Besides joining the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1960s, Guinea also became
a member of the International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) in August 1964. In addition to receiving
aid from international organizations, Guinea has at one time
or another received economic and technical aid from private
or government sources in the United States, West Germany,
Peoples Republic of China, Great Britain, Australia, Italy,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Spain, Switzerland, Japan, Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and since 1977
from France. In addition Guinea has received assistance
from a number of international organizations and banks, in-
cluding the IMF and IBRD, the World Bank, US Import-Export
Bank, Societe Financiere Europeene, International Development
Association, World Food Program, Afro-Arab Bank, Saudi Arabian
Development Fund, European Economic Community, Islamic Devel-
opment Bank, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in
a-c • 21Africa.
Guinea has also diversified its economic associations in
mineral exploitation and infrastructure construction. The
country's main resource bauxite is exploited by companies
which are jointly owned by Guinea and private or public con-
cerns in at least five nations. Two mines are operated by
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joint Government of Guinea and private US companies, two by
Guinea and the Soviet Union, one by a joint Guinean-Nigerian
company, and one by a Guinean-Swiss company. Plans are now
underway for a joint bauxite venture in association with
22
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrein.
Iron ore deposits are being exploited by joint efforts
which include Guinea and Italy, Australia, Romania, Yugo-
slavia, and the US.
An April 1979 African Business article reported the
relaunching of Guinea's diamond industry which had laid
dormant since the early 1960s when the Soviets had ceased
operating the concession. The new mining was to be carried
out by a joint Guinean, British, and Swiss company. A smaller
less valuable diamond concession was also being mined by an
23American company.
Finally, hydroelectric projects have been financed with
assistance from the US, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia,
24
and the Peoples Republic of China.
Soviet lack of interest in providing additional aid to
Guinea is reflected in the amount of economic credits and
grants extended to Guinea in 1977 and 1978. In 1977, $US 1
million in credits and grants were extended to Guinea, while
in 1978 the Soviet Union extended no economic credits or
25grants to Guinea. This decline in Soviet interest is being
countered by increased interest in Guinean development by
France and the Arab oil producing nations.
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In view of Sekou Toure ' s desire to strengthen Guinea's
nonaligned image, it seems unlikely that there will be any
significant increase in Soviet economic aid to Guinea in
the near future. It has become apparent to the Soviets
that military aid garners more political influence than do
trade agreements whereby the Soviets export machinery, petro-
leum products, vehicles, cement and textiles to Guinea in
exchange for items for use in the Soviet Union, such as
bauxite, high quality wood, tropical fruits, and coffee.
Economic and technical aid to Guinea has provided the Soviets
with little in the way of long term influence or other polit-
ical or economic gain.
D. SOVIET AID TO SOMALIA
Somalia by any standards is a poor country. By UN estimates
it has a per capita income averaging only $US 80 a year.
It is a country lacking exploitable mineral resources (although
the feasibility of exploiting Somalia's uranium deposits is
now being studied) , a sedentary population, and an educated
nucleus of sufficient size to manage the nation's affairs
efficiently. Yet despite this bleak condition, Somalia's
strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea has brought a
number of suitors to her doorstep bearing offers of economic
and technical aid. Somalia's ex-President Shermarke summed
up his country's attitudes towards its economic suitors in
the aphorism, "if a hungry man is offered food, it is useless
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to warn that he risks indigestion. First he will sate him-
27
self, then consider how to avoid possible digestive trouble."
This national attitude was displayed when Somalis unveiled
its first Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967) which called
for a public sector development expenditure of $US 196 million
financed entirely out of aid. The ambitiousness of the plan
may be judged by considering that the nation's ordinary bud-
get, which averaged $US 23 million during the first two years
of independence, could only be balanced by using grants -in
-
28
aid, mainly from former colonial power Italy.
The Soviet Union and Somalia signed their first aid agree-
29
ment in June 1961. Although this agreement called for the
construction of a radio station and a printing press, it did
not contain the type of grandiose projects undertaken in
30Guinea. Much of the initial Soviet economic aid was ear-
marked for the construction of agri -manufacturing concerns,
a meat processing factory, a milk processing factory, and a
fish processing plant. In fact by the end of 1969 over 45
percent of Soviet aid to Somalian projects had been spent on
these three processing plants.
This pattern of investing in agri-manufacturing continued
through the first decade of the Soviet-Somali association
and included a flour mill, a bakery, a leather tannery, and
an agricultural project constructed in the Jelib.One project
which was to have unexpected strategic significance for the
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Soviets was the expansion of Berbera Harbor. This was one
of very few infrastructure projects undertaken by the Soviets.
Somalia further tied herself to the Soviet Union when
it decided in 1966 to import petroleum and subsidiary products
from the Soviet Union.
By 1967, Somalia was experiencing severe economic diffi-
culties. There were a number of reasons for these difficulties,
not the least of which was the inability of the Somali govern-
ment to realistically plan and efficiently execute economic
development. In a May 1967 radio broadcast Somali Prime
Minister Hussein gave the official Somali account of the causes
of the economic difficulties. Among the reasons he cited were
the 1963 loss of aid from Great Britain ($US 3.64 million per
year); payment of loan interest to the Soviet Union; payment
for goods received from the US and Peoples Republic of China;
and incomplete planning for those projects already constructed
which had resulted in there being insufficient supplies of
meat, fish, and milk to ensure that newly built factories
could operate at capacity.
Although there was considerable truth in some of the
arguments, some of the others were weak. The Chinese made
up the shortfall in British aid in 1964, and West Germany
did likewise in 1965, so the loss was not as severe as it
32
could have been. In June 1964, Radio Mogadishu reported
the signing of a Soviet-Somali protocol which converted an
unspecified Soviet loan into a free grant as had been requested
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33by the Somalis. There was also evidence of government
mismanagement of agricultural resources as shown by a 1966
UN survey carried out in the southern section of the nation
which revealed that out of 20 million acres of fertile agri-
cultural land only 94 thousand acres were under cultivation.
During the decade of the 1960s Somalia received aid from
a wide cross-section of nations and international organiza-
tions. Besides the US, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Italy,
Great Britain (until 1963), and the Peoples Republic of China,
Somalia received aid from France, the World Bank, the European
Fund for Overseas Development, UN Special Fund for Technical
Assistance, European Economic Community, and the International
Development Association.
The mismanagement of the aid received was a contributing
factor in the October 1969 revolution, and rapid economic
development was a cardinal goal of the new Supreme Revolution-
ary Council.
One of the initial problems faced by the new Somali
government was the loss of both US and West German aid in
mid-1970. The US stopped aid because Somalia refused to
de-register Somali ships observed trading with North Vietnam.
West Germany cut off aid because Somalia recognized East
Germany. Somali President Barre justified both Somali actions
as being in keeping with the nation's nonaligned policy. As
a result of this loss of aid the Soviet Union, increasingly
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aware of the strategic location of Somalia, became its main
supplier of economic aid.
.
Soviet aid during the early 1970s continued to be aimed
at the agri-manufacturing and fishing industries, along with
the construction of that infrastructure necessary to support
Soviet military requirements in the country. The 1970s also
saw the appearance of a new actor on the "aid stage" in the
form of North Korea who undertook to aid Somalia with agri-
manufacturing projects.
The Somali debt burden to the Soviet Union was eased
considerably in July 1974, when the Soviet Union cancelled
$US 100 million debt upon the signing of the Soviet-Somali
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
During the early 1970s Somalia continued to receive aid
from Italy, and such international organizations as the Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) , European Development
Fund, and the IBRD. 1974 also saw the Somali entrance into
The Arab League, and the commencement of the Saudi Arabian
led conservative Arab attempt to woo Somalia away from the
Soviet Union through the use of their new oil riches.
The 1974-1975 drought had a devastating effect on the
Somali economy, from which it has still not recovered. Addi-
tionally, the unsuccessful Ogaden War in 1977 and 1978 further
burdened the economy. As a result of the split in relations
between Somalia and the Soviet Union in November 1977, Somalia
no longer receives any aid from Moscow. This loss was to some
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degree absorbed by the European Economic Community and the
Peoples Republic of China who agreed to provide aid to per-
37
mit completion of the uncompleted Soviet projects. Addition-
ally, Somalia continues to receive support from her Arab
League associates. As noted previously the Somali government
envisions an increasing role for foreign private capital in
the manufacturing sector. The problems in Somalia, however,
remain severe and it is therefore not without justification
38that Somalia has been called "the graveyard of foreign aid."
E. CONCLUSION
The Soviet use of economic and technical aid in Guinea
and Somalia has not met with great success. Its initial
failures can be contributed to inadequate planning while in
the 1970s the Soviets obviously made a conscious decision to
deemphasize the use of this type aid in Sub-Saharan Africa
and utilize military aid to garner political influence.
In countries like Guinea and Somalia not only assistance
in establishing industrial and agricultural projects is
needed, but also financial aid to keep the projects function-
ing after they have been established until local expertise
and backward and forward linkages in the economy have developed
The Soviets are singularly ill-equipped to give this type of
economic aid. It is therefore unlikely that any significant
increase in economic and technical aid will be forthcoming
from Moscow to Guinea or Somalia.
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What then of the hypotheses? The two cases studied reveal
that it is unlikely that any African nation will become solely
reliant on the Soviet Union for aid, even in the event of
Western unwillingness/failure to provide the desired economic
aid, not only because the Soviet Union is unable to provide
sufficient economic and technical aid, but also because an
"aid embargo" by the "entire West" is unlikely to occur.
Additionally, there are a number of international organiza-
tions, socialist states, and oil producing states capable
and desirous of providing economic and technical aid to LDCs.
The case studies further reveal that the Soviets are
unable, and since the mid-1970s have been unwilling, to pro-
vide sufficient economic aid and assistance to ensure the
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VI. AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN GUINEA AND SOMALIA
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters a number of hypotheses regarding
Soviet relations with the Sub-Saharan African nations of
Guinea and Somalia have been reviewed. It has been shown
that although Soviet economic and technical aid may have pro-
vided limited influence, the Soviets were neither willing nor
able to match the development aid available from the West,
international assistance organizations, or newly rich oil-
producing Third World nations. It has been shown that the
provision of military aid to Guinea and Somalia has provided
the Soviets with significantly more leverage in these nations
with which to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives.
Finally, it has been shown that the West's refusal to provide
either military or economic and technical aid has been a
primary factor in both Guinea and Somalia's looking away from
the West for assistance.
After about two decades of experience in Sub-Saharan
Africa, what lessons have United States (US) policy-makers
learned regarding broadening and strengthening the association
between the US and African nations? Have the lessons of the
past resulted in the US pursuing more realistic policies in
Africa? If so, what form do these interests take?
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In the discussion that follows an attempt will be made
to determine what the American national interest is with
regard to Guinea and Somalia.
B. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Although much has been written concerning the concept of
the national interest, it remains a concept only vaguely
defined. The literature exhibits little consensus, and this
coupled with its lack of definition makes national interest
a concept which is difficult to use precisely in policy making
In principle, the criterion of national interest should
help policy-makers cut through the multiplicity of competing
values and interests and improve judgments regarding the
proper ends and goals for foreign policy. In practice,
however, national interest has become so elastic and ambiguous
a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is prob-
2lematic and controversial.
The concept of the national interest goes back several
centuries, and the idea of national interest appears to have
played a significant role at times in the determination of
policy in the classical system of democracy before the French
Revolution. "The essential characteristic of the period was
the identification of the nation with the person of the sov-
3
ereign." The national interest was therefore relatively
simple to determine, since it was considered to be merely the
4interest of the ruler.
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With the "democratization" of nationalism the relative
simplicity of the concept was eroded, as the state came to
be viewed as composed of different interests. "The national
interest came to reflect a weighing of various diverse in-
terests within the state, held together, somewhat tenuously
at times, by the doctrine of nationalism."
With the transition from the laissez-faire to the social
service state after 1914, more groups saw their interests
affected by foreign policy, as foreign policy expanded into
the realm of economics. The concept has been further confused
by the erosion during the past several decades of the tra-
ditional distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" policy.
As a result national interest to be utilized in the formation
of foreign policy must encompass the interface between the
7foreign and domestic sides of each policy issue in question.
Consequently, the determination of the national interest has
become both more complicated and more unpredictable than it
was historically.
This dilemma has prompted many modern analysts to conclude
that the concept is a generally useless concept, mired in
semantic chaos. "Today the student of international relations
finds numerous definitions of national interest, most of




Many students of foreign policy have written about "the
national interest", but few have done more than criticize the
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attempts of their colleagues to define the concept. Even
fewer authors have attempted to precisely define and opera-
tionalize the concept. This is unfortunate since the expressed
function of the concept "is to specify a means [by] which
policymakers can make disciplined choices among interests
9
and therefore among policy alternatives."
Since World War II the problem of defining the concept
has been approached in two ways. Some analysts have attempt-
ed to define the national interest of a given state by looking
at the state's actual policy output, looking for repetitive
behavior patterns, and after finding them inducing from them
the national interest. For example, John Chase in 1956
suggested four aspects of the American national interest which
guided the development of its foreign policy:
(1) to deprive potential aggressors of bases from which
they might launch attacks against the United States; [2)
to support self-government and democracy abroad; (3) to
protect and advance commerce; and (4) to help establish
and maintain a favorable world balance of power.
H
Other analysts approached the task of defining the concept
by basing their analysis on logical reasoning and deduction,
framing their conclusions in less tangible and more conceptual
12terms. Robert Osgood put national survival at the head of
the list of national interests "because everything else would
13
clearly depend on the achievement of this goal." He defined
survival in terms of territorial integrity, political inde-
pendence, and maintenance of fundamental governmental
14institutions. George and Keohane define national interest
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in terms of "irreducible national interests." These interests
consist of physical survival (by which they mean survival of
the citizens, not necessarily the preservation of territory
or sovereignty) ; liberty (by which they mean the ability of
the inhabitants of the country to choose their form of gov-
ernment and to exercise a set of individual rights defined
by law and protected by the state) ; and economic subsistence
(by which they mean the maximization of economic welfare)
.
Finally, Hans Morgenthau has defined the national inter-
est as "the survival of a political unit... in its identity
as the irreducible minimum of a state's interest vis-a-vis
other units, encompassing in this the integrity of a state's
territory, its political institutions, and its culture."
Despite differences in the various definitions of the
national interest, there is a degree of similarity in the
various descriptions of the concept. Most of the descriptions
refer "to tangible interests- -to concrete conditions or advan-
17tages, concretely experienced." There are, however, a few
interests (culture and liberty) which are intangible--these
encompass how a society feels about itself, and how a nation
18
maintains and strengthens its morale.
A significant difficulty with the concept of national
interest is the challenge of operationalizing the concept.
Who determines the national interest? Is the national inter-
est merely the aggregation of specific interests? How does
one determine priorities when faced with conflicting inter-
ests? These questions have no easy answers.
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The best and perhaps the only procedure for determining
the national interest may be to accept that definition pro-
vided by the nation's highest officials and policy-makers.
There are, of course, a number of problems and shortcomings
with this procedure. First, efforts are complicated by the
intrusion of the policy-maker's ideological values, his
image of the opponent, his view of the nature of the conflict
with the opponent, and his beliefs about the character of
19the international system.
Second, many of the decisions made concerning the national
interest are made in crisis situations which result in the
policy-maker being forced to make a decision based on incom-
plete information, in a limited amount of time, and while
being pressured for strong action to "defend American inter-
20
ests." As a result what has been called "value extension"
whereby "personal interests and political values other than
those associated with safeguarding the national interest may
intrude into the motivations and incentives of the decision-
21
maker and his advisers." This can result in the emergence
within the policymaking group of an unfocused concensus
which emphasizes the "need for action to defend US interests"
and seriously impairs rational decisionmaking. As a result
the "desirability" of doing something to protect endangered
US interests can result in an inadequate discussion of the
"feasibility" of doing so. "The typical error under these
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circumstances is a gross underestimation of the costs and
22
risks of the action taken."
For the purposes of the remainder of this chapter I
have chosen to use the concept of the national interest as
23
operationalized by Donald E. Nuechterlein. The heart of
his conceptual framework is comprised of four basic national
interests which are applicable to all sovereign states (defense
of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and
promotion of values) and four levels of intensity (the stakes)
which all states believe to be invoked in specific interna-
tional issues. The four levels of intensity are survival,
24
vital, major, and peripheral. The conceptual framework is
shown in the following matrix.
NATIONAL- INTEREST MATRIX
25
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland ... ... ... ...
Economic well-being ... ... ... ...
Favorable world order ... ... ... ...
Promotion of values ... ... ... ...
To utilize the matrix, a definition of terms is essential.
National interest may be described as "the perceived needs
and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sover-
eign states which constitute its external environment."
The basic interests of states suggest four fundamental
interests. First, "defense interest" which involves
...the protection of the nation-state and its citizens from
the threat of physical violence by another country, and/or
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protection from an externally inspired threat to the
national political system... it does not include alliances
with other states, although it may include strategic
bases whose primary function is the protection of the
homeland. 2 7
Second, "economic interest" which involves "the enhance-
ment of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations
28
with other states."
Third, "world-order interest" which requires "the main-
tenance of an international political and economic system
in which the nation-state can feel secure and in which its
citizens and commerce can operate peacefully outside their
29
own borders."
Finally, "ideological interest" which ensures "the pro-
tection and furtherance of a set of values which the citizens
30
of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good."
In sum, the four national interests outlined are "dynamic
factors" conditioning the behavior of nation-states, and
changes in priority among them are usually measured in years
rather than in months.
Intensities must also be categorized in order to allow
the analyst to better determine the differing degrees of
interest that a government perceives to be involved in given
international events.
Survival issues are those in which
The very existence of the nation-state is in jeopardy, either
as a result of overt military attack on its own territory
or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's
demands be rejected. The key to whether an issue is one
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of survival, or a vital issue, on this scale of priorities
is the degree to which there is an immediate, credible
threat of massive physical harm by one state on another.
By this definition, there probably are no economic, world-
order or ideological interests that qualify .. .Only if the
issue is at the survival level would a government be jus-
tified, on any rational ground, in actually using strategic-
nuclear weapons against an enemy. 31
Vital issues are those in which
Serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong
measures, including the use of conventional military force,
are employed to counter an adverse action by another state
or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation. A
vital issue may, in the long run, be as serious a threat...
as a survival issue... a vital issue [however] usually pro-
vides a government with sufficient time to seek help from
allies, bargain with the antagonist or take aggressive
countermeasures to warn the enemy... a vital issue may in-
volve not only defense interests but also economic, world-
order and, in some cases, ideological interests. 32
Major issues are those in which
The political, economic and ideological well-being of the
state may be adversely affected by events and trends in
the international environment which thus require corrective
action in order to prevent them from becoming serious
threats (vital issues). Most [major] issues... are usually
resolved through diplomatic negotiation. 33
Finally, peripheral issues are those in which
The well-being of the state is not adversely affected by
events or trends abroad, but the interests of private citi-
zens and companies operating in foreign countries are
endangered. . .Each nation-state makes its own determination
on how greatly it values commercial enterprises operating
abroad; for some, these companies constitute major issues
of national interest; for others, they are only of peripher-
al importance . 34
In light of this framework what has shaped American policy
toward Africa during the past decade? What are the American
national interests in Guinea and Somalia?
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C. UNITED STATES AFRICAN POLICY TO 1968
During the past twenty-five years Africa has been the
scene of a continuing struggle between the West and Soviet
Union for political influence. Commencing with Egypt in
1955, this struggle has spread southward. In most cases
early Soviet successes were more the result of Western foreign
policy miscalculations than of a coherently executed Soviet
strategy. When the US refused economic and military aid
to Egypt, the Soviets stepped in to fill the vacuum. When
France cast Guinea adrift the Soviets again stepped in to
fill the void. When Somalia found Western sources unwilling
to provide her with military assistance because of her claims
on the territory of her neighbors, the Soviets became Somalia's
primary supplier of arms.
A significant determinant of US policy toward Africa has
been the continuing black/white tension vividly seen in
southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia and, until recently,
Rhodesia) . This has given US African policy a southern African
focus, and much of US policy is framed in terms of US inter-
ests in southern Africa. This focus has, however, been
extended to the entire Sub-Saharan Africa region since how
the US reacts to the black/white confrontation in southern
Africa sets the tenor for how black nations in Africa will
react to the United States.
Prior to 1957, US policy toward Africa was characterized
by "deferring to the colonial allies" and policy was based
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on what they said was appropriate. As the former colonies
in Africa began to win their independence, US policy began
to take on a more activist character. This change was due,
in part, to the new Soviet interest in Africa as reflected
in Nikita Khrushchev's 1960 "wars of national liberation"
speech, and their growing influence in newly independent
Ghana and Guinea. During the Kennedy administration, the
US frequently supported anti-colonial resolutions in the
United Nations. This was in keeping with Kennedy's desire
to project an image of the US as a "friend of all oppressed
peoples," in order to allow the New Frontier to be "free of
automatic identification with colonialism." This activist
approach did not, however, produce any appreciable amount
of consensus in American policy toward Africa; American poli-
cy thinking was split between those who advocated "deferring
to the colonialists" and those who advocated continued dealing
with Africa on its own terms.
The Johnson Administration between 1963 and 1968 became
so preoccupied with the Vietnam War that Africa, with all
of its instability, received little serious attention.
D. THE NIX0N--F0RD AFRICAN POLICY 1969 to 1976
1 . National Security Study Memorandum Number 39
Shortly after assuming the Presidency in 1969 Presi-
dent Nixon directed that a comprehensive review of US policy
toward southern Africa be conducted. On 10 April 1969 Henry
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Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Adviser, issued Nation-
al Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) tasking the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director,
Central Intelligence Agency to conduct the review. The
resultant study suggested five options which the US could
follow in relations with southern Africa.
Option One called for a closer association with the
white regimes in the area in order to protect and enhance US
35
economic, strategic, and scientific interests. This option
was based on the premise that US disagreement with the domes-
tic policies of either the white or the black regimes should
not inhibit relations with them. Further, since the US was
perceived as incapable of having significant effect on the
situation, it was suggested that the US continue to pursue
economic, strategic, and scientific interests because the
political costs of doing so would not be excessive.
Option Two was based on the premise that the whites were
in Africa to stay and African blacks would be unable to gain
political rights through violence, since constructive change
could only come by acquiescence of the whites. It was there-
fore suggested that the US seek broader association with both
black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation
in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states
in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-
border violence, and to encourage improved relations among
states in the area.
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The premise upon which Option Three was based asserted
that the US could not significantly influence the domestic
policies of the white states, nor was there any internal
indication that change would be forthcoming. Consequently,
it was suggested that the US continue "limited association"
with the white states while continuing association with black
states in an effort to retain some economic, scientific, and
strategic interests in the white states while maintaing a
posture on the racial issue which was acceptable to the blacks,
though opposing violent solutions to problems in the region.
Option Four was founded on the premise that the US could
not influence the white states toward constructive change
and therefore increasing violence was likely. As a result
of this it was suggested that the US cut its ties with white
states and seek closer relations with black states in an
effort to enhance US standing on the racial issue both in
Africa and internationally.
The final option was based on the premise that racial
confrontation in southern Africa was not only unmanageable
but would grow worse despite any effort the US might make.
It was therefore suggested that the US disassociate itself
from both black and white states in an effort to limit US
involvement in the problems of the area.
On 2 January 1970 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon
recommending the adoption of option two. The President
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followed this recommendation and approved a policy toward
Africa whereby the US
. . .would quietly improve official relations with South
Africa, including a partial relaxation of the arms embargo
and avoidance of the issue of illegal South African
control of Namibia (South West Africa) in a bilateral
context; eschew pressuring the Portuguese; modulate Ameri-
can rhetoric on southern Africa at the United Nations;
and, to balance these moves, increase [US] aid to black
African nations. 37
This policy decision was not universally accepted in
the State Department who tagged the chosen policy the "Tar
Baby Option" because they asserted that the policy would
prove sticky because once adopted, the policy would be
impossible to abandon if it did not work.
The policy was implemented without fanfare. The White
House preferred that the shift in policy not be revealed
because it was intended to be a quiet, long-term relaxation,
which was to become evident over a period of time. They were
further concerned with both domestic and foreign reaction to
the decision if it were widely publicized, since this would
make it more difficult for the US to continue to express
opposition to apartheid and white racism in southern Africa
while moving closer diplomatically to the racist regimes.
The shift in policy was exhibited in a number of prac-
tical ways. First, the US redefined the rules of embargoes
on military equipment to Portugal and South Africa; second,
a new agreement was reached with the Portuguese government
concerning the continued US use of bases in the Azores; third,
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the Export -Import Bank was given authority to loan Portugal
up to $US 400 million; and fourth, there were a series of
abstentions and negative votes at the United Nations on
measures condemning apartheid and the white regimes of south-
ern Africa.
President Nixon further highlighted the effects of the
new policy in his "State of the World" speech made to Congress
on 3 May 1973. After pledging America's continued commitment
to the "goals of regional peace, economic development, self-
39determination, and racial justice in Africa," Nixon enumer-
ated a number of economic indicators which showed increased
US activity in Africa. Between 1970 and 1972 US bilateral
and multilateral aid to Africa had risen from $US 450 million
40
to $US 600 million. American direct private investment in
Africa was reported to have doubled in four years (1969-1973),
reaching a total of $US 4 billion, seventy-five percent of
41the total going to Africa's developing countries. Two-way
trade between the US and Africa grew thirty percent between
1970 and 1973. 42
Nixon further reaffirmed that a cardinal principle of US
policy was non-interference in African internal affairs. He
asserted that the US recognized UN jurisdiction over Namibia,
and favored self-determination in the Portuguese colonies.
Although condemning South Africa's racial policies, Nixon
indicated that the US did not subscribe to the belief that
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isolating them from the influence of the rest of the world
was an effective way of encouraging them to follow a course
43
of moderation or to accomodate change.
2. The Angolan Civil War
The April 1974 coup d'etat in Lisbon eliminated one
of the main presuppositions from America's African policy-
-
that the whites were in Africa to stay. The events of the
subsequent twenty-four months, which led to a fundamental
shift in US policy toward Africa, have been the subject of
extensive interpretation and analysis. A brief historical
analysis of the Angolan crisis as seen by US government
decision-makers will be instructive in this regard.
US policy toward Angola was the subject of some in-
ternal Department of State controversy during late 1974.
This controversy was evidenced in the removal of Donald Easum
from his post as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, following his return from a trip to Africa by Secre-
tary of State Kissinger. The disagreement focused on a
speech made by Easum during his stay in Tanzania in which he
urged that the US work toward change in southern Africa,
rather than supporting the status quo. Upon his return to
the US on 25 November 1974 Easum was removed from his post
and replaced by Nathaniel Davis.
The Alvor Agreement, concluded in Portugal on 15 Jan-
uary 1975 and signed by the Portuguese Government and the
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three Angolan nationalist parties (MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA)
,
established the mechanics for a transitional government in
Angola, and established 11 November 1975 as independence
day. 44
The transitional government was installed on 31
January 19 75, about the same time as the American 40 Commit-
tee approved a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) request
for $US 300 thousand in covert aid to the FNLA faction in
Angola.
During the next five months a split developed between
the African Bureau of the State Department and the CIA. This
was partially due to the substantial increase in Soviet aid
provided to the MPLA commencing in March 1975. This aid
contributed to an increase in armed conflict between the three
Angolan factions which threatened the Alvor Agreement. In
response to this the CIA advocated a substantial increase in
covert aid to the FNLA, and the initiation of covert support
46for UNITA. The NSC Interagency Task Force on Angola, which
was chaired by Nathaniel Davis, recommended a diplomatic
solution to the problem. This "diplomatic option" would
have included provisions that the US urge Portugal to play a
stronger, but impartial role in the conflict and encourage
Portugal and influential African governments to press the
Soviets to reduce their support to the MPLA. The option
favored the US working in concert with Tanzania, Zambia, and
47Zaire to reduce the arms flow to Angola.
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The Task Force saw three main advantages to the ap-
proach. First, it would shift factional competition back
toward the political arena, thereby reducing the likelihood
that Soviet arms would determine the outcome of the conflict
and substantially improving the prospects of the FNLA and
UNITA. Second, this option would reduce the danger of "big-
power" confrontation on the continent. Third, it was felt
that this approach would reflect US recognition that Angola
was basically an African problem. As an added bonus the
Task Force stressed that this approach would probably gain
48both congressional and public support in the US.
The Task Force pointed out to the 40 Committee that
covert action would probably not only increase the level of
violence in the conflict, but that it might seriously damage
the chances for workable relations with the successor Angolan
regime if the MPLA should come to power. This, the argument
continued, was a high price to pay for action that would not
serve larger US interests- -in fact so far as concrete US
interests in Angola were concerned, Gulf Oil Company's $US
300 million investment in Cabinda appeared to be the principal
49
one.
Despite these persuasive arguments, on 17 July 1975
the 40 Committee approved the CIA request for dispatching
$US 14 million to the FNLA and UNITA. 50 The choice of this
policy option was especially questionable in light of the
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fact that the CIA had in a report to the 40 Committee made
it clear that even in the best of circumstances, US backed
factions could not win the civil war. The CIA reasoned that
if the struggle could not be won, the US should make victory
for the Soviet backed MPLA as costly for the Soviet Union
.,. 51
as possible.
US covert aid began to arrive in Angola in late
August and early September 19 75, about one month before South
African troops launched a major offensive into Angola. This
was followed by an additional offensive launched from the
north by Zairian and FNLA troops. These escalations were
met by the first involvement of Cuban advisers on the front
lines, and were followed shortly thereafter by the arrival
of the first contingent of Cuban troops intended to be used
52in direct support of the MPLA.
As Angola approached independence day (UNovember 1975)
an increasing number of "leaks" were being published in US
newspapers concerning US covert involvement in Angola. The
congressional reaction to these revelations came first in the
form of the "Tunney Amendment" which was passed by the Senate
on 19 December 1975, cutting off all covert aid to Angola.
This was followed about a month later by a House of Represen-
tative's vote to join the Senate in cutting off American
53
covert aid to Angola.
In the congressional hearings held subsequent to
these congressional votes, the Executive branch sought to
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justify their policy decisions in a number of ways. In
testimony before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Jr. sought to
characterize US actions in Angola as "reactive to those of
the Soviet Union and Cuba, independent of those of South
Africa, and designed to achieve a military situation
which would promote a government of national unity composed
54
of all three factions."
In earlier testimony, Secretary of State Kissinger
asserted that despite the Alvor Accord, it was the intention
of the Soviet Union and the Portuguese Communist Party to
install the MPLA in power in Angola through stepped up arms
shipments. As a result "on July 9 all-out civil war began
when the MPLA attacked the FNLA and UNITA, driving both or-
ganizations out of Luanda, thereby ending the short-lived
coalition government."
Characterizing the Soviets and Cubans as being guilty
of "outside intervention in African affairs," the type of
action which the Organization of African Unity condemns,
Kissinger justified US covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA forces
as being a response to Zairian and Zambian requests for US
assistance in preventing the Soviet Union and Cuba "from
imposing a solution in Angola, becoming a dominant influence




Kissinger further denied US complicity in the South
African intervention, claiming "South Africa responded by
sending in military equipment, and some military personnel,
57
without consultation with the United States."
He claimed that the US chose covert means of support
in Angola to keep US visibility to a minimum, as the US
wanted the greatest possible opportunity for an African solu-
58
tion. This effort at minimum visibility he continued, was
destroyed by the exposure of domestic debate and congressional
action in the US, which removed the leverage of a possible
military option, and which in turn made the possibility of
59
achieving a diplomatic solution impossible.
The failure of US policy in Angola brought about a
fundamental reevaluation of US policy toward Africa. A new
policy was unveiled by Secretary Kissinger in an address
delivered in Lusaka, Zambia, on 27 April 1976. Calling Africa
a "continent of hope--a modern frontier," Kissinger assured
African leaders that he was not attempting to give "American
prescriptions for Africa's problems," nor did the US intend
to set African against African because "African problems
cannot be solved and your destiny cannot be fulfilled except
by a united Africa."
Specifying that of "all the challenges before us
[US and Africa] .. .racial justice is the most basic," Kissinger
asserted that US support of racial justice in southern Africa
was not simply a matter of foreign policy, but was an imperative
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of the American moral heritage. Consequently, Kissinger
reaffirmed an unequivocal US commitment to human rights as
expressed in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Then, in what was a significant shift in
America's African policy, Kissinger proclaimed: "We support
self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human
dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa- -in the name
of moral principle, international law, and world peace."
Kissinger concluded his speech by emphasizing that
the US did not seek any "pro-American African bloc confronting
a bloc supporting any other power," nor did the US "wish to
support one faction of a liberation movement against another."
The basic principles of US African policy were the support
of "African unity and integrity."
Kissinger followed up this speech nine days later
with a speech at the fourth ministerial meeting of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Nairobi,
Kenya. In this second speech he articulated the American
view of how the "North" and the "South" could expand coopera-
tion for global economic development.
By late August 1976, Kissinger felt that the new
African policy had improved US relations with Africa. Stat-
ing that the "character of our [US] relationship with Africa
has been transformed," he lauded the growth of "mutual confi-
dence and respect between America and black Africa." He
further articulated the US position toward direct dealings
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with liberation movements in southern Africa (non-African
nations should not deal directly with such movements) , and
toward the transfer of military equipment to Africa (although
the US was determined to avoid unnecessary African arms races,
she was willing to give serious consideration to "modest and
responsible requests" from "friendly and moderate nations
like Kenya and Zaire" to permit them to protect themselves
against belligerent neighbors possessing substantial quanti-
64ties of modern Soviet weapons...".
E. THE CARTER AFRICAN POLICY- -1977 TO 1980
With President Ford's defeat in the 1976 general election,
and the inauguration of President Carter in January 1977,
American foreign policy in general was the subject of a re-
evaluation, with President Carter unveiling the basic priori-
ties of the "Carter Foreign Policy" in a speech given to
the UN General Assembly on 17 March 1977. In the speech he
called on the member nations to dedicate themselves to a
"prolonged and persistent effort" to maintain peace and reduce
the arms race; to build a better and more cooperative inter-
national economic system; and to work with potential adversaries
as well as close friends to advance the cause of human rights.
In regard to Africa, President Carter reaffirmed the US
commitment to work to help attain majority rule through peaceful
means. He further asserted that the US was "ready to normal-
ize .. .relationships and to seek reconciliation with all states
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which are ready to work... in promoting global progress and
global peace." President Carter also pledged himself to
work "to insure sustained American assistance as the process
f\ 7
of global economic development continues."
The new emphasis in American foreign policy was on "human
rights" which President Carter reminded all UN members that
they had pledged to respect by signing the UN charter. "Thus
no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment
of its citizens is solely its own business."
In a speech made two months later President Carter inti-
mated a new philosophical framework for conducting American
foreign policy. He claimed that the US had freed itself of
its inordinate fear of communism which had in the past led
the US to embrace any dictator who joined "us" in that fear.
He further asserted that US foreign policy must be open and
candid.
It was left to Secretary of State Vance to articulate
specific US policy toward Africa. In a 1 July 1977 speech,
Vance asserted that US policy toward Africa emanated from
the basic proposition that Africa had an unique identity- -a
continent of incredible diversity and enormous potential
(human, resource, and energy).
Vance then proceeded to define the general nature of
the US approach to Africa. First, American policies must
be affirmative policies, not merely reactive to crises or
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to other power's actions in Africa. Second, the US objective
must be to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at
peace, which can only be accomplished by helping Africans
resolve their own disputes. Third, African nationalism should
be encouraged. Fourth, US policies must be supportive of
political, economic, and social human rights throughout
Africa. Fifth, US ties with Africa include not only politi-
cal ties, but cultural and economic ties as well. Finally,
the US must seek openness in dealing with African nations,
71
attempting to broaden dialogue even when we may not agree.
Specifically, the US made "human development" the key
to Africa's future, yet did not lose sight of the fact that
Africa was in need of infrastructure. To help alleviate these
problems Vance pledged US assistance. Although arms trans-
fers would be discouraged, he reemphasized the former admini-
stration's stand that the US would "consider sympathetically
appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by
a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisers on
72their borders, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa." Arms
transfers would be, however, an "exceptional tool of our
policy."
Admitting to the fact that the US could not impose solu-
tions on southern Africa, Vance emphasized that the US, as
one of "the few governments in the world that can talk to
both white and black Africans frankly and yet with a measure
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of trust," could and would use its good offices in seeking
an African solution to the southern African problems.
Shortly after delivering this speech, Carter's African
policy was given its first real test, not in southern Africa,
but in the Horn of Africa where Somali-backed guerillas
fighting in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia were officially
73joined by Somali army units.
There are indications that as early as July 1977 the US,
in light of worsening Somali-Soviet relations, had informed
Siad Barre that it was ready to join other governments in
providing Somalia with an alternative source of military
74
assistance. This had been preceded by the April 1977
Ethiopian expulsion of the MAAG, the USIS and the remnant of
the US personnel in Kagnew. This expulsion was followed
by the suspension of a $US 10 million foreign military sales
credit and the halt in delivery of items in the military
75pipeline to Ethiopia.
After a reconsideration of its policy options in the Horn,
the US announced in August 1977 that it would transfer no
arms to Somalia as long as Somali troops were fighting in
Ethiopia; and furthermore, the US would approve no third-party
transfers to the Somalis of US-supplied equipment. Britain,
France, and other West European arms producers stood behind
the US decision. 76
The Carter Administration was caught on the horns of a
dilemma. A traditional American ally, Ethiopia, was fighting
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a war in the Ogaden with US equipment, supported beginning
in late 1977 by Soviet equipment and Cuban troops. The
Somali government was fighting the war with Soviet equip-
ment in violation of the OAU's stand on the sanctity of
Africa's colonial boundaries. Therefore US support of the
Somalis, who had expelled both Soviet and Cuban advisers
in November 1977, would be a contradiction of US policy sup-
porting African solutions to African problems, and would
surely anger many OAU members toward the US.
As a result of this dilemma, the US government did nothing
to attempt to influence the outcome of the conflict which
was eventually resolved, after massive Soviet and Cuban support
to Ethiopia forced the Somalis to retreat from the Ogaden
in March 1978. Anthony Lake, the Director of the Policy
Planning Staff, described the US "policy of restraint" as
consisting of
a refusal to supply arms to either side; support for peace-
ful diplomatic initiatives by Africans themselves, includ-
ing the [OAU] ; and a willingness to provide economic and
humanitarian assistance to both sides, to relieve human
suffering and to convey symbolically our desire for good
relations with both. '
A readjustment of US foreign policy toward Africa was
expressed by Secretary Vance in June 1978 when, in a speech
specifying the "essential elements of our approach" toward
Africa, he emphasized an "element" that had not been stressed
in his July 1977 speech. Although President Carter had
previously expressed the end of an "inordinate fear of
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communism," Secretary Vance in his June 1978 speech stated
...in private and public, we have emphasized our concern
about the nature of Soviet activities in Africa, and we
have been in contact with European, Arab, and African
countries and members of the nonaligned movement who
share our concern. We have pointed out to the Soviets
the problems which their activities pose for Africa and
for our overall relations. 78
This then has become the thrust of US policy toward
Africa. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
William Harrop summarized the continuing US policy in Africa
in early 1980. In a statement before the House Subcommittee
on Africa he "stressed" the main aspects of the American
Africa policy that had been "carefully" developed and imple-
mented during the previous three years. The main aspects were
addressing the root causes of political instability,
primarily through development assistance; seeking peace-
ful resolution of conflicts in southern Africa and else-
where on the continent; responding to the legitimate
security concerns of the African nations; and working
with multilateral organizations like the United Nations
and the Organization of African Unity... in the pursuit
of these goals. ?9
In recent months, as a result of the British-led solution
to the Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) conflict and the refocusing of
US foreign policy attention to the Middle East, Iran, and
Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa has resumed a relatively low
priority on the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda.
Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe did not result in a
"communist takeover" in that country. The Horn is relatively
quiet. The US continues to press for a Namibian settlement,
and an easing of racial restrictions in South Africa, but
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these are viewed as problems that will be solved sometime
in the future. In West Africa the US has deferred influence
to the French, while quietly working to establish closer
relations with a number of African nations.
In light of the southern Africa focus of current US
African policy what are the American national interests in
Guinea and Somalia?
F. DEFINING THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN GUINEA
American relations with Guinea, which got off to a slow
start in 1958 when the US joined France in ignoring Guinea,
have improved over the past two decades. This has been due
in part to the fact that the US has found Sekou Toure, despite
his radical rhetoric, to be a pragmatic leader, willing to
compromise to acquire what is needed for his country.
Although Guinea was long considered to be a Soviet client,
Toure' s refusal to allow Soviet aircraft landing rights en-
route to Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, and his subsequent
termination of landing rights in response to Soviet pressure
to permit them to build a naval base on Guinean sovereign
territory, has moderated the US view significantly.
An additional method by which Toure has garnered Western
support and favor is his continued encouragement of foreign
80private investment in Guinea, with only reasonable restrictions.
In light of the fact that Guinea has done a creditable
job of maintaining her nonaligned status, what, if any,
American national interest is there in Guinea in 1980?
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AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN GUINEA MATRIX
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The matrix above is a presentation of the American
national interest in Guinea presented in Neuchterlein'
s
framework.
1 . Defense Interest
Since neither Guinea nor any country that is or has
been permitted to use Guinean facilities has posed any seri-
ous threat to the American homeland, it is apparent that
American "defense interest" in Guinea is no more than periph-
eral. At the present time there are several American companies
operating in Guinea, and a number of personnel working in
the nation. As is the case with all US citizens living
abroad, the US government is concerned about ensuring their
safety and human rights to the greatest degree possible. It
is unlikely that the lives of American citizens or the con-
tinued operation of American enterprises will be jeopardized
in Guinea at anytime in the near future. Even in the unlikely
event that US personnel are taken hostage, or US enterprises
are nationalized, American reaction to such moves would involve
diplomatic attempts to free the hostages and settle the claims





The US has no significant economic interest in
Guinea. In 1976, out of a total of $US 271 million in eco-
nomic assistance provided to Africa, Guinea received only
81$US 9 million in economic grants and credits. Preliminary
figures for 1978, using a projected $US 450 million in aid
to Africa, reveal that Guinea received only $US 10 million
82in grants and credits.
Trade figures show a similar trend. Although in
1977 Guinea exported $US 55.55 million worth of goods to
the US, Guinea only imported $US 17.05 million worth of goods
8 3from the US. In addition, the US is not dependent on
Guinea for any single mineral.
Therefore in the unlikely event that Guinea and the
US severed economic relations, the impact on the US economy
would be minimal.
3. World-Order Interest
The American quest to limit outside intervention in
Africa, makes the world-order interest a major US national
interest. Stated US foreign policy seeks to let the Africans
solve their own problems and encourages African nationalism.
From the American perspective, any significant non-Western
involvement in Guinea is potentially threatening to the
entire West Africa region.
To date the socialist states in West Africa have been
more rhetorically radical, than politically radical. As a
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result they have not actively exported revolution to the
degree that a "true Soviet satellite" might. The American
national interest is therefore better served if Guinea re-
mains nonaligned. Such a position will provide a more secure
and peaceful environment within which to conduct not only
bilateral relations, but multilateral relations as well.
The US also has an interest in the economic development of
Guinea, because a more economically stable Guinea will also
be a more politically stable Guinea, less liable to fall prey
to political attack.
4. Ideological Interest
In dealings with the West and East during the past
two decades, Sekou Toure has been led by his own brand of
nonaligned, socialist, pragmatism. As has been stated pre-
viously, the US is coming to the realization that it can deal
with radical nationalists as long as their radicalism does
not threaten the international political system.
As a result of this, Sekou Toure' s "ideology" poses
no threat to the US, nor is there any impelling reason for
the US to attempt to impose its ideology on Guinea. We can
have cordial relations and economic ties despite our ideolog-
ical differences.
G. DEFINING THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN SOMALIA
Somalia, unlike Guinea, received US recognition upon
independence. This support was, however, somewhat restrained
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because of Somalia's irredentist claims against the territory
of two of her neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, both of whom
had good relations with the US. The fact that Somalia had
a "working" pluralistic form of government also impressed
the US, especially when many of the independent regimes were
being overthrown in the mid-1960s.
Although the Soviet Union became Somalia's main supplier
of military equipment, she received economic aid from the
US and other European countries (Italy, Great Britain, and
West Germany)
.
When Great Britain terminated aid in 1963, West Germany
and the Peoples Republic of China filled the gap providing
equivalent aid for at least two years. In the early 1970s,
following the revolution which replaced the pluralistic sys-
tem with a centralized government, the US and West Germany
also terminated economic aid to Somalia. The West Germans
acted because Somalia granted diplomatic recognition to East
Germany and the US because Somalia refused to de-register
Somali ships trading with North Vietnam.
In 1977 relations between the Soviets and the Somalis
cooled and relations with the US improved. Today the US and
Somalia enjoy what can be described as cordial relations.
In view of these improving relations, what are the American
national interests in Somalia in 1980?
233

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN SOMALIA MATRIX
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1. Defense Interest
At the present time neither Somalia nor any foreign
power operating from facilities in Somalia, is a threat to
the US. The US does, however, have more than a peripheral
interest in Somalia because of the potential possibility that
a nation opposed to the US could gain military facilities in
Somalia from which to threaten US and European oil sea lanes
of communication.
The US interest is not necessarily one of ensuring
that the US or a "friendly" nation has access to Somali facili
ties. It would also serve US interests to deny their use to
the Soviets. Therefore, to the degree that the economic well-
being of the US and her allies could be threatened militarily
from Somali bases, the US has a major defense interest in the
nation.
2. Economic Interest
The US has even less economic interest in Somalia
than it has in Guinea. The US extended only $US 3 million in
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economic grants and credits to Somalia in 1976, and even though
the figure rose to $US 14 million in 1978, much of this in-
crease is attributable to an increase in aid for refugee
relief. 84
In the area of trade, US involvement has been incon-
sequential. In 1977 Somalia exported $US 1.36 million worth
85
of goods to the US in return for $US 5.06 million in US goods.
The US has no significant private investment interests
in Somalia at the present time, and it is not likely that any
private investment will be forthcoming.
3. World-Order Interest
Unlike Guinea, Somalia has been the stage for an
East-West confrontation. Although the confrontation did not
involve the commitment of US armed forces, the fact that the
Soviet Union was again intervening in the internal affairs of
Africa with the assistance of Cuban troops, set another dan-
gerous precedent of the Soviets intervening "on request .
"
Since the confrontation in 1977, the Somali government
has been wooing the West to replace the Soviets and Cubans
expelled in November 1977. In order to prevent the Somalis
from requesting the reentry of the Soviet Union into a "friend-
ship and cooperation" relationship with them, the US must act
to fill the economic and technical void left by the Soviet
departure. The US does not need to force Somalia into becoming
a client state, but should cultivate a positive relationship
based on mutual trust and understanding.
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Again as with the defense interest, the US interest
is not so much one of becoming actively involved in Somali
affairs- -in fact the US should not become so involved- -as in
preventing the Soviet Union from regaining influence in Somalia
and attempting to form an Ethiopian-Somali-South Yemen alliance.
The primary desire of the US toward Somalia is that
Somalia remain nonaligned and at peace so she can concentrate
on the economic development she so badly needs.
4 . Ideological Interest
In Somalia, as in Guinea, the US has no desire or
justification to attempt to project capitalist ideology on
Somalia, nor is there any danger that Somalia will attempt to
convert the US to "scientific socialism." As long as Siad
Barre maintains a non-hostile position toward the US on the
international scene, there is no ideological reason why the
US cannot continue to provide economic aid to Somalia.
H. CONCLUSION
What policy option has the US chosen to use in 1980? It
would appear that the US had chosen the pursuit of "Tempered
Idealism" in Africa.
By use of this option, the US has attempted (unsuccessfully
until now) to work with the Soviets in an attempt to substan-
tially reduce the flow of arms from all sources into Africa,




The US continues to strive to keep both black and white
Africans talking in Southern Africa in hopes of resolving the
confrontation peacefully, and remains firm in its commitment
to the central role of the UN in guiding Namibia to independence
The US further continues to emphasize the important role
that key African leaders within the OAU and in ad hoc groups
can play in the resolution of internal African disputes.
Finally, in the economic sphere, the US is encouraging
private investment in Africa, and is continually emphasizing
to African leaders that increased economic cooperation with
the US is in their country's best interest.
Since the mid-1970s US policy-makers have come to accept
the fact that in a continent as diverse as Africa, a single
policy is not sufficient. The US needs multiple policies
focused on individual nations and regions. We must not focus
our attention so fully on southern Africa, where the potential
for explosive unrest is perhaps the greatest, that we lose
sight of the drought-caused human suffering in the Sahel and
the refugee problem in areas such as Somalia, the Sudan, and
West Africa.
Although the specific American national interests in Guinea
and Somalia were few and low in intensity, the US does have
more intense interests in other parts of Africa; these should
be recognized and policies developed to insure that the best
interest of the US is served.
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In formulating this policy, however, US policy-makers
must ensure that they remain sensitive to the national inter-
ests of the African nations. This sensitivity will assist
the African nations in maintaining their identity. We must
continue to strive to find African solutions to African
problems
.
As has been seen in the previous chapters, the Soviet
appeal in Africa is not always as significant as it sometimes
appears. The Soviets have proved they can react quickly to
requests for military assistance, but both Guinea and Somalia
have learned that Soviet aid is costly, so costly in fact that
economic development can suffer. It has further been seen
that the Soviets are now reluctant to provide any substantial
amount of economic and technical aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.
This is evident to the pragmatic African leaders, and Soviet
credibility will suffer in the long run.
The idea that the US, along with its industrial allies
and the newly rich oil-producing nations, can hope to solve
or even basically alleviate the economic problems in the poor
Sub-Saharan Africa nations with massive relief aid, is no longer
tenable. What is most needed is a program of assistance de-
signed to solve the fundamental problem of the developing
nations, the attainment of self-sustaining economic growth.
The agricultural area is one area where this type of program
could be introduced. Both Guinea and Somalia have vast untapped
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agricultural resources which, if developed fully, could relieve
their country's balance of payments problems, by alleviating
the necessity for the two countries to import such large
amounts of food.
Additionally, if private investors were provided reason-
able assurances of the safety of their investments by African
nations, they could do much to foster this desired economic
development.
Of utmost importance to American credibility in Africa
is US policy toward the resolution of the impasses in Namibia
and South Africa. Black Africa is looking to the US for con-
sistency in enforcing the human rights portion of our foreign
policy. To fail to enforce the policy across-the-board makes
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